-
25Clarifying the Relation Between Mechanistic Explanations and ReductionismFrontiers in Psychology 14 984949. 2023.The topic of mechanistic explanation in neuroscience has been a subject of recent discussion. There is a lot of interest in understanding what these explanations involve. Furthermore, there is disagreement about whether neurological mechanisms themselves should be viewed as reductionist in nature. In this paper I will explain how these two issues are related. I will, first, describe how mechanisms support a form of antireductionism. This is because the mechanisms that exist should be seen as inv…Read more
-
106Functional properties and convergence in biologyPhilosophy of Science 72 (5): 1041-1051. 2005.Evolutionary convergence is often appealed to in support of claims about multiple realization. The idea is that convergence shows that the same function can be realized by different kinds of structures. I argue here that the nature of convergence is more complicated than it might appear at first look. Broad claims about convergence are made by biologists during general discussions of the mechanisms of evolution. In their specialized work, though, biologists are often more limited in the claims t…Read more
-
71Some concerns with Polger and Shapiro’s viewPhilosophical Psychology 31 (3): 419-430. 2018.This paper provides some responses to Tom Polger and Larry Shapiro’s The Multiple Realization Book (2016). I first provide a description of the authors’ framework for thinking about multiple realization and the conditions they claim this involves. I explain what I think they get right and what they get wrong with this framework. After this, I then consider a few examples of multiple realization they discuss and the interpretations they offer. While I am sympathetic to several things they say abo…Read more
-
985Mechanisms and Constitutive RelevanceSynthese 183 (3): 375-388. 2011.This paper will examine the nature of mechanisms and the distinction between the relevant and irrelevant parts involved in a mechanism’s operation. I first consider Craver’s account of this distinction in his book on the nature of mechanisms, and explain some problems. I then offer a novel account of the distinction that appeals to some resources from Mackie’s theory of causation. I end by explaining how this account enables us to better understand what mechanisms are and their various features.
-
36The Philosophy of Philip Kitcher (edited book)Oxford University Press USA. 2016.The Philosophy of Philip Kitcher contains eleven chapters on the work of noted philosopher Philip Kitcher, whose work is known for its broad range and insightfulness. Topics covered include philosophy of science, philosophy of biology, philosophy of mathematics, ethics, epistemology, and philosophy of religion. Each of the chapters is followed by a reply from Kitcher himself. This first significant edited volume devoted to examining Kitcher's work is an essential reference for anyone interested …Read more
-
24Causal Role Theories of Functional ExplanationIn James Fieser & Bradley Dowden (eds.), Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, . 2011.
-
115Functional explanation in contextPhilosophy of Science 76 (2): 253-269. 2009.The claim that a functional kind is multiply realized is typically motivated by appeal to intuitive examples. We are seldom told explicitly what the relevant structures are, and people have often preferred to rely on general intuitions in these cases. This article deals with the problem by explaining how to understand the proper relation between structural kinds and the functions they realize. I will suggest that the structural kinds that realize a function can be properly identified by attendin…Read more
-
Natural KindIn Robert L. Fastiggi (ed.), New Catholic Encyclopedia Supplement 2012-13: Ethics and Philosophy, Gale. 2012.
-
140Multiple realization in comparative perspectiveBiology and Philosophy 24 (4): 505-519. 2009.Arguments for multiple realization depend on the idea that the same kind of function is realized by different kinds of structures. It is important to such arguments that we know the kinds used in the arguments have been individuated properly. In the philosophical literature, though, claims about how to individuate kinds are frequently decided on intuitive grounds. This paper criticizes this way of approaching kinds by considering how practicing researchers think about the matter. I will consider…Read more
South Orange, New Jersey, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
General Philosophy of Science |