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Belief and IndeterminacyPhilosophical Review 121 (1): 1-54. 2012.An attractive approach to the semantic paradoxes holds that cases of semantic pathology give rise to indeterminacy. What attitude should a rational agent have toward a proposition that it takes to be indeterminate in this sense? Orthodoxy holds that rationality requires that an agent disbelieve such a proposition. I argue that a rational agent should be such that it is indeterminate whether it believes the proposition in question. For rational agents, indeterminacy in the objects of their attitu…Read more
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Vagueness and semantic indiscriminabilityPhilosophical Studies 160 (3): 365-377. 2012.I argue, pace Timothy Williamson, that one cannot provide an adequate account of what it is for a case to be borderline by appealing to facts about our inability to discriminate our actual situation from nearby counterfactual situations in which our language use differs in subtle ways. I consider the two most natural ways of using such resources to provide an account of what it is for a case to be borderline and argue that both face crippling defects. I argue that the problems faced by these two…Read more
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Rational Probabilistic IncoherencePhilosophical Review 122 (4): 527-575. 2013.Probabilism is the view that a rational agent's credences should always be probabilistically coherent. It has been argued that Probabilism follows, given the assumption that an epistemically rational agent ought to try to have credences that represent the world as accurately as possible. The key claim in this argument is that the goal of representing the world as accurately as possible is best served by having credences that are probabilistically coherent. This essay shows that this claim is fal…Read more
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Metasemantics and Metaphysical IndeterminacyIn Alexis Burgess & Brett Sherman (eds.), Metasemantics: New Essays on the Foundations of Meaning, Oxford University Press. 2014.
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Calibration and ProbabilismErgo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 1. 2014.
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Credence in the Image of ChancePhilosophy of Science 82 (4): 626-648. 2015.
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Unruly Words (review)Philosophical Review 124 (3): 415-419. 2015.
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Agreement theorems for self-locating beliefReview of Symbolic Logic 9 (2): 380-407. 2016.
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Benardete’s paradox and the logic of counterfactualsAnalysis 78 (1): 22-34. 2018.
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Doxastic LogicIn Jonathan Weisberg & Richard Pettigrew (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology, Philpapers Foundation. pp. 499-541. 2019.
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Agreement and Updating For Self-Locating BeliefJournal of Philosophical Logic 47 (3): 513-547. 2018.In this paper, I argue that some plausible principles concerning which credences are rationally permissible for agents given information about one another’s epistemic and credal states have some surprising consequences for which credences an agent ought to have in light of self-locating information. I provide a framework that allows us to state these constraints and draw out these consequences precisely. I then consider and assess the prospects for rejecting these prima facie plausible principle…Read more
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A Problem for Credal ConsequentialismIn Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Jeff Dunn (eds.), Epistemic Consequentialism, Oxford University Press. 2018.
Toronto, Ontario, Canada
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Language |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |