Mauricio Suárez

This chapter defends a deflationary, or ‘quietist’ account of causation in science. It begins by laying out the elements of four central philosophical theories of causation, namely the regularity, counterfactual, probabilistic and process accounts. It then proceeds to briefly criticise them. While the criticisms are essentially renditions of arguments that are well-known in the literature, the conclusion that is derived from these is new. It is argued that the limitations of each of the theories point to a deflationary or quietist approach to causation in science. The practical focus is on interventionist methods for causal inference in physics and biology, and on the extant debates within the philosophy of each discipline as to how best to approach such methods. It is then argued that none of the four central theories proposed can completely explain or reduce the methods of causal inference that appear in each science. Yet, each theory provides partial insights into some of the grounds of causal inference and causal discovery. It is consequently suggested that we should retain the various methodological lessons without committing expressly to any metaphysics of causation.

This Element has two main aims. The first one is an historically informed review of the philosophy of probability. It describes recent historiography, lays out the distinction between subjective and objective notions, and concludes by applying the historical lessons to the main interpretations of probability. The second aim focuses entirely on objective probability, and advances a number of novel theses regarding its role in scientific practice. A distinction is drawn between traditional attempts to interpret chance, and a novel methodological study of its application. A radical form of pluralism is then introduced, advocating a tripartite distinction between propensities, probabilities and frequencies. Finally, a distinction is drawn between two different applications of chance in statistical modelling which, it is argued, vindicates the overall methodological approach. The ensuing conception of objective probability in practice is the 'complex nexus of chance'.

A pesar de su brevedad, Filosofía de la Ciencia: Historia y práctica es una obra ambiciosa, tanto por su voluntad de síntesis, como por su inusual carácter híbrido. Combina objetivos de divulgación, docentes, y de investigación. Por un lado, proporciona una primera aproximación a la práctica de la filosofía de la ciencia, accesible a cualquier persona interesada. Por otro lado, constituye un breve manual docente, en forma de bibliografía comentada, de uso tanto para profesores como alumnos, en cursos de grado y máster, en facultades de ciencias y de humanidades. Por último, se trata de un monográfico que defiende una tesis propia, en torno a la deuda de la filosofía contemporánea de la ciencia con el positivismo lógico del Círculo de Viena. El resultado es el primer tratado con una perspectiva histórica que arranca en el Círculo de Viena y culmina en el debate actual, de marcado carácter epistemológico, sobre el realismo científico. Esta particular forma de abordar la materia, en un momento en que la disciplina experimenta una revisión a fondo de su historiografía, permite apreciar las raíces profundamente europeas de nuestra actual reflexión filosófica sobre la ciencia.

This paper is a critical response to Andreas Bartels’ sophisticated defense of a structural account of scientific representation. We show that, contrary to Bartels’ claim, homomorphism fails to account for the phenomenon of misrepresentation. Bartels claims that homomorphism is adequate in two respects. First, it is conceptually adequate, in the sense that it shows how representation differs from misrepresentation and non-representation. Second, if properly weakened, homomorphism is formally adequate to accommodate misrepresentation. We question both claims. First, we show that homomorphism is not the right condition to distinguish representation from misrepresentation and non-representation: a “representational mechanism” actually does all the work, and it is independent of homomorphism – as of any structural condition. Second, we test the claim of formal adequacy against three typical kinds of inaccurate representation in science which, by reference to a discussion of the notorious billiard ball model, we define as abstraction, pretence, and simulation. We first point out that Bartels equivocates between homomorphism and the stronger condition of epimorphism, and that the weakened form of homomorphism that Bartels puts forward is not a morphism at all. After providing a formal setting for abstraction, pretence and simulation, we show that for each morphism there is at least one form of inaccurate representation which is not accommodated. We conclude that Bartels’ theory – while logically laying down the weakest structural requirements – is nonetheless formally inadequate in its own terms. This should shed serious doubts on the plausibility of any structural account of representation more generally

This paper argues for a representational semantic conception of scientific theories, which respects the bare claim of any semantic view, namely that theories can be characterised as sets of models. RSC must be sharply distinguished from structural versions that assume a further identity of ‘models’ and ‘structures’, which we reject. The practice-turn in the recent philosophical literature suggests instead that modelling must be understood in a deflationary spirit, in terms of the diverse representational practices in the sciences. These insights are applied to some mathematical models, thus showing that the mathematical sciences are not in principle counterexamples to RSC.

This article provides a state of the art review of the philosophical literature on scientific representation. It first argues that the topic emerges historically mainly out of what may be called the modelling tradition. It then introduces a number of helpful analytical distinctions, and goes on to divide contemporary approaches to scientific representation into two distinct kinds, substantive and deflationary. Analogies with related discussions of artistic representation in aesthetics, and of the nature of truth in metaphysics are pursued. It is finally urged that the most promising approaches - and the ones most likely to feature prominently in future developments - are deflationary. In particular, a defence is provided of a genuinely inferential conception of representation.

This paper argues that if propensities are displayed in objective physical chances then the appropriate representation of these chances is as indexed probability functions. Two alternative formal models, or accounts, for the relation between propensity properties and their chancy or probabilistic manifestations, in terms of conditionals and conditional probability are first reviewed. It is argued that both confront important objections, which are overcome by the account in terms of indexed probabilities. A number of further advantages of the indexed probability account are discussed, which suggest that it is promising as a general theory of objective physical chance. The paper ends with a discussion of the indexical character of the objective chances that are grounded in propensities.

Table of Contents: Preface.- 1. Introduction; Mauricio Suárez.- PART I: PROBABILITIES.- 2. Probability and time symmetry in classical Markov processes; Guido Bacciagaluppi.- 3. Probability assignments and the principle of indifference: An examination of two eliminative strategies; Sorin Bangu.- 4. Why typicality does not explain the approach to equilibrium; Roman Frigg; PART II: CAUSES.- 5. From metaphysics to physics and back: The example of causation; Federico Laudisa.- 6. On explanation in retro-causal interpretations of quantum mechanics; Joseph Berkovitz.- 7. Causal completeness in general probability theories; Balasz Gyenis, Miklós Rédei.- 8. Causal Markov, robustness and the quantum correlations; Mauricio Suárez, Iñaki San Pedro.- PART III: PROPENSITIES.- 9. Do dispositions and propensities have a role in the ontology of quantum mechanics? Some critical remarks; Mauro Dorato.- 10. Is the quantum world composed of propensitons?; Nicholas Maxwell.- 11. Derivative dispositions and multiple derivative levels; Ian Thompson.