•  342
    Contextualism and relativism
    Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2): 215-242. 2004.
  •  174
    This book makes a stimulating contribution to the philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. It begins with a spirited defence of the view that propositions are structured and that propositional structure is 'psychologically real'. The author then develops a subtle view of propositions and attitude ascription. The view is worked out in detail with attention to such topics as the semantics of conversations, iterated attitude ascriptions, and the role of propositions as bearers of truth. Along…Read more
  •  173
    Relativistic content and disagreement (review)
    Philosophical Studies 156 (3): 421-431. 2011.
    Herman Cappelen and John Hawthorne’s Relativism and Monadic Truth presses a number of worries about relativistic content. It forces one to think carefully about what a relativist should mean by saying that speakers disagree or contradict one another in asserting such content. My focus is on this question, though at points (in particular in Sect. 4) I touch on other issues Cappelen and Hawthorne (CH) raise.
  •  136
    What are Propositions?
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (5): 702-719. 2013.
    (2013). What are Propositions? Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 43, Essays on the Nature of Propositions, pp. 702-719.
  •  131
    When Truth Gives Out
    Oxford University Press. 2008.
    Is the point of belief and assertion invariably to think or say something true? Is the truth of a belief or assertion absolute, or is it only relative to human interests? Most philosophers think it incoherent to profess to believe something but not think it true, or to say that some of the things we believe are only relatively true. Common sense disagrees. It sees many opinions, such as those about matters of taste, as neither true nor false; it takes it as obvious that some of the truth is rela…Read more
  •  116
    Precis of When Truth Gives Out (review)
    Philosophical Studies 160 (3): 441-444. 2012.
    Precis of When Truth Gives Out Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-4 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9792-4 Authors Mark Richard, Philosophy Department, Harvard University, Emerson Hall, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
  •  110
  •  100
    Attitudes in context
    Linguistics and Philosophy 16 (2). 1993.
  •  92
    Marcus on Belief and Belief in the Impossible
    Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 28 (3): 407-420. 2013.
    I review but don’t endorse Marcus’ arguments that impossible beliefs are impossible. I defend her claim that belief’s objects are, in some important sense, not the bearers of truth and falsity, discuss her disposition- alism about belief, and argue it’s a good fit with the idea that belief’s objects are Russellian states of affairs.
  •  91
    Meaning (edited book)
    Wiley-Blackwell. 2003.
    _ Meaning_ brings together some of the most significant philosophical work on linguistic representation and understanding, presenting canonical essays on core questions in the philosophy of language. Brings together essential readings which define and advance the literature on linguistic representation and understanding. Examines key topics in philosophy of language, including analyticity; translational indeterminacy; theories of reference; meaning as use; the nature of linguistic competence; tr…Read more
  •  84
    Quotation, grammar, and opacity
    Linguistics and Philosophy 9 (3). 1986.
  •  77
    Meaning and Attitude Ascriptions
    Philosophical Studies 128 (3): 683-709. 2006.
  •  75
    Commitment
    Philosophical Perspectives 12 255-281. 1998.
  •  59
    Articulated terms
    Philosophical Perspectives 7 207-230. 1993.
  •  55
    Semantic theory and indirect speech
    Mind and Language 13 (4). 1998.
  •  54
    Quantification and Leibniz's law
    Philosophical Review 96 (4): 555-578. 1987.
    The Philosophical Review, Vol. XCVI, No. 4 (October 1987) Mark I. Fix a language; Leibniz's Law for that language is the principle (L) Any universal closure of a sentence of the form of if x is identical with y, then, if S, then S'
  •  51
    Content Inside Out
    Analytic Philosophy 54 (2): 258-267. 2013.
  •  51
    Deflating truth
    Philosophical Issues 8 57-78. 1997.
  •  45
    Sense, necessity and belief
    Philosophical Studies 69 (2-3). 1993.
  •  44
    Defective Contexts, Accommodation, and Normalization
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (4). 1995.
    Propositional Attitudes defends an account of ‘believes’ on which the verb is contextually sensitive. x believes that S says that x has a belief which is ‘well rendered’ or acceptably translated by S; since contextually variable information about what makes for a good translation helps determine the extension of ‘believes,’ the verb is contextually sensitive. Sider and Soames criticize this account. They say it has unacceptable consequences in cases in which we make multiple ascriptions of belie…Read more
  •  42
    How I Say What You Think
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 14 (1): 317-337. 1989.
  •  39
    XIV—Attitude Ascriptions, Semantic Theory, and Pragmatic Evidence
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 87 (1): 243-262. 1987.
  •  37
    Reply to Lynch, Miščević, and Stojanović
    Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (2): 197-208. 2011.
    This paper responds to discussions of my book When Truth Gives Out by Michael Lynch, Nenad Miščević, and Isidora Stojanović. Among the topics discussed are: whether relativism is incoherent (because it requires one to think that certain of one’s views are and are not epistemically superior to views one denies); whether and when sentences in which one slurs an individual or group are truth valued; whether relativism about matters of taste gives an account of “faultless disagreement” superior to c…Read more