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6Mind in action: expanding the concept of affordancePhilosophical Psychology. forthcoming.Originally introduced by J. J. Gibson (1979) in the context of the development of an ecological approach to visual perception, the notion of affordance refers to the perception of opportunities for...
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7Intersectionality as emergencePhilosophical Studies 1-21. forthcoming.Intersectionality is the notion that concerns the complexity of the experiences of individuals in virtue of their belonging to multiple socially significant categories. One of its main insights is that the way society is structured around categories such as gender, race, sexuality, class, etc., produces distinctive and specific forms of discrimination and privilege for groups in the intersections. In this paper, we suggest conceiving intersectionality as a general metaphysical framework wherein …Read more
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27Perceptual Motivation for ActionReview of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (3): 939-958. 2022.In this paper we focus on a kind of perceptual states that we call perceptual motivations, that is, perceptual experiences that plausibly motivate us to act, such as itching, perceptual salience and pain. Itching seems to motivate you to scratch, perceiving a stimulus as salient seems to motivate you to attend to it and feeling a pain in your hand seems to motivate actions such as withdrawing from the painful stimulus. Five main accounts of perceptual motivation are available: Descriptive, Conat…Read more
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38José Ortega Y gasset, José gaos, Joaquín Xirau, L. eulogio palaciones, Agustín Serrano de haro. Cuerpo vivido. Madrid, encuentro, 2010, 168 pp (review)Investigaciones Fenomenológicas 8 217. 2011.
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35What does it take to be rigid? Reflections on the notion of rigidity in autismFrontiers in Psychiatry 14. 2023.Characterizations of autism include multiple references to rigid or inflexible features, but the notion of rigidity itself has received little systematic discussion. In this paper we shed some light on the notion of rigidity in autism by identifying different facets of this phenomenon as discussed in the literature, such as fixed interests, insistence on sameness, inflexible adherence to routines, black-and-white mentality, intolerance of uncertainty, ritualized patterns of verbal and non-verbal…Read more
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27Correction to: Perceptual Motivation for ActionReview of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (2): 527-527. 2022.
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54Metaphors of intersectionality: Reframing the debate with a new proposalEuropean Journal of Women's Studies 29 (1): 23-38. 2022.Whereas intersectionality presents a fruitful framework for theoretical and empirical research, some of its fundamental features present great confusion. The term ‘intersectionality’ and its metaphor of the crossroads seem to reproduce what it aims to avoid: conceiving categories as separate. Despite the attempts for developing new metaphors that illustrate the mutual constitution relation among categories, gender, race or class keep being imagined as discrete units that intersect, mix or combin…Read more
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57Perceptual Motivation for ActionReview of Philosophy and Psychology (3): 1-20. 2022.In this paper we focus on a kind of perceptual states that we call perceptual motivations, that is, perceptual experiences that plausibly motivate us to act, such as itching, perceptual salience and pain. Itching seems to motivate you to scratch, perceiving a stimulus as salient seems to motivate you to attend to it and feeling a pain in your hand seems to motivate actions such as withdrawing from the painful stimulus. Five main accounts of perceptual motivation are available: Descriptive, Conat…Read more
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79Is There a Specific Experience of Thinking?Theoria 25 (2): 187-196. 2010.In this paper I discuss whether there is a specific experience of thinking or not. I address this question by analysing if it is possible to reduce the phenomenal character of thinking to the phenomenal character of sensory experiences. My purpose is to defend that there is a specific phenomenality for at least somethinking mental states. I present Husserl's theory of intentionality in the Logical Investigations as a way to defend this claim and I consider its assumptions. Then I present the cas…Read more
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17Thinking and Phenomenal ConsciousnessBalkan Journal of Philosophy 3 (1): 101-110. 2011.The topic of this paper concerns the relation between thinking and phenomenality as it is discussed in the Philosophy of Mind. Thus, I am addressing the following questions: does the domain of phenomenal consciousness include thinking? And if so, is the phenomenality of thinking (PT) proprietary or not? I will firstly present the debate and the main notions involved in it, by contrasting a certain mainstream picture of the mind with the one offered by Phenomenology. Second, I will consider the p…Read more
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509Several theories propose that one of the core functions of inner speech (IS) is to support subjects in the completion of cognitively effortful tasks, especially those involving executive functions (EF). In this paper we focus on two populations who notoriously encounter difficulties in performing EF tasks, namely, people diagnosed with schizophrenia who experience auditory verbal hallucinations (Sz-AVH) and people within the Autism Spectrum Conditions (ASC). We focus on these two populations bec…Read more
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1858Metaphors of Intersectionality: Framing the Debate with a New ImageEuropean Journal of Women's Studies -. 2020.Whereas intersectionality presents a fruitful framework for theoretical and empirical research, some of its fundamental features present great confusion. The term ‘intersectionality’ and its metaphor of the crossroads seem to reproduce what it aims to avoid: conceiving categories as separate. Despite the attempts for developing new metaphors that illustrate the mutual constitution relation among categories, gender, race or class keep being imagined as discrete units that intersect, mix or c…Read more
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1187Phenomenal contrast arguments: What they achieveMind and Language 35 (3): 350-367. 2019.Phenomenal contrast arguments (PCAs) are normally employed as arguments showing that a certain mental feature contributes to (the phenomenal character of) experience, that certain contents are represented in experience and that kinds of sui generis phenomenologies such as cognitive phenomenology exist. In this paper we examine a neglected aspect of such arguments, i.e., the kind of mental episodes involved in them, and argue that this happens to be a crucial feature of the arguments. We use ling…Read more
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166Husserlian Horizons, Cognitive Affordances and Motivating Reasons for ActionPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (5): 1-22. 2020.According to Husserl’s phenomenology, the intentional horizon is a general structure of experience. However, its characterisation beyond perceptual experience has not been explored yet. This paper aims, first, to fill this gap by arguing that there is a viable notion of cognitive horizon that presents features that are analogous to features of the perceptual horizon. Secondly, it proposes to characterise a specific structure of the cognitive horizon—that which presents possibilities for action—a…Read more
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62Review of Inner Speech. New Voices (OUP), edited by Peter Langland-Hassan and Agustín Vicente. (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews --. 2019.
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99Beyond Mutual Constitution: The Properties Framework for Intersectionality StudiesSigns: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 45 (1): 175-200. 2019.Within feminist theory and a wide range of social sciences, intersectionality has emerged as a key analytic framework, challenging paradigms that consider gender, race, class, sexuality, and other categories as separate and instead conceptualizing them as interconnected. This has led most authors to assume mutual constitution as the pertinent model, often without much scrutiny. In this essay we critically review the main senses of mutual constitution in the literature and challenge what we take …Read more
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71Semantic Perception: How the Illusion of a Common Language Arises and Persists, by Jody Azzouni (review)Mind 125 (497): 290-297. 2016.
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1919Cognitive Phenomenology, Access to Contents, and Inner SpeechJournal of Consciousness Studies 21 (9-10): 74-99. 2014.In this paper we introduce two issues relevantly related to the cognitive phenomenology debate, which, to our minds, have not been yet properly addressed: the relation between access and phenomenal consciousness in cognition and the relation between conscious thought and inner speech. In the first case, we ask for an explanation of how we have access to thought contents, and in the second case, an explanation of why is inner speech so pervasive in our conscious thinking. We discuss the prospects…Read more
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7Book Review: Joan González Guardiola. Heidegger y los relojes (Heidegger and the Watches): Fenomenología genética de la medición del tiempo (Genetic phenomenology of time measurement). Madrid: Encuentro, 2008 (review)Continental Philosophy Review 45 (4): 597-602. 2012.
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28Book Review: Joan González Guardiola. Heidegger y los relojes (Heidegger and the Watches) (review)Continental Philosophy Review 45 (4): 597-602. 2012.
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1069The Linguistic Determination of Conscious Thought ContentsNoûs (3): 737-759. 2017.In this paper we address the question of what determines the content of our conscious episodes of thinking, considering recent claims that phenomenal character individuates thought contents. We present one prominent way for defenders of phenomenal intentionality to develop that view and then examine ‘sensory inner speech views’, which provide an alternative way of accounting for thought-content determinacy. We argue that such views fare well with inner speech thinking but have problems accountin…Read more
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33Editor’s IntroductionDisputatio 4 (30): 103-105. 2011.Introduction to the Special Issue resulting from the XII Taller d'Investigació en Filosofia (XII TIF).
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95Book review: Bayne, T. and Montague, M. (eds.) (2011). Cognitive phenomenology. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press (review)Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4): 883-890. 2013.
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109Thoughts, Processive Character and the Stream of ConsciousnessInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (5): 730-753. 2015.This paper explores the relation of thought and the stream of consciousness in the light of an ontological argument raised against cognitive phenomenology views. I argue that the ontological argument relies on a notion of ‘processive character’ that does not stand up to scrutiny and therefore it is insufficient for the argument to go through. I then analyse two more views on what ‘processive character’ means and argue that the process-part account best captures the intuition behind the argument.…Read more
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123Is There A Specific Experience of Thinking?Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 25 (2): 187-196. 2010.In this paper I discuss whether there is a specific experience of thinking or not. I address this question by analysing if it is possible to reduce the phenomenal character of thinking to the phenomenal character of sensory experiences. My purpose is to defend that there is a specific phenomenality for at least some thinking mental states. I present Husserl's theory of intentionality in the Logical Investigations as a way to defend this claim and I consider its assumptions. Then I present the ca…Read more
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614Conscious Thought and the Limits of RestrictivismCritica 47 (141): 3-32. 2015.How should we characterize the nature of conscious occurrent thought? In the last few years, a rather unexplored topic has appeared in philosophy of mind: cognitive phenomenology or the phenomenal character of cognitive mental episodes. In this paper I firstly present the motivation for cognitive phenomenology views through phenomenal contrast cases, taken as a challenge for their opponents. Secondly, I explore the stance against cognitive phenomenology views proposed by Restrictivism, classifyi…Read more
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30The Conscious and Phenomenal Character of Thought: Reflections on their Possible DissociationPhenomenology and Mind 10. 2016.In this paper I focus on what we can call “the obvious assumption” in the debate between defenders and deniers (of the reductionist sort) of cognitive phenomenology: conscious thought is phenomenal and phenomenal thought is conscious. This assumption can be refused if “conscious” and "phenomenal” are not co-extensive in the case of thought. I discuss some prominent ways to argue for their dissociation and I argue that we have reasons to resist such moves, and thus, that the “obvious assumption” …Read more
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Universitat Pompeu FabraRegular Faculty
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Psychology |
Feminist Philosophy |