Matthew Jope

Many philosophers of trust endorse the idea that trust is inherently risky. This raises the question of how exactly we ought to understand the relevant notion of risk. Should we understand it in objectivist or evidentialist terms? I argue that neither of these two ways of unpacking things holds up in light of number of clear examples of trust where there is no associated risk. In view of this failure to make sense of what it could mean for trust to inherently involve risk, I propose an alternative account that takes vulnerability, rather than risk, to be necessary for trust. I suggest that philosophers of trust have hitherto failed to be sensitive to this distinction, leading to widespread acceptance of the falsehood that trust essentially entails risk. I provide a range of examples of “mere” vulnerability with no associated risk and then argue that vulnerability is the better notion to help us capture what is essentially involved in placing our trust in others.

This article takes issue with two prominent views in the current debate around epistemic partiality in friendship. Strong views of epistemic partiality hold that friendship may require biased beliefs in direct conflict with epistemic norms. Weak views hold that friendship may place normative expectations on belief formation but in a manner that does not violate these norms. It is argued that neither view succeeds in explaining the relationship between epistemic norms and friendship norms. Weak views inadvertently endorse a form of motivated reasoning, failing to resolve the normative clash they seek to avoid. Strong views turn out to be incoherent once we consider the question of whether the requirement to form an epistemically partial belief is independent of whether the belief in question would be true. It is then argued that an epistemology of friendship should recognise the special role that understanding plays in friendship. On this view, friendship normatively requires understanding the truth about our friends. This entails that epistemic partiality, far from being a requirement, is in fact at odds with good friendship.