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1Freedom of ChoiceIn Paul Anand, Prasanta Pattanaik & Clemens Puppe (eds.), Handbook of Rational and Social Choice, Oxford University Press. 2009.
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48Responsibility voidsPhilosophical Quarterly 61 (242). 2011.We present evidence for the existence of `responsibility voids' in committee decision-making, that is, the existence of situations where no member of a committee can individually be held morally responsible for the outcome. We analyse three types of reasons (causal, normative and epistemic) for the emergence of responsibility voids, and show that each of them can occur in committees. But the conditions for these voids are so restrictive as to reduce the philosophical or institutional significanc…Read more
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123An Anatomy of Moral ResponsibilityMind 121 (483). 2012.This paper examines the structure of moral responsibility for outcomes. A central feature of the analysis is a condition that we term the 'avoidance potential', which gives precision to the idea that moral responsibility implies a reasonable demand that an agent should have acted otherwise. We show how our theory can allocate moral responsibility to individuals in complex collective action problems, an issue that sometimes goes by the name of 'the problem of many hands'. We also show how it allo…Read more
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2Intentions and plans in decision and game theoryIn Bruno Verbeek (ed.), Reasons and Intentions, Ashgate. 2007.
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69Introduction to the special issue of economics and philosophy on ambiguity aversionEconomics and Philosophy 25 (3): 247-248. 2009.The paradigm for modelling decision-making under uncertainty has undoubtedly been the theory of Expected Utility, which was first developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and later extended by Savage (1954) to the case of subjective uncertainty. The inadequacy of the theory of Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) as a descriptive theory was soon pointed out in experiments, most famously by Allais (1953) and Ellsberg (1961). The observed departures from SEU noticed by Allais and Ellsberg beca…Read more
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39On Rights in Game FormsSynthese 123 (3). 2000.This paper makes a contribution to the further development of the game-theoretic analysis of rights. The model presented here differs in several respects from the existing models. First of all, a distinction is made between outcome-oriented and action-oriented rights, a distinction which is closely related to the distinction between active and passive rights. Second, the legal-theoretic notions of negative and positive rights are formally defined. Third, we not only discuss the definition of rig…Read more
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79Counterfactual success and negative freedomEconomics and Philosophy 23 (2): 141-162. 2007.Recent theories of negative freedom see it as a value-neutral concept; the definition of freedom should not be in terms of specific moral values. Specifically, preferences or desires do not enter into the definition of freedom. If preferences should so enter then Berlin's problem that a person may enhance their freedom by changing their preferences emerges. This paper demonstrates that such a preference-free conception brings its own counter-intuitive problems. It concludes that these problems m…Read more
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449Choice Functions and Hard ChoicesJournal of Mathematical Economics 95 (0304-4068): 102479. 2021.A hard choice is a situation in which an agent is unable to make a justifiable choice from a given menu of alternatives. Our objective is to present a systematic treatment of the axiomatic structure of such situations. To do so, we draw on and contribute to the study of choice functions that can be indecisive, i.e., that may fail to select a non-empty set for some menus. In this more general framework, we present new characterizations of two well-known choice rules, the maximally dominant choice…Read more
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16Logical Constraints on Judgement AggregationJournal of Philosophical Logic 35 (6): 569-585. 2006.Logical puzzles like the doctrinal paradox raise the problem of how to aggregate individual judgements into a collective judgement, or alternatively, how to merge collectively inconsistent knowledge bases. In this paper, we view judgement aggregation as a function on propositional logic valuations, and we investigate how logic constrains judgement aggregation. In particular, we show that there is no non-dictatorial decision method for aggregating sets of judgements in a logically consistent way …Read more
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31Degrees of CausationErkenntnis 71 (3): 323-344. 2009.The primary aim of this paper is to analyze the concept of degrees of causal contribution for actual events and examine the way in which it can be formally defined. This should go some way to filling out a gap in the legal and philosophical literature on causation. By adopting the conception of a cause as a necessary element of a sufficient set (the so-called NESS test) we show that the concept of degrees of causation can be given clear and even empirical meaning. We then apply a game theoretica…Read more
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107Logical Constraints on Judgement AggregationJournal of Philosophical Logic 35 (6). 2006.Logical puzzles like the doctrinal paradox raise the problem of how to aggregate individual judgements into a collective judgement, or alternatively, how to merge collectively inconsistent knowledge bases. In this paper, we view judgement aggregation as a function on propositional logic valuations, and we investigate how logic constrains judgement aggregation. In particular, we show that there is no non-dictatorial decision method for aggregating sets of judgements in a logically consistent way …Read more
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92Degrees of CausationErkenntnis 71 (3). 2009.The primary aim of this paper is to analyze the concept of degrees of causal contribution for actual events and examine the way in which it can be formally defined. This should go some way to filling out a gap in the legal and philosophical literature on causation. By adopting the conception of a cause as a necessary element of a sufficient set (the so-called NESS test) we show that the concept of degrees of causation can be given clear and even empirical meaning. We then apply a game theoretica…Read more
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30Causing Harm. A Logico-Legal Study. By Lennart Åqvist and Philip Mullock. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. 1989. Pp. 353Ratio Juris 10 (3): 351-355. 1997.
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176An Anatomy of Moral ResponsibilityMind 121 (483): 601-634. 2012.This paper examines the structure of moral responsibility for outcomes. A central feature of the analysis is a condition that we term the ‘avoidance potential’, which gives precision to the idea that moral responsibility implies a reasonable demand that an agent should have acted otherwise. We show how our theory can allocate moral responsibility to individuals in complex collective action problems, an issue that sometimes goes by the name of ‘the problem of many hands’. We also show how it allo…Read more
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93On the Analysis of Negative FreedomTheory and Decision 45 (2): 175-197. 1998.This paper presents a non-preference-based approach to the analysis of negative freedom. It is argued that a proper understanding of (different conceptions of) negative freedom necessitates an examination of the consequences of changes in the set of feasible alternatives. For this reason the paper does not focus on freedom rankings of opportunity sets but on freedom rankings of opportunity situations, i.e., pairs consisting of a feasible set and an opportunity set. Three different freedom rankin…Read more
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62Ordering the Right and the Good, Practically SpeakingJournal of Value Inquiry 48 (1): 95-105. 2014.
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87Rights, goals, and capabilitiesPolitics, Philosophy and Economics 12 (3): 247-259. 2013.This article analyses the relationship between rights and capabilities in order to get a better grasp of the kind of consequentialism that the capability theory represents. Capability rights have been defined as rights that have a capability as their object (rights to capabilities). Such a definition leaves the relationship between capabilities and rights to a great extent underspecified since nothing is said about the nature of those rights. Hence, it is not precluded that they are mere negativ…Read more
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79Acting Autonomously Versus not Acting HeteronomouslyTheory and Decision 54 (4): 337-355. 2003.This paper presents a formal framework that purports to capture some aspects of Kant's theory of freedom. In particular, we argue that the analysis sheds further light on Kant's distinction between a negative and a positive concept of freedom. The paper shows that the two concepts are not equivalent: we not only argue that in a Kantian perspective negative freedom need not entail positive freedom, but also that there are situations in which a person can be said to be positively but not negativel…Read more
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2De vele gedaantes van de rationele-keuzetheorieAlgemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 94 (1). 2002.
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58SOCREAL 2010: 2nd International Workshop on Philosophy and Ethics of Social Reality. Sapporo, Japan, 2010-03-27/28. Session 3: Responsibility and Collective Agency.
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65Voluntariness, suffering and euthanasiaPhilosophical Explorations 6 (1). 2003.Dutch euthanasia legislation states that an act of euthanasia is only permissible if it is based on a voluntary request made in a situation of unbearable suffering to which there are no alternatives.The central question of this article is whether these criteria can be satisfied simultaneously. In an analysis of several (partly overlapping) definitions of voluntariness it is argued that there are circumstances in which this question should be answered negatively.The possible incompatibility of th…Read more
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23Logic, game theory and social choice oisterwijk (near tilburg), the netherlands, 13-16 may 1999Theory and Decision 46 (106). 1999.
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147The Formula of Universal Law: A ReconstructionErkenntnis 80 (2): 243-260. 2015.This paper provides a methodologically original construction of Kant’s “Formula of Universal Law” . A formal structure consisting of possible worlds and games—a “game frame”—is used to implement Kant’s concept of a maxim and to define the two tests FUL comprises: the “contradiction in conception” and “contradiction in the will” tests. The paper makes two contributions. Firstly, the model provides a formal account of the variables that are built into FUL: agents, maxims, intentions, actions, and …Read more