• Integrated information theory (IIT) 4.0: Formulating the properties of phenomenal existence in physical terms
    with Larissa Albantakis, Leonardo Barbosa, Graham Findlay, Andrew Haun, William Marshall, William G. P. Mayner, Alireza Zaeemzadeh, Melanie Boly, Bjørn Juel, Shuntaro Sasai, Keiko Fujii, Isaac David, Jeremiah Hendren, Jonathan Lang, and Giulio Tononi
    Arxiv. 2022.
    This paper presents Integrated Information Theory (IIT) 4.0. IIT aims to account for the properties of experience in physical (operational) terms. It identifies the essential properties of experience (axioms), infers the necessary and sufficient properties that its substrate must satisfy (postulates), and expresses them in mathematical terms. In principle, the postulates can be applied to any system of units in a state to determine whether it is conscious, to what degree, and in what way. IIT of…Read more
  •  15
    Conference Report: The Science of Consciousness 2022
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 29 (11-12): 186-209. 2022.
  •  4
    The power of color
    American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (1): 65-78. 2020.
    Are colors features of objects “out there in the world” or are they features of our inner experience and only “in our head?” Color perception has been the focus of extensive philosophical and scientific debate. In this paper we discuss the limitations of the view that Chalmers’ has characterized as Primitivism, and we develop Marmodoro’s Constitutionalism further, to provide a metaphysical account of color perception in terms of causal powers. The result is Power-based Constitutionalism, the vie…Read more
  •  34
    Causal reductionism and causal structures
    with Larissa Albantakis, Jonathan Lang, and Giulio Tononi
    Nature Neuroscience 24. 2021.
    Causal reductionism is the widespread assumption that there is no room for additional causes once we have accounted for all elementary mechanisms within a system. Due to its intuitive appeal, causal reductionism is prevalent in neuroscience: once all neurons have been caused to fire or not to fire, it seems that causally there is nothing left to be accounted for. Here, we argue that these reductionist intuitions are based on an implicit, unexamined notion of causation that conflates causation wi…Read more
  •  142
    Consciousness and the Fallacy of Misplaced Objectivity
    with Francesco Ellia, Jeremiah Hendren, Csaba Kozma, Garrett Mindt, Jonathan Lang, Andrew Haun, Larissa Albantakis, Melanie Boly, and Giulio Tononi
    Neuroscience of Consciousness 7 (2): 1-12. 2021.
    Objective correlates—behavioral, functional, and neural—provide essential tools for the scientific study of consciousness. But reliance on these correlates should not lead to the ‘fallacy of misplaced objectivity’: the assumption that only objective properties should and can be accounted for objectively through science. Instead, what needs to be explained scientifically is what experience is intrinsically— its subjective properties—not just what we can do with it extrinsically. And it must be…Read more
  •  25
    IIT, half masked and half disfigured
    with Giulio Tononi, Melanie Boly, Jeremiah Hendren, Bjorn E. Juel, William G. P. Mayner, William Marshall, and Christof Koch
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 45. 2022.
    The target article misrepresents the foundations of integrated information theory and ignores many essential publications. It, thus, falls to this lead commentary to outline the axioms and postulates of IIT and correct major misconceptions. The commentary also explains why IIT starts from phenomenology and why it predicts that only select physical substrates can support consciousness. Finally, it highlights that IIT's account of experience – a cause–effect structure quantified by integrated info…Read more
  •  79
    Introduction: Mental Powers
    Topoi 39 (5): 1017-1020. 2020.
    The metaphysics of powers (Shoemaker, 1980; Mumford, 2004; Marmodoro, 2009; Heil, 2012 among many others) is a promising conceptual framework that has been successfully put to use in many philosophical and scientific domains, but surprisingly its potential applications in the contemporary philosophy of mind are still under-investigated. This thematic issue aims to show that power ontology has implications concerning major questions in the contemporary philosophy of mind, such as: what is the met…Read more
  •  59
    IIT vs. Russellian Monism: A Metaphysical Showdown on the Content of Experience
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (1-2): 48-75. 2019.
    Integrated information theory attempts to account for both the quantitative and the phenomenal aspects of consciousness, and in taking consciousness as fundamental and widespread it bears similarities to panpsychist Russellian monism. In this paper I compare IIT's and RM's response to the conceivability argument, and their metaphysical account of conscious experience. I start by claiming that RM neutralizes the conceivability argument, but that by virtue of its commitment to categoricalism it do…Read more
  •  662
    Sleep and dreaming in the predictive processing framework
    Philosophy and Predictive Processing. 2017.
    Sleep and dreaming are important daily phenomena that are receiving growing attention from both the scientific and the philosophical communities. The increasingly popular predictive brain framework within cognitive science aims to give a full account of all aspects of cognition. The aim of this paper is to critically assess the theoretical advantages of Predictive Processing (PP, as proposed by Clark 2013, Clark 2016; and Hohwy 2013) in defining sleep and dreaming. After a brief introduction, we…Read more
  •  26
    Ontology, Mind and Free Will. A Workshop in Memory of E.J. Lowe
    with Mattia Sorgon
    Rivista Italiana di Filosofia Analitica Junior 5 (2): 128-136. 2014.
    The single day conference “Ontology, Mind and Free Will. A Workshop in Memory of E.J. Lowe (1950-2014)” took place at the Department of Humanities of the University of Macerata on March, 3 rd 2014. It included as speakers Sophie Gibb (Durham University), Mario De Caro (Roma Tre University) and Michele Paolini Paoletti (University of Macerata). This event was thought by the organizers in order to honor the British philosopher Ethan Jonathan Lowe, who suddenly passed away last January with infinit…Read more
  •  760
    Cognitive Neuroscience and Animal Consciousness
    In Sofia Bonicalzi, Leonardo Caffo & Mattia Sorgon (eds.), Naturalism and Constructivism in Metaethics, Cambridge Scholars Press. pp. 182-203. 2014.
    The problem of animal consciousness has profound implications on our concept of nature and of our place in the natural world. In philosophy of mind and cognitive neuroscience the problem of animal consciousness raises two main questions (Velmans, 2007): the distribution question (“are there conscious animals beside humans?”) and the phenomenological question (“what is it like to be a non-human animal?”). In order to answer these questions, many approaches take into account similarities and diss…Read more
  •  254
    The Metaphysics of Free Will: A Critique of Free Won’t as Double Prevention
    Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 6 (1): 120-129. 2015.
    The problem of free will is deeply linked with the causal relevance of mental events. The causal exclusion argument claims that, in order to be causally relevant, mental events must be identical to physical events. However, Gibb has recently criticized it, suggesting that mental events are causally relevant as double preventers. For Gibb, mental events enable physical effects to take place by preventing other mental events from preventing a behaviour to take place. The role of mental double prev…Read more