Martin Ritter

Studie tematizuje dva fenomenologické přístupy k tělu a poukazuje na jejich slabiny. Větší pozornost je věnována Husserlově výkladu těla v Idejích II: zejména analýzou teorie „lokalizace“ se snažíme ukázat, že Husserl nedoceňuje význam extenzionality těla. Merleau-Pontyho koncepce z Fenomenologie vnímání je poté interpretována jako takový přístup k tělu, v němž je tělo redukováno na neosobní dovednost, resp. mohutnost jednání. Studie dospívá k závěru, že fenomenologie nemůže pojmout tělo jako princip zjevování, jehož konstitutivní působení by dokázala artikulovat analýzou prožívání, nýbrž spíše je musí respektovat jako „sféru“ nezjevnosti, která se v prožívání a zjevování projevuje autonomním způsobem.The study interprets two phenomenological approaches to the body and underlines their weak points. More attention is dedicated to Husserl’s explication of the body in Ideas II: particularly on the basis of his theory of “localization“ we try to show that Husserl underestimates the extensionality of the body. Merleau-Ponty’s concept in Phenomenology of Perception is then interpreted as such an approach to the body that reduces it to an impersonal skill of our (bodily) actions. Our conclusion is that phenomenology cannot conceive the body as a principle of appearing, the constitutive role of which it might articulate through an analysis of experience, but instead it should respect it as an “area“ of the un-apparent that manifests itself autonomously in experience.

Technologies are undeniably having a decisive, transformative impact on Earth, yet the currently prevailing empirically orientated approaches in the philosophy of technology seem unable to get to conceptual grips with this fact. Some thinkers have therefore been trying to develop alternative methods capable of clarifying it. This paper focuses on Vincent Blok’s call for rehabilitating an ontologically oriented approach. It reconstructs the rationale of his method as well as its key elements and structure. Elucidating Blok’s emphasis on the experience of climate change, the paper clarifies his call for a terrestrial turn in the philosophy of technology. This turn is indisputably needed, but Blok’s conceptualisation of Earth is problematic: Apart from its speculative nature, it underestimates the impact of humans on Earth. Blok seeks to clarify how ontic phenomena, especially particular technologies, can have an ontological impact, but there is a friction between his Heideggerian concept of the world as grounding inner-worldly beings and the idea of technologies as founding a new world. Identifying the elements where the undoubtedly required ontological approach needs to be rethought, the paper suggests that we need more mundane conceptualisations of both Earth and the world, accompanied by more attention to ontic processes.

While up to the 19th century there were philosophers within Judaism, these sages neither perceived themselves as Jewish philosophers nor did the Jewish community categorized them under this term. This situation changed with the rise of historicism. The first academically trained scholars in Judaism faced a new challenge: almost all leading contemporay German philosophers operated with a concept of a Christian philosophy which left no room for an acknowledgement of Jewish contributions to the history of philosophy. Zunz was the first Jewish scholar who took issue with this Christian challenge when he coined the term Jewish philosophy. Zunz followed Boeckh when he drew a distinction between Philosophy within Judaism and Jewish philosophy. Zunz used the first term for the historical contributions of Jews in the history of philosophy. If the modern scholar does examine the Jewish sources properly with the historical-critical method, the conclusions will lead him to a Jewish philosophy. Since Jewish philosophy for Zunz did not represent the Jewish Volksgeist, he did not elaborate further upon it. After Zunz, Geiger preferred a different approach. Since Geiger understood himself as a theologian who was closer to Schleiermacher, he described an alternative dialectical relationship by confronting the histoical-critical examination of Jewish philosophical sources now with Jewish theology. Munk's Esquisse set the standard for all subsequent histories of Jewish philosophy. He was not interested in a contemporary Jewish philosophy but focussed exclusively on what Zunz had rendered philosophy within Judaism. His aim was to give back Jewish philosophy its rightful place as an integral part of the history of Western philosophy. Munk's groundbreaking studies were triggered by Ritter. Even though Munk's conception still has a certain heuristic value, the deficiency of this approach is obvious as well.

As a distinctive voice in the current philosophy of technology, postphenomenology elucidates various ways of how technologies “shape” both the world and humans in it. Distancing itself from more speculative approaches, postphenomenology advocates the so-called empirical turn in philosophy of technology: It focuses on diverse effects of particular technologies instead of speculating on the essence of technology and its general impact. Critics of postphenomenology argue that by turning to particularities and emphasizing that technologies are always open to different uses and interpretations, postphenomenology becomes unable to realize how profoundly technology determines our being in the world. Seeking to evaluate the postphenomenological ability to radically reflect on the human being conditioned by technology, I discuss the two most pertinent criticisms of postphenomenology: an “existential” one by Robert C. Scharff and an “ontological” one by Jochem Zwier, Vincent Blok, and Pieter Lemmens. Assessing the ontological alternative, I point to incapacity of Heidegger’s concept of Enframing to do justice to material technologies. Simultaneously, I acknowledge the necessity of speculating on technology as transcending concrete technologies. Such speculating would be instrumental in reviving Ihde’s idea of non-neutrality of technology in its full philosophical potency.

We live in a world where it is impossible to exist without, and beyond, technologies. Despite this omnipresence, we tend to overlook their influence on us. The vigorously developing approach of postphenomenology, combining insights from phenomenology and pragmatism, focuses on the so-called technological mediation, i.e., on how technologies as mediators of human-world relations influence the appearing of both the world and the human beings in it. My analysis aims at demonstrating both the methodological weaknesses and open possibilities of postphenomenology. After summarizing its essentials, I will scrutinize, first, its ability to turn to the technological things themselves and, second, the so-called empirical turn as realized by postphenomenology. By assessing its conceptual framework from the phenomenological perspective, I hope to demonstrate that postphenomenology needs philosophical clarification and strengthening. In short, it needs a more phenomenological, and less pragmatic, approach to technology in its influence on human experience.

Critically evaluating and synthesizing all the previous research on the phenomenology of Czech philosopher Jan Patočka, the book brings a new voice into contemporary philosophical discussions. It elucidates the development of Patočka’s phenomenology and offers a critical appropriation of his work by connecting it with non-phenomenological approaches. The first half of the book offers a succinct, and systematizing, overview of Patočka’s phenomenology throughout its development to help readers appreciate the motives behind and grounds for its transformations. The second half systematically explicates, critically examines and creatively develops Patočka’s concept of the movement of existence as the most promising part of his asubjective phenomenology. The book appeals to new readers of Patočka as well as his scholars, and to students and researchers of contemporary philosophy concerned with topics such as embodiment, personal identity, intersubjectivity, sociality, or historicity. By re-assessing Patočka’s philosophy of history and his civilizational analysis, it also helps to better articulate the question of the place of Europe in the post-European world.

Jan Patočka’s early phenomenology, as presented in The Natural World as a Philosophical Problem, does not merely adopt Husserl’s concept of the lifeworld. The paper demonstrates the originality of Patočka’s appropriation of this concept, but also its internal tensions and difficulties. Seeking to elaborate a concept of a phenomenology allowing for a theory of the lifeworld stricto sensu, i.e. of the life of the world, Patočka’s book effectively shows that there is no ahistorical, absolute or “natural” starting point for phenomenology. Truth, as approachable through phenomenology, is not given, but must rather be developed. Elaborating on the concept of transcendental idealism, Patočka’s early phenomenology thus suggests a vivid idea of “intermeshing” monads ontologically grounding the world.

_ Source: _Volume 47, Issue 3, pp 388 - 405 The paper tackles Patočka’s ideas on the world crisis and on the possibility that it may be overcome. The key flaw in Patočka’s approach, one which also underpins his Eurocentrism, is identified as his drawing a firm line between a free, truly historical way of life, and unfree, earthbound living. In order to sketch a usable conception, the paper reinterprets Patočka’s notion of the three movements of existence, thereby connecting his historical and political reflections with his ontological thought and also with Arendt’s concept of action. The dichotomy between earthiness and freedom, corresponding to the contrast between the first two movements and the third, is refuted by emphasizing not only the inseparability of all the movements of existence but also the historicity of each of them. On the basis of such a reinterpretation, Patočka’s concept can provide a phenomenological framework not only for a non-Eurocentric analysis of human being in the world but also of the world crisis.

Studie je interpretací Patočkova pozdního myšlení a snaží se osvětlit určité netriviální souvislosti, zejména úzký vztah mezi Patočkovou filosofií dějin a fenomenologií. Patočkův pokus využít pro interpretaci současné situace Evropy platónský pojem psyché je zasazen do dějinně-filosofického kontextu, ale zejména je situován do kontextu Patočkových husserlovských a heideggerovských filosofických východisek. Jako desideratum Patočkova myšlení se ukazuje koncepce pravdy, jež by brala v potaz problematiku lidské zodpovědnosti

Care of the soul is arguably the core concept in Patočka’s phenomenology. However, what is the soul? In this paper I seek to determine its ontological meaning, connecting the concept of caring for the soul with that of the movement of existence. Starting from Patočka’s affirmative presentation of Aristotle’s criticism of Plato, I interrogate the “orthodox” Platonic concept of caring for the soul and develop an alternative notion, putting emphasis on action in the world. I demonstrate the impossibility of identifying the third movement with true existence, or with the care for the soul, whether conceived as the performance of philosophy or as political action. Finally, I outline a reinterpreted concept of care for the soul in which the self-moving of the soul is not ontologically prior to responding. The soul is inherent in action; and it is free only as responding to the world and responsible only in being free.

Studie se snaží určit, co přesně v Platónově Timaiovi znamená ”vznik z nutnosti”, z jakého důvodu je k popisu nutnosti nezbytné postulovat existenci chóry, jak máme tuto entitu chápat, a konečně v jakém smyslu je matematická konstituce stoicheiai živlů dílem nutnosti, resp. rozumu. Výklad bere v potaz některé textové nesrovnalosti a nejprve ukazuje, že z nutnosti vznikají parciální tělesa, tento materiál vjemového světa, a zákonitosti jejich střetů, které jsou alogon. Tyto fenomény jsou sice jistým, jim přiměřeným způsobem logizovány, a to čísly a tvary, jimiž demiurg uspořádává, tj. přemlouvá matérii, touto ”logizací” však není zrušen jejich charakter nutnosti, protože není překonána prostorovost, dimenzionalita těchto jevů, která s sebou nese jisté nutné charakteristiky a vztahy. Důvodem těchto charakteristik je způsob bytí chóry, kterou lze po Timaiově podrobném výkladu ztotožnit se zcela neurčitým prostorem, analogickým Kantovu čistému názoru prostoru, přesněji řečeno s principem prostoru. Studie dokládá, že chóra není látka ani příčina pohybu, a osvětluje, že i v rámci výkladu vzniku z nutnosti musí být při díle demiurg, poněvadž ryzí princip nutnosti, jenž je implikován v bytostných rysech neurčitého prostoru, nelze sám o sobě vůbec uchopit