•  71
    A Tale of Two Deficits: Causality and Care in Medical AI
    Philosophy and Technology 33 (2): 245-267. 2020.
    In this paper, two central questions will be addressed: ought we to implement medical AI technology in the medical domain? If yes, how ought we to implement this technology? I will critically engage with three options that exist with respect to these central questions: the Neo-Luddite option, the Assistive option, and the Substitutive option. I will first address key objections on behalf of the Neo-Luddite option: the Objection from Bias, the Objection from Artificial Autonomy, the Objection fro…Read more
  •  67
    This paper addresses the Basic Argument in favour of incompatibilism, both in its Strawsonian form and in its weakened form (the CDA). After examining the worries raised by this argument, I will defend a version of semi-compatibilism that is motivated by a narrative theory of the self, arguing that moral responsibility is possible even if the thesis of determinism is taken to be incompatible with the thesis of freedom of will. The semi-compatibilist argument that I provide lowers the standard of…Read more
  •  47
    Criterial problems in creative cognition research
    Philosophical Psychology 31 (3): 368-382. 2018.
    In creative cognition research, the Romantic view about creative cognition is traditionally rejected in favor of the modern view. The modern view about creative cognition maintains that creativity is neither mysterious nor unintelligible and that it is indeed susceptible to analysis. The paradigmatic objects of analysis in creative cognition research have been creative output and the creative process. The degree of creativity of an output is assessed in accordance with certain criterial definiti…Read more
  •  41
    Care, Narrativity, and the Nature of Disponibilité
    Hypatia 30 (4): 778-793. 2015.
    This paper attempts to make more explicit the relationship between narrativity and feminist care ethics. The central concern is the way in which narrativity carries the semantic load that some accounts of feminist care ethics imply but leave hanging. In so doing, some feminist theorists of care-based ethics then undervalue the major contribution that narrativity provides to care ethics: it carries the semantic load that is essential to the best care. In this article, I defend the narrative as th…Read more
  •  40
    Philosophy and Literature: Problems of a Philosophical Subdiscipline
    Philosophy and Literature 41 (2): 471-482. 2017.
    What is philosophy and literature? It is (or at least ought to be) a truth universally acknowledged that this is a question to which there are no easy answers. Does philosophy and literature constitute a subdiscipline of philosophy, as logic, epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, philosophy of science, and even philosophy of religion do? Alternatively: ought it constitute a subdiscipline of philosophy if it does not already do so? What is the nature of the relationship between philosophy and litera…Read more
  •  40
    Is Ethics Nonsense?: The Imagination, and the Spirit against the Limit
    Philosophy and Literature 39 (1): 172-187. 2015.
    The letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life.In the exegetical tradition of Wittgenstein, there have existed three types of readings: the positivist reading, the ineffability reading, and the resolute reading. In this essay, I will be adhering to the resolute reading, whose roots may be traced to James Conant and Cora Diamond. However, the positivist reading of Wittgenstein having been historically prior and still in currency, it bears first examining the features of this approach.2Two reading…Read more
  •  37
    Apologia pro Vita-Fabula Sua: Defending Narrativity and How We Make Sense of Our Lives
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (3): 251-268. 2015.
    This paper attempts to provide a defence for a narrative theory of the self in the face of criticisms from the anti-narrative camp. It begins by addressing certain uncontroversial premises that both pro- and the anti-narrative camps might be thought to agree on: the status of humans as homo significans or meaning-makers, the natural form-finding tendency and certain desiderata for significance and value that we possess, and the raw material of life and its constituents that we proceed from. Wher…Read more
  •  32
    Mahadevan proposes that we are at the cusp of imagination science, one of whose primary concerns will be the design of imagination machines. Programs have been written that are capable of generating jokes, producing line-drawings that have been exhibited at such galleries as the Tate, composing music in several styles reminiscent of such greats as Vivaldi and Mozart, proving geometry theorems, and inducing quantitative laws from empirical data. In recent years, Dartmouth has been hosting Turing …Read more
  •  23
    Causal Reasoning and Meno’s Paradox
    with Lock Yue Chew
    AI and Society 1-9. forthcoming.
    Causal reasoning is an aspect of learning, reasoning, and decision-making that involves the cognitive ability to discover relationships between causal relata, learn and understand these causal relationships, and make use of this causal knowledge in prediction, explanation, decision-making, and reasoning in terms of counterfactuals. Can we fully automate causal reasoning? One might feel inclined, on the basis of certain groundbreaking advances in causal epistemology, to reply in the affirmative. …Read more
  •  10
    In this paper, I will identify two problems of trust in an AI-relevant context: a theoretical problem and a practical one. I will identify and address a number of skeptical challenges to an AI-relevant theory of trust. In addition, I will identify what I shall term the ‘scope challenge’, which I take to hold for any AI-relevant theory of trust that purports to be representationally adequate to the multifarious forms of trust and AI. Thereafter, I will suggest how trust-engineering, a position th…Read more
  •  4
    Correction to: A Tale of Two Deficits: Causality and Care in Medical AI
    Philosophy and Technology 32 (4): 769-770. 2019.
    The original version of this article unfortunately contains an unconverted data in footnotes 5, 9 and 13.