•  2463
    Belief, Voluntariness and Intentionality
    Dialectica 65 (4): 537-559. 2011.
    In this paper, I examine Alston's arguments for doxastic involuntarism. Alston fails to distinguish (i) between volitional and executional lack of control, and (ii) between compatibilist and libertarian control. As a result, he fails to notice that, if one endorses a compatibilist notion of voluntary control, the outcome is a straightforward and compelling case for doxastic voluntarism. Advocates of involuntarism have recently argued that the compatibilist case for doxastic voluntarism can be bl…Read more
  •  347
    Doxastic Voluntarism and Epistemic Deontology
    Acta Analytica 15 (1): 25-56. 2000.
    Epistemic deontology is the view that the concept of epistemic justification is deontological: a justified belief is, by definition, an epistemically permissible belief. I defend this view against the argument from doxastic involuntarism, according to which our doxastic attitudes are not under our voluntary control, and thus are not proper objects for deontological evaluation. I argue that, in order to assess this argument, we must distinguish between a compatibilist and a libertarian construal …Read more
  •  246
    Doxastic freedom
    Synthese 161 (3): 375-392. 2008.
  •  209
    Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (edited book)
    with Matthias Steup and Ernest Sosa
    Wiley-Blackwell. 2005.
    Eleven pairs of newly commissioned essays face off on opposite sides of fundamental problems in current theories of knowledge. Brings together fresh debates on eleven of the most controversial issues in epistemology. Questions addressed include: Is knowledge contextual? Can skepticism be refuted? Can beliefs be justified through coherence alone? Is justified belief responsible belief? Lively debate format sharply defines the issues, and paves the way for further discussion. Will serve as an acce…Read more
  •  197
    Empiricism, metaphysics, and voluntarism
    Synthese 178 (1): 19-26. 2011.
    This paper makes three points: First, empiricism as a stance is problematic unless criteria for evaluating the stance are provided. Second, Van Fraassen conceives of the empiricist stance as receiving its content, at least in part, from the rejection of metaphysics. But the rejection of metaphysics seems to presuppose for its justification the very empiricist doctrine Van Fraassen intends to replace with the empiricist stance. Third, while I agree with Van Fraassen’s endorsement of voluntarism, …Read more
  •  187
    Internalist reliabilism
    Philosophical Issues 14 (1). 2004.
    When I take a sip from the coffee in my cup, I can taste that it is sweet. When I hold the cup with my hands, I can feel that it is hot. Why does the experience of feeling that the cup is hot give me justification for believing that the cup is hot?And why does the experience of tasting that the coffee is sweet give me justification for believing that the coffee is sweet?In general terms: Why is it that a sense experience that P is a source of justification—a reason—for believing that P? Call thi…Read more
  •  151
    The analysis of knowledge
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2008.
  •  145
    This volume gathers eleven new and three previously unpublished essays that take on questions of epistemic justification, responsibility, and virtue. It contains the best recent work in this area by major figures such as Ernest Sosa, Robert Audi, Alvin Goldman, and Susan Haak.
  •  140
    Belief control and intentionality
    Synthese 188 (2): 145-163. 2012.
    In this paper, I argue that the rejection of doxastic voluntarism is not as straightforward as its opponents take it to be. I begin with a critical examination of William Alston's defense of involuntarism and then focus on the question of whether belief is intentional
  •  132
    Believing intentionally
    Synthese 194 (8): 2673-2694. 2017.
    According to William Alston, we lack voluntary control over our propositional attitudes because we cannot believe intentionally, and we cannot believe intentionally because our will is not causally connected to belief formation. Against Alston, I argue that we can believe intentionally because our will is causally connected to belief formation. My defense of this claim is based on examples in which agents have reasons for and against believing p, deliberate on what attitude to take towards p, an…Read more
  •  129
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2008.
    Defined narrowly, epistemology is the study of knowledge and justified belief. As the study of knowledge, epistemology is concerned with the following questions: What are the necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge? What are its sources? What is its structure, and what are its limits? As the study of justified belief, epistemology aims to answer questions such as: How we are to understand the concept of justification? What makes justified beliefs justified? Is justification internal or …Read more
  •  126
    Contextualism and conceptual disambiguation
    Acta Analytica 20 (1): 3-15. 2005.
    I distinguish between Old Contextualism, New Contextualism, and the Multiple Concepts Theory. I argue that Old Contextualism cannot handle the following three problems: (i) the disquotational paradox, (ii) upward pressure resistance, (iii) inability to avoid the acceptance of skeptical conclusions. New Contextualism, in contrast, can avoid these problems. However, since New Contextualism appears to be a semanticized mirror image of MCT, it remains unclear whether it is in fact a genuine version …Read more
  •  119
    Is Epistemic Circularity Bad?
    Res Philosophica 90 (2): 215-235. 2013.
    Is it possible to argue that one’s memory is reliable without using one’s memory? I argue that it is not. Since it is not, it is impossible to defend the reliability ofone’s memory without employing reasoning that is epistemically circular. Hence, if epistemic circularity is vicious, it is impossible to succeed in producing a cogent argument for the reliability of one’s memory. The same applies to any other one of one’s cognitive faculties. I further argue that, if epistemic circularity is vicio…Read more
  •  117
  •  81
  •  79
    Epistemic Justification. Essays in the Theory of Knowledge
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1): 228-232. 1992.
  •  70
    Defeaters can prevent a perceptual belief from being justified. For example, when you know that red light is shining at the table before you, you would typically not be justified in believing that the table is red. However, can defeaters also destroy a perceptual experience as a source of justification? If the answer is ‘no’, the red light defeater blocks doxastic justification without destroying propositional justification. You have some-things-considered, but not all-things-considered, justifi…Read more
  •  70
    A foundationalist account of the justification of our empirical beliefs is committed to the following two claims: (1) Sense experience is a source of justification. (2) Some empirical beliefs are basic: justified without receiving their justification from any other beliefs. In this paper, I will defend each of these claims against an objection. The objection to (1) that I will discuss is due to Donald Davidson. He writes: The relation between a sensation and a belief cannot be logical, since sen…Read more
  •  55
    Proper and Improper Use of Cognitive Faculties: A Counterexample to Plantiga’s Proper Functioning Theory (review)
    with Alvin Plantinga
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (2): 409. 1995.
  •  52
    Unrestricted Foundationalism and the Sellarsian Dilemma
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 60 (1): 75-98. 2000.
    I propose a version of foundationaUsm with the following distinctive features. First, it includes in the class of basic beliefs ordinary beliefs about physical objects. This makes it unrestricted. Second, it assigns the role of ultimate justifiers to A-states: states of being appeared to in various ways. Such states have propositional content, and are justifiers if they are presumptively reliable. The beliefs A-states justify are basic if they are non-inferential. In the last three sections of t…Read more
  •  51
    Doxastic Voluntarism and Up-To-Me-Ness
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (4): 611-618. 2018.
  •  43
    A companion to epistemology, second edition (edited book)
    with Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa
    Blackwell. 2010.
  •  41
    A Companion to Epistemology (edited book)
    with Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa
    Wiley-Blackwell. 1992.
    Epistemology - the theory of knowledge and of justified belief - has always been of central importance in philosophy. Progress in other areas of philosophical research has often depended crucially on epistemological presuppositions. This Companion, with well over 250 articles ranging from summary discussions to major essays on topics of current controversy, is the first complete reference work devoted to the subject. All the main theoretical positions in epistemology are discussed and analysed, …Read more
  •  37
    Knowledge and the State of Nature: An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis (review)
    Philosophical Review 101 (4): 856. 1992.
  •  37
    Harmless naturalism: The limits of science and the nature of philosophy
    Philosophical Review 109 (3): 462-465. 2000.
    Should we only believe what science can prove? Robert Almeder analyzes "naturalized epistemology," which holds that the only valid claims that can be made about the world must be proven by the natural sciences and that all philosophical questions are ultimately answered by science. The author examines and refutes different forms of naturalized epistemology before settling on "harmless naturalism," a compromise which implies that certain questions about the world are answerable and have been answ…Read more
  •  32
  •  29
    This book offers a systematic and up-to-date account of the landscape of contemporary epistemology. It presupposes only a minimum of prior philosophical knowledge, and includes an account of the logical and conceptual tools needed for philosophical analysis. Focuses on the writings and ideas of W. Alston, R. Audi, L. BonJour, R. Chisholm, A. Goldman. H. Kornboith, K. Lehrer. A. Plantinga, W. V. Quine, E. Sosa, and B Stroud, among others; links particular theories and arguments to their chief pro…Read more