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6The irrational failure to actPhilosophical Quarterly. forthcoming.I defend against a salient objection the thesis that practical rationality requires us to perform intentional actions. The objection is that if rationality requires the performance of intentional actions, then agents are irrational for failing to succeed in what they intend to do. I reply to this objection by hewing closely to the principle that the rational ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. We are rationally required not to successfully realize the content of our intentions but to exercise the fallible ab…Read more
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24Deciding Under a DescriptionPacific Philosophical Quarterly 105 (2): 191-209. 2024.I issue a challenge for the view that deciding‐to‐A is rendered intentional by an intention or other pro‐attitude towards deciding. Either such an attitude cannot rationalize my deciding specifically to A for a reason I take to support doing A, or, fixing for this, cannot accommodate deciding without entertaining alternatives. If successful, the argument motivates the search for an account that does not source the intentionality of deciding in a rationalizing pro‐attitude.
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68Perceptual transparency and the temporal structure of experiencePhilosophical Studies 178 (6): 1829-1844. 2020.According to the Matching Thesis (MT), the temporal structure of experience in time matches the apparent temporal structure of the objects and events represented in the content of perceptual experience. In this paper I critically address attempts to show the MT on the grounds that perceptual experience is transparent: that experiences themselves possess no introspectively discernible temporal structure apart from that of the apparent objects perceived. Pace such a Transparency Argument for the M…Read more
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80Diachronic agency and practical entitlementEuropean Journal of Philosophy 28 (1): 177-198. 2019.As diachronic agents, we deliberate and decide in the present to perform future courses of action. Such future‐directed decisions normally enjoy a distinctive species of rational authority over subsequent thought and action. But what is the nature of this authority, and what underwrites its normative force? In this paper, I argue that our answer to this question must begin by situating future‐directed deciding within an intrapersonal model of cross‐temporal influence. The role of future‐directed…Read more
Columbia University
PhD, 2020
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Mind |
Areas of Interest
Free Will |