•  2
    If a deductive argument is valid, then the conclusion is not novel. If the conclusion of an argument is not novel, the argument is not useful. So, if a deductive argument is valid, it is not useful. This conclusion,, is unacceptable. Since the argument is valid, we must reject at least one premise. So, should we reject or? This puzzle is usually known as the ‘scandal of deduction’. Analytic philosophers have tried to reject but have assumed premise. I argue here that Aristotle would deny. Aristo…Read more
  •  2
    Fine-grained and Coarse-grained Knowledge in Euthydemus 293b7–d1
    Australasian Philosophical Review 3 (2): 198-205. 2019.
    ABSTRACT McCabe [2021: 137–40] identifies a crucial ambiguity in the terms ‘learns’ and ‘knows’. Such terms can be read as either ‘perfective’ or ‘imperfective’. This is an aspect difference. The former indicates a settled state, the latter a directed process. McCabe uses this insight to show how Socrates can rebut the sophists’ view of meaning, render compelling Socrates’ self-refutation arguments, and explain the Socratic connections between learning, knowledge, and how one should live. In the…Read more
  • Relative Change
    Cambridge University Press. 2020.
    A relative change occurs when some item changes a relation. This Element examines how Plato, Aristotle, Stoics and Sextus Empiricus approached relative change. Relative change is puzzling because the following three propositions each seem true but cannot be true together: No relative changes are intrinsic changes; Only intrinsic changes are proper changes; Some relative changes are proper changes. Plato's Theaetetus and Phaedo property relative change. I argue that these dialogues assume relativ…Read more
  •  3
    Thought as Internal Speech in Plato and Aristotle
    History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 19 (1): 105-125. 2016.
    Scholars often assert that Plato and Aristotle share the view that discursive thought is internal speech. However, there has been little work to clarify or substantiate this reading. In this paper I show Plato and Aristotle share some core commitments about the relationship of thought and speech, but cash out TIS in different ways. Plato and Aristotle both hold that discursive thinking is a process that moves from a set of doxastic states to a final doxastic state. The resulting judgments can be…Read more
  •  6
    Dialectic and Logic in Aristotle and his tradition
    History and Philosophy of Logic 37 (1): 1-8. 2016.
    status: published.
  •  1
    This book explores how ancient philosophers, particularly Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and Sextus Empiricus, understood relativity and how their theories of the phenomenon affected, and were affected by, their broader philosophical outlooks.
  •  62
    Aristotle’s Two Accounts of Relatives in Categories 7
    Phronesis 60 (4): 436-461. 2015.
    AtCategories7, 6a36-7 Aristotle defines relatives, but at 8a13-28 worries that the definition may include some substances. Aristotle introduces a second account of relatives to solve the problem. Recent commentators have held that Aristotle intends to solve the extensional adequacy worry by restricting the extension of relatives. That is, R2 counts fewer items as relative than R1. However, this cannot explain Aristotle’s attitude to relatives, since he immediately returns to using R1. I propose …Read more
  •  1137
    Thought as Internal Speech in Plato and Aristotle
    History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 19 105-125. 2016.
  •  430
    Plato’s Absolute and Relative Categories at Sophist 255c14
    Ancient Philosophy 32 (1): 77-86. 2012.
    Sophist 255c14 distinguishes καθ’ αὑτά and πρὸς ἄλλα (in relation to others). Many commentators identify this with the ‘absolute’ and ‘relative’ category distinction. However, terms such as ‘same’ cannot fit into either category. Several reliable manuscripts read πρὸς ἄλληλα (in relation to each other) for πρὸς ἄλλα. I show that πρὸς ἄλληλα is a palaeographically plausible reading which accommodates the problematic terms. I then defend my reading against objections.
  •  45
    Dialectic and logic in Aristotle and his tradition
    with Catarina Dutilh Novaes
    History and Philosophy of Logic 37 (1): 1-8. 2016.
    status: published.
  •  141
    Irreflexivity and Aristotle's Syllogismos
    Philosophical Quarterly 64 (256): 434-452. 2014.
  •  1
    Plato (review)
    Philosophical Forum 42 (3): 274-275. 2011.