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14The First Person Perspective and Other EssaysSydney Shoemaker New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996, xiii + 278 pp., $59.95, $18.95 paper (review)Dialogue 38 (2): 453-455. 1999.
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754Quasi-Singular Propositions: The Semantics of Belief ReportsAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 69 (1). 1995.
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60Notional SpecificityMind and Language 10 (4): 464-477. 1995.I hold that a belief report characterizes the subject's belief not only by its truth conditions, but also by the token mental representations involved in it (based on conversational hints). To what extent does a belief report specify the mental representations required to make it true? I advance two surprising theses: (i) many reports specify representations by actually referring to them, and (ii) it is not clear that any ordinary reports simply leave open what sorts of representations are requi…Read more
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871The Prince and the Phone Booth: Reporting Puzzling BeliefsJournal of Philosophy 86 (12): 685. 1989.Beliefs are concrete particulars containing ideas of properties and notions of things, which also are concrete. The claim made in a belief report is that the agent has a belief (i) whose content is a specific singular proposition, and (ii) which involves certain of the agent's notions and ideas in a certain way. No words in the report stand for the notions and ideas, so they are unarticulated constituents of the report's content (like the relevant place in "it's raining"). The belief puzzles (He…Read more
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102Thing talk moonlightingPhilosophical Studies 108 (1-2). 2002.It is controversial whether the truth conditions of attitude sentences are opaque. It is not, or shouldn't be controversial, however, that conditions of apt or unexceptionable usage are opaque. A framework for expressing such uncontroversial claims of opacity is developed, and within this framework it is argued that opacity resides at a locutionary level — that it is a matter of expressed content (which might not be truth-conditional). The same claim is made for a related pattern in attitude tal…Read more
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18The First Person Perspective and Other Essays (review)Dialogue 38 (2): 453-455. 1999.In the twelve recent essays collected here, Shoemaker unfolds a comprehensive account of first-personal access to mental phenomena.
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540So-labeled neo-fregeanismPhilosophical Studies 69 (2-3). 1993.I explain and criticize a theory of beliefs and of belief sentences offered by Graeme Forbes. My main criticism will be directed at Forbes' idea that, as a matter of the semantic rules of belief reporting -- as a matter of the meaning of belief ascriptions -- to get at the subject's way of thinking in an attitude ascription, we must use expressions that are "linguistic counterparts" of the subject's expressions. I think we often do something like that, but that we have other, equally good method…Read more
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232Talk About BeliefsMIT Press. 1992.Talk about Beliefs presents a new account of beliefs and of practices of reporting them that yields solutions to foundational problems in the philosophies of...
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6993Philosophy of LanguageIn Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Genealogy to Iqbal, Routledge. pp. 408-11. 1996.
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Quasi-Singular Propositions: The Semantics of Belief ReportsAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 69 175-209. 1995.
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RepresentationIn Hans Burkhardt & Barry Smith (eds.), Handbook of metaphysics and ontology, Philosophia Verlag. pp. 2--791. 1991.
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62Propositional Attitudes: An Essay on Thoughts and How We Ascribe Them (review)Philosophical Review 101 (4): 895. 1992.
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565I Falsely Believe That PAnalysis 52 (3): 191. 1992.I present a counterexample to the claim that it is never true to say "I falsely believe that so-and-so." .
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2343Hesperus and PhosphorusPhilosophical Review 107 (1): 1-47. 1998.In “On Sense and Reference,” surrounding his discussion of how we describe what people say and think, identity is Frege’s first stop and his last. We will follow Frege’s plan here, but we will stop also in the land of make-believe.
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751Context in the attitudesLinguistics and Philosophy 15 (2). 1992.I wish first to motivate very briefly two points about the kind of context sensitive semantics needed for attitude reports, namely that reports are about referents and about mental representations; then I will compare two proposals for treating the attitudes, both of which capture the two points in question.
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