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1Introduction: The Mental as FundamentalIn The Mental as Fundamental: New Perspectives on Panpsychism, Ontos Verlag. pp. 7-14. 2011.
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42Panpsychism without Subjectivity? A Brief Commentary on Sam Coleman’s ‘Mental Chemistry’ and ‘The Real Combination Problem’Disputatio 5 (37): 299-309. 2013.Blamauer, Michael_Panpsychism without Subjectivity.
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1Schelling’s Real MaterialismMinerva - An Internet Journal of Philosophy 16 1-24. 2012.In this paper, some of Schelling’s core ideas on consciousness and nature are investigated with the aim ofemphasizing their historical and systematic relevance to the current discussion on consciousness andpanpsychism. The focus is on the reasons and consequences of Schelling’s “turn” from his early Fichteanidealism to the “real materialism” of his later Identity Philosophy. It is shown that Schelling’s way of copingwith the ontological problems of the emergence of consciousness from a natural b…Read more
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16The Mental as Fundamental: New Perspectives on Panpsychism (edited book)Ontos Verlag. 2011.A revival of panpsychistic considerations of the mind's place in nature has recently enriched the debate on the mind-body problem in the contemporary philosophy of the mind. The essays assembled in the present collection aim to supply a positive contribution to these considerations, providing new perspectives on panpsychism by shedding new light on its arguments and impacts, as well as on its problems and theoretical challenges. Panpsychism is discussed as a position that understands consciousne…Read more
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146The Role of Subjectivity in the Continuity-Argument for PanpsychismPolish Journal of Philosophy 7 (1): 7-18. 2013.The Principle of Continuity is a major premise in what can be called the “Continuity-Argument for Panpsychism” : If we, as complex conscious organisms, are the evolutionary products of originally inorganic components and processes, and consciousness is a metaphysically irreducible feature, thenconsciousness must have already been a feature of these fundamental components, assuming there is continuity between the inorganic and the organic. This argument faces one serious objection, based on the p…Read more
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71Is the Panpsychist Better off as an Idealist? Some Leibnizian Remarks on Consciousness and CompositionEidos: Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad Del Norte 15 48-75. 2011.Some philosophers of mind have argued for considering consciousness as a further fundamental feature of reality in addition to its physical properties. Hence most of them are property dualists. But some of them are panpsychists. In the present paper it will be argued that being a real property dualist essentially entails being a panpsychist. Even if panpsychism deals rather elegantly with certain problems of the puzzle of consciousness, there’s no way around the composition problem. Adhering to …Read more
Vienna, Austria
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
20th Century Philosophy |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |