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58La nature individuelle non-descriptive des êtres conscientsRÉPHA, revue étudiante de philosophie analytique 8 11-33. 2014.
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285Reddish Green: A Challenge for Modal Claims about Phenomenal StructurePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2). 2009.We discuss two modal claims about the phenomenal structure of color experiences: (i) violet experiences are necessarily experiences of a color that is for the subject on that occasion phenomenally composed of red and blue (the modal claim about violet) and (ii) no subject can possibly have an experience of a color that is for it then phenomenally composed of red and green (the modal claim about reddish green). The modal claim about reddish green is undermined by empirical results. We discuss whe…Read more
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12Phänomenales Bewusstsein und Subjekte von ErfahrungIn Detlev Ganten, Volker Gerhardt & Julian Nida-Rümelin (eds.), Funktionen des Bewusstseins, Walter De Gruyter. pp. 39-62. 2008.
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235IntroductionDialectica 60 (3): 209-222. 2006.In November 2003, the University of Fribourg hosted a symposium on the ontology of colors. The invited participants included Justin Broackes, Alex Byrne, David Chalmers, Larry Hardin, Joe Levine and Barry Maund. The points of view presented by the participants in their thought-provoking papers were highly divergent. The presentation of each paper was followed by a long and intense discussion. Despite the divergence of the views proposed, the discussion during the symposium was highly focus…Read more
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Colours and shapesIn Fiona Macpherson & Fabian Dorsch (eds.), Phenomenal Presence, Oxford University Press. 2018.
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The Phenomenology of Self-Awareness and the Nature of Conscious Subjects (edited book)Routledge. forthcoming.
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97On belief about experiences: An epistemological distinction applied to the knowledge argumentPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1): 51-73. 1998.The article introduces two kinds of belief-phenomenal belief and nonphenomenal belief---about color experiences and examines under what conditions the distinction can be extended to belief about other kinds of mental states. A thesis of the paper is that the so-called Knowledge Argument should not be formulated---as usual---using the locution of ‘knowing what it’s like’ but instead using the concept of phenomenal belief and explains why ‘knowing what it's like’ does not serve the purposes of tho…Read more
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205On belief about experiences: An epistemological distinction applied to the knowledge argument against physicalismPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1): 51-73. 1998.The article introduces two kinds of belief-phenomenal belief and nonphenomenal belief-about color experiences and examines under what conditions the distinction can be extended to belief about other kinds of mental states. A thesis of the paper is that the so-called Knowledge Argument should not be formulated-as usual-using the locution of `knowing what it's like' but instead using the concept of phenomenal belief and explains why `knowing what it's like' does not serve the purposes of those who…Read more
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46Transtemporale Identität bewusstseinsfähiger WesenDeutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 56 (4): 513-534. 2008.Unser natürliches Verständnis der transtemporalen Identität bewusstseinsfähiger Wesen unterscheidet sich grundlegend von unserem Verständnis der transtemporalen Identität von Dingen, die wir nicht für bewusstseinsfähig halten. Der Unterschied beruht letztlich auf begrifflichen Besonderheiten unseres selbstbezogenen Denkens. Wir haben ein von Kriterien der transtemporalen Identität freies Verständnis der eigenen transtemporalen Identität und diese Kriterienfreiheit überträgt sich auf unsere Gedan…Read more
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138The Illusion of IllusionismJournal of Consciousness Studies 23 (11-12): 160-171. 2016.A central thesis of Frankish's argument for illusionism is the claim that illusionism is possibly true. This is what the realist about phenomenal consciousness must deny. Frankish's argument for that premise is based on a widely shared understanding of phenomenal consciousness as being a matter of certain events instantiating special properties. I argue that the illusionist's reasoning is difficult to avoid if one accepts this common account. A positive argument for the thesis that the mere poss…Read more
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254Transparency of experience and the perceptual model of phenomenal awarenessPhilosophical Perspectives 21 (1). 2007.
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55Realism about Identity and Individuality of Conscious BeingsIn Katharina Neges, Josef Mitterer, Sebastian Kletzl & Christian Kanzian (eds.), Realism - Relativism - Constructivism: Proceedings of the 38th International Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg, De Gruyter. pp. 279-292. 2017.
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120A Puzzle About ColorsDialectica 60 (3): 321-336. 2006.I propose a description of one aspect of the philosophical problem about the ontology of colors by formulating and motivating six plausible premises that seem to be hard to deny in isolation but that are jointly incoherent. I briefly sketch a solution and comment on the views presented in this volume from the perspective of the puzzle.
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42La nozione di soggetto cosciente e la sua base fenomenologica nell'autocoscienza preriflessivaRivista di Filosofia 104 (3): 485-504. 2013.
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116Freedom and the Phenomenology of AgencyErkenntnis 83 (1): 61-87. 2018.Free action and microphysical determination are incompatible but this is so only in virtue of a genuine conflict between microphysical determination with any active behavior. I introduce active behavior as the veridicality condition of agentive experiences and of perceptual experiences and argue that these veridicality conditions are fulfilled in many everyday cases of human and non-human behavior and that they imply the incompatibility of active behavior with microphysical determination. The ma…Read more
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1An argument from transtemporal identity for subject-body dualismIn Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays, Oxford University Press. 2009.
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51Zur Abhängigkeit transtemporaler, personaler Identität von empirischen BeziehungenZeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 52 (2). 1998.In dem Artikel wird die These vertreten, daß unser Begriff transtemporaler, personaler Identität keine Reduktion auf empirische Beziehungen zuläßt und auch eine Revision zugunsten eines reduzierbaren Begriffs personaler Identität mit tief verwurzelten begrifflichen Besonderheiten unseres Denkens in Konflikt geriete. Diese nicht-reduktionistische Auffassung sollte aber, so wird in dem Artikel argumentiert, mit einer These der nomologischen Abhängigkeit transtemporaler, personaler Identität von üb…Read more
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The character of color predicates: A phenomenalist viewIn M. Anduschus, Albert Newen & Wolfgang Kunne (eds.), Direct Reference, Indexicality, and Propositional Attitudes, Csli Press. 1997.
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1Phenomenal essentialism: A problem for identity theoristsIn Ralph Schumacher (ed.), Perception and Reality: From Descartes to the Present, Mentis. 2004.
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88Intrinsic phenomenal properties in color science: A reply to Peter RossConsciousness and Cognition 8 (4): 571-574. 1999.
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88I discuss three puzzles of probability theory which seem connected with problems of direct reference and rigid designation. The resolution of at least one of them requires referential use of definite descriptions in probability statements. I argue that contrary to common opinion all these puzzles are in a way still unsolved: They seem to exemplify cases in which a change of probabilities is rationally required, even though any specific change presupposes unjustified assumptions.
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38Buchkritik Subjektivität. Wissen von innenDeutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 58 (6): 1001-1005. 2010.
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Zur Frage der Übertragbarkeit intentionaler Begriffe auf physische ZuständeEthik Und Sozialwissenschaften 3 (4): 484. 1992.
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186The experience property frame work: a misleading paradigmSynthese 195 (8): 3361-3387. 2018.According to the experience property framework qualia are properties of experiences the subject undergoing the experience is aware of. A phenomenological argument against this framework is developed and a few mistakes invited by the framework are described. An alternative to the framework, the framework of experiential properties is presented and defended as preferable. It is argued that the choice between these two frameworks makes a substantial difference for theoretical purposes.
Lugano, Ticino, Switzerland
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |