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309Buddhism and techno-physicalism: Is the eightfold path a program?Philosophy East and West 51 (3): 307-314. 2001.Recent developments in technology and material culture suggest that physicalism may come to be accepted as the commonsense view of the constitution of persons. Like many other spiritual practices, Buddhism has traditionally relied on a dualist understanding of human nature, according to which persons are made up of both physical and nonphysical entities and events. Would anything central to the Buddhist project be lost if that were replaced by physicalism? Clearly the Yogācāra doctrine of consci…Read more
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286An introduction to buddhist ethics: Foundations, values and issuesJournal of Chinese Philosophy 31 (3). 2004.This systematic introduction to Buddhist ethics is aimed at anyone interested in Buddhism, including students, scholars and general readers. Peter Harvey is the author of the acclaimed Introduction to Buddhism, and his new book is written in a clear style, assuming no prior knowledge. At the same time it develops a careful, probing analysis of the nature and practical dynamics of Buddhist ethics in both its unifying themes and in the particularities of different Buddhist traditions. The book app…Read more
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243Some Sceptical Doubts about “Buddhist Scepticism”In Oren Hanner (ed.), Buddhism and Scepticism: Historical, Philosophical, and Comparative Perspectives, Projektverlag. pp. 21-35. 2020.
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194Self, no self?: perspectives from analytical, phenomenological, and Indian traditions (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2011.It is time to bring the rich resources of these traditions into the contemporary debate about the nature of self. This volume is the first of its kind.
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177Beyond compatibilism: A buddhist approach to freedom and determinismAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 24 (2): 149-59. 1987.
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162Paleo-compatibilism and buddhist reductionismSophia 47 (1): 29-42. 2008.Paleo-compatibilism is the view that the freedom required for moral responsibility is not incompatible with determinism about the factors relevant to moral assessment, since the claim that we are free and the claim that the psychophysical elements are causally determined are true in distinct and incommensurable ways. This is to be accounted for by appealing to the distinction between conventional truth and ultimate truth developed by Buddhist Reductionists. Paleo-compatibilists hold that the ill…Read more
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156Buddhist reductionismPhilosophy East and West 47 (4): 455-478. 1997.While Derek Parfit is aware that his reductionism about persons is anticipated in early Buddhism and Abhidharma, he has not explored that tradition for any clues it might yield concerning the consequences of adopting the position. In this essay, the tradition is used to construct a taxonomy of possible views about persons, and then examine the meta-physical commitments that Buddhist reductionists claim are entailed by their view. While these turn out to be significant, it is argued here that thi…Read more
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120Moonshadows. Conventional Truth in Buddhist PhilosophyOxford University Press. 2011.The doctrine of the two truths - a conventional truth and an ultimate truth - is central to Buddhist metaphysics and epistemology. The two truths (or two realities), the distinction between them, and the relation between them is understood variously in different Buddhist schools; it is of special importance to the Madhyamaka school. One theory is articulated with particular force by Nagarjuna (2nd ct CE) who famously claims that the two truths are identical to one another and yet distinct. One o…Read more
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109Buddhism as Philosophy: An IntroductionHackett Pub. Co.. 2007.In this clear, concise account, Siderits makes the Buddhist tradition accessible to a Western audience, offering generous selections from the canonical Buddhist texts and providing an engaging, analytical introduction to the basic tenets of Buddhist thought.
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105Buddhism As PhilosophyHackett Publishing Company. 2021.In _Buddhism As Philosophy_, Mark Siderits makes the Buddhist philosophical tradition accessible to a Western audience. Offering generous selections from the canonical Buddhist texts and providing an engaging, analytical introduction to the fundamental tenets of Buddhist thought, this revised, expanded, and updated edition builds on the success of the first edition in clarifying the basic concepts and arguments of the Buddhist philosophers.
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97Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka: A Philosophical Introduction, by Jan Westerhoff.: Book Reviews (review)Mind 119 (475): 864-867. 2010.(No abstract is available for this citation)
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78Perceiving particulars: A buddhist defensePhilosophy East and West 54 (3): 367-382. 2004.In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Perceiving Particulars:A Buddhist DefenseMark SideritsIn a recent article in this journal, Monima Chadha claimed that the position of certain Buddhist philosophers concerning the perception of particulars is incoherent.1 Her defense of what she calls a "Nyāya-Kantian" position raises interesting questions concerning how we have knowledge of mind-independent reality. While the view that she subscribes to may well be right, I shall try…Read more
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70Defending the Semantic Interpretation: A Reply to FerraroJournal of Indian Philosophy 41 (6): 655-664. 2013.In a recent article in this journal, Giuseppe Ferraro mounted a sustained attack on the semantic interpretation of the Madhyamaka doctrine of emptiness, an interpretation that has been championed by the authors. The present paper is their reply to that attack
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65Causation, 'Humean' Causation and EmptinessJournal of Indian Philosophy 42 (4): 433-449. 2014.One strategy Mādhyamikas use to support their claim that nothing has intrinsic nature (svabhāva) is to argue that things with intrinsic nature could not enter into causal relations. But it is not clear that there is a good Madhyamaka argument against ultimate causation that understands causation in ‘Humean’ terms and understands dharmas as tropes. After exploring the rationale behind the intrinsic-nature criterion of dharma-hood, I survey the arguments Mādhyamikas actually give for their claim t…Read more
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62Buddhist Philosophy of Consciousness: Tradition and Dialogue (edited book)Brill | Rodopi. 2020._Buddhist Philosophy of Consciousness_ explores a variety of different approaches to the study of consciousness developed by Buddhist philosophers in classical India and China. It addresses questions that are still being investigated in cognitive science and philosophy of mind.
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54The Buddhist Unconscious: The Alaya-vijnana in the Context of Indian Buddhist Thought (review) (review)Philosophy East and West 55 (2): 358-363. 2005.In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Buddhist Unconscious: The Ālaya-vijñāna in the Context of Indian Buddhist ThoughtMark SideritsThe Buddhist Unconscious: The Ālaya-vijñāna in the Context of Indian Buddhist Thought. By William S. Waldron. New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003. Pp. xvi + 269. $90.00.The Buddhist Unconscious: The Ālaya-vijñāna in the Context of Indian Buddhist Thought by William S. Waldron is an examination of the origins of the Yogācāra conce…Read more
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53The sense-reference distinction in indian philosophy of languageJournal of Chinese Philosophy 14 (3): 331-355. 1987.
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51The Prapañca ParadoxJournal of Indian Philosophy 47 (4): 645-659. 2019.Madhyamaka claims that while everything is in fact empty, the use of concepts invariably leads to the error known as prapañca or hypostatisation, in the form of the supposition that there are things with intrinsic nature. This may be put as the claim that all conceptualisation falsifies. But this claim is paradoxical in that its truth would entail its falsity. While Mādhyamikas have not directly addressed this problem, a solution might be found utilizing the resources of contextualist semantics.…Read more
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49Apoha: Buddhist Nominalism and Human Cognition (edited book)Columbia University Press. 2011.When we understand that something is a pot, is it because of one property that all pots share? This seems unlikely, but without this common essence, it is difficult to see how we could teach someone to use the word "pot" or to see something as _a_ pot. The Buddhist apoha theory tries to resolve this dilemma, first, by rejecting properties such as "potness" and, then, by claiming that the element uniting all pots is their very difference from all non-pots. In other words, when we seek out a pot, …Read more
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49The Nyāya-sūtra: Selections with Early Commentaries trans. by Matthew Dasti and Stephen PhillipsPhilosophy East and West 68 (3): 1-3. 2018.This work is a translation of selected sutras of the Nyāya-sūtra, together with relevant extracts from three commentaries: Nyāya-sūtra-bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana; Nyāya-vārttika of Uddyotakara; and Nyāya-vārttika-tātparya-ṭīkā of Vācaspatimiśra. The translators' introduction gives a general overview of the Nyāya school, its overall aims, and its place within classical Indian philosophy. Each of the nine chapters covers a particular topic in the Nyāya scheme: knowledge sources, philosophical method, th…Read more
Seoul, Seoul-t'ukpyolsi, Korea (Republic of)
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Asian Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Asian Philosophy |