My philosophical views

Question Answer Comments
A priori knowledge: yes and no Accept: yes
Abstract objects: Platonism and nominalism Lean toward: Platonism
Aesthetic value: objective and subjective Accept both
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes and no Lean toward: no
Epistemic justification: internalism and externalism Accept: externalism
External world: idealism, skepticism or non-skeptical realism Lean toward: non-skeptical realism
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism or no free will Lean toward: compatibilism
God: theism and atheism Accept: atheism
Knowledge: empiricism and rationalism The question is too unclear to answer
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism or invariantism Reject one, undecided between others
Laws of nature: Humean and non-Humean Agnostic/undecided
Logic: classical and non-classical Agnostic/undecided
Mental content: internalism and externalism Accept: externalism
Meta-ethics: moral realism and moral anti-realism Lean toward: moral realism
Metaphilosophy: naturalism and non-naturalism The question is too unclear to answer
Mind: physicalism and non-physicalism The question is too unclear to answer
Moral judgment: cognitivism and non-cognitivism Accept: cognitivism
Moral motivation: internalism and externalism Accept: internalism This one should be sharpened to get a precise question, though on most sharpenings I count as an internalist.
Newcomb's problem: one box and two boxes Lean toward: one box
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism or virtue ethics Lean toward: deontology
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism or sense-datum theory Lean toward: representationalism
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view or further-fact view Reject one, undecided between others
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism or libertarianism Accept: egalitarianism
Proper names: Fregean and Millian Accept: Millian
Science: scientific realism and scientific anti-realism Lean toward: scientific realism
Teletransporter (new matter): survival and death Lean toward: death
Time: A-theory and B-theory Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch and don't switch The question is too unclear to answer It seems that it matters whether you are driving the trolley or a bystander -- at least if you think the relevant distinction is between killing or letting die. That's now Judy Thomson's view and I've myself found it at least plausible for about 20 years.
Truth: correspondence, deflationary or epistemic Lean toward: correspondence Without a precise view of how deflationary a view of truth needs to be to be deflationary it is hard to answer this well.
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible or metaphysically possible Agnostic/undecided