Michael Lacewing

Psychoanalysis is often equated with Sigmund Freud, but this comparison ignores the wide range of clinical practices, observational methods, general theories, and cross-pollinations with other disciplines that characterise contemporary psychoanalytic work. Central psychoanalytic concepts to do with unconscious motivation, primitive forms of thought, defence mechanisms, and transference form a mainstay of today's richly textured contemporary clinical psychological practice. In this landmark collection on philosophy and psychoanalysis, leading researchers provide an evaluative overview of current thinking. Written at the interface between these two disciplines, the Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychoanalysis contains original contributions that will shape the future of debate. With 34 chapters divided into eight sections covering history, clinical theory, phenomenology, science, aesthetics, religion, ethics, and political and social theory, this Oxford Handbook displays the enduring depth, breadth, and promise of integrating philosophical and psychoanalytic thought. Anyone interested in the philosophical implications of psychoanalysis, as well as philosophical challenges to and re-statements of psychoanalysis, will want to consult this book. It will be a vital resource for academic researchers, psychoanalysts and other mental health professionals, graduates, and trainees.

Is there a best way to live? If so, is this a form of ethical life? The answer, I believe, turns on what we can say about the nature and place of the passions – emotions and desires – in our lives, including in particular, our ability to be truthful about our passions and our relations with other people. I approach the question through the work of Bernard Williams. I consider first what it might be for a way of life to be ‘objectively’ best, before looking more closely at the psychological conditions of such a life, using ideas from psychoanalysis on the way we hide our true passions from ourselves and the effect this can have on our understanding of both ourselves and others. I end by considering whether we can say that a truthful life is the best life, and whether it places universal and material constraints on how best to live.

I review the debate between ‘realist’ and ‘constructivist’ understandings of the psychoanalytic unconscious. To oversimplify, realists hold that unconscious mental states exist in the analysand’s mind fully formed and with determinate intentional content, independent of consciousness, and these are discovered in analysis. Constructivists (including relationalists and intersubjectivists) hold that the unconscious meaning of clinical material does not exist ‘pre-organised’ in the analysand’s mind, but is constructed, not discovered, through the analytic relationship. I argue that the debate is multiply confused. For example, different meanings of ‘psychoanalysis’ and ‘constructivism’ are at play, and a number of central arguments rest on misunderstandings of complex philosophical positions concerning the status of science and the nature of human knowledge. Once these confusions are removed, an understanding of the psychoanalytic unconscious that retains the strengths of both realism and constructivism presents itself.

In my paper, 'The science of psychoanalysis,' I make two assumptions. First, I assume that a 'hermeneutic science' is not a contradiction in terms. Second, I assume that explanations of why someone behaved as they did in terms of motives are a form of causal explanation, and therefore that inferring what someone's motives are from their behavior is a form of causal inference. In his commentary, Gipps objects to both of these assumptions, and this gives me the opportunity to clarify them. Following the focus of Gipps's commentary, I shall concentrate primarily on the issue of science, and discuss causation only in relation to this.Herein, I am not concerned to defend a detailed positive theory of...

I am very grateful to both Edward Erwin and Peter Fonagy for their thoughtful and engaging comments. I do not have space to deal fully with all the issues they raise, but I will try to clarify some key points at which perhaps I implied more than I intended, or failed to be clear. Erwin states that I claim the following principle is a method for inferring causes: “if X is causally relevant to the occurrence of Y, then the incidence of Ys in the class of Xs and Ys will be different compared with the incidence of Ys in the class of non-Xs and Ys” (Erwin 2012, 217). This is not so. The method I attribute to Grünbaum is given in what follows the principle in the quotation given on p. 199, namely, “To validate a ..

Can psychoanalysis take its place in the science that is psychology? I want, for now, to put aside the therapy, and ask about the theory, its evidence and generation. For at the heart of psychoanalysis as theory and therapy is a theory about the nature, development, and functioning of the human mind, especially in relation to motives. There are a number of features of this theory, in particular the role and nature of unconscious mental states and processes, that makes it recognizably distinct and a competitor with other psychological theories deriving, for instance, from cognitive psychology or neuroscience.1 I take the question of whether this theory is scientific to be the question of how we can establish whether...

Philosophy for A2: Unit 4 is the definitive textbook for students of the current AQA Advanced Level syllabus for philosophy. Structured very closely around the AQA specifications for Unit 4: Philosophical Problems, Michael Lacewing helps students to engage with and understand the arguments of the five key texts: Hume's An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding Plato's The Republic Mill's On Liberty Descartes' Meditations Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil . All chapters are helpfully subdivided into short digestible passages, and include: quiz questions to test core knowledge discussion questions to deepen understanding 'going further' sections for advanced study text boxes highlighting key definitions and arguments cross-references to help students make connections. In addition, a chapter on exam preparation contains a wealth of helpful hints and tips on revision and exam techniques. Written by an experienced philosopher and A Level consultant, Philosophy for A2: Unit 4 is an essential companion for all students of A2 Level philosophy

Philosophy for AS _and A Level _is an accessible textbook for the new 2017 AQA Philosophy syllabus. Structured closely around the AQA specification this textbook covers the two units shared by the AS and A Level, Epistemology and Moral Philosophy, in an engaging and student-friendly way. With chapters on 'How to do philosophy', exam preparation providing students with the philosophical skills they need to succeed, and an extensive glossary to support understanding, this book is ideal for students studying philosophy. Each chapter includes: argument maps that help to develop student’s analytical and critical skills comprehension questions to test understanding discussion questions to generate evaluative argument explanation and commentary of the AQA set texts ‘thinking harder’ sections for advanced study cross-references to help students make connections bullet-point summaries of each topic. The companion website hosts a wealth of further resources, including PowerPoint slides, flashcards, further reading, weblinks and handouts, all structured to accompany the textbook. It can be found at

_Philosophy for A Level_ is an accessible textbook for the new 2017 AQA Philosophy syllabus. Structured closely around the AQA specification this textbook covers the two units Metaphysics of God and Metaphysics of Mind, in an engaging and student-friendly way. With chapters on 'How to do philosophy', exam preparation providing students with the philosophical skills they need to succeed, and an extensive glossary to support understanding, this book is ideal for students studying philosophy. Each chapter includes: argument maps that help to develop student’s analytical and critical skills comprehension questions to test understanding discussion questions to generate evaluative argument explanation and commentary of the AQA set texts ‘thinking harder’ sections for advanced study cross-references to help students make connections bullet-point summaries of each topic. The companion website hosts a wealth of further resources, including PowerPoint slides, flashcards, further reading, weblinks and handouts, all structured to accompany the textbook. It can be found at www.routledge.com/cw/alevelphilosophy.

In this article, I provide a guide to some current thinking in empirical moral psychology on the nature of moral intuitions, focusing on the theories of Haidt and Narvaez. Their debate connects to philosophical discussions of virtue theory and the role of emotions in moral epistemology. After identifying difficulties attending the current debate around the relation between intuitions and reasoning, I focus on the question of the development of intuitions. I discuss how intuitions could be shaped into moral expertise, outlining Haidt’s emphasis on innate factors and Narvaez’s account in terms of a social-cognitive model of personality. After a brief discussion of moral relativism, I consider the implications of the account of moral expertise for our understanding of the relation between moral intuitions and reason. I argue that a strong connection can be made if we adopt a broad conception of reason and a narrow conception of expertise.

Ever since Freud, psychoanalysts have explored the connections between psychoanalysis and literature and psychoanalysis and philosophy, while literary criticism, social science and philosophy have all reflected on and made use of ideas from psychoanalytic theory. The Academic Face of Psychoanalysis presents contributions from these fields and gives the reader an insight into different understandings and applications of psychoanalytic theory. This book comprises twelve contributions from experts in their fields covering philosophy, psychoanalysis, sociology and literary theory. The chapters are divided into three distinct sections: Psychoanalysis Philosophy Social science and literary theory Louise Braddock and Michael Lacewing successfully bring these contributions together with an in-depth introduction that allows the reader to explore the connections between the different disciplines. The multi-disciplinary approach to this book is rare; it will appeal to academics and students, from the subject areas of psychoanalysis, humanities and social science

Marcia Cavell’s recent book is the continuation of a ‘conversation between philosophy and psychoanalysis’ in which she has been engaged for some time. Her previous monograph, The Psychoanalytic Mind (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), was a powerful and sustained argument in favour of an interpretation of psychoanalysis and children’s mental development informed by a broadly Davidsonian perspective on mind and meaning. Her theme in Becoming a Subject is the nature of self, which she understands as the self-conscious, reflective, judging, reason-giving self – ‘someone who recognizes herself as an ‘I’, as having her own peculiar perspective’ (1).

Philosophy for A2: Unit 3 is the definitive textbook for students of the current AQA Advanced Level syllabus. Structured very closely around the AQA specifications for Unit 3: Key Themes in Philosophy, it introduces the student to each of the core themes: philosophy of mind political philosophy epistemology and metaphysics moral philosophy philosophy of religion. All chapters are helpfully subdivided into short digestible passages, and include: quiz questions to test core knowledge discussion questions to deepen understanding 'going further' sections for advanced study text boxes highlighting key definitions and arguments cross-references to help students make connections lively illustrations, diagrams and a glossary. In addition, a chapter on exam preparation contains a wealth of helpful hints and tips on revision and exam techniques. Written by an experienced philosopher and A Level consultant, Philosophy for A2: Unit 3 is an essential companion for all students of A2 Level philosophy

The very idea of unconscious emotion has been thought puzzling. But in recent debate about emotions, comparatively little attention has been given explicitly to the question. I survey a number of recent attempts by philosophers to resolve the puzzle and provide some preliminary remarks about their viability. I identify and discuss three families of responses: unconscious emotions involve conscious feelings, unconscious emotions involve no feelings at all, and unconscious emotions involve unconscious feelings. The discussion is exploratory rather than decisive for three reasons. First, the aim is to provide a framework for the debate, and identify a number of key issues for further research. Second, a number of the positions depend for their plausibility upon theoretical commitments that can be made clear, but cannot be evaluated in detail, in a survey article. Third, I believe no fully satisfactory, comprehensive solution has yet been developed

From its inception, psychoanalysis has been troubled by the problem of suggestion. I defend an answer to the problem of suggestion understood as a methodological concern about the evidential basis of psychoanalytic theory. This purely methodological approach is relatively uncommon in discussions in psychoanalysis. I argue that suggestion in psychoanalysis is best understood in terms of experimenter expectancy effects. Such effects are not specific to psychoanalysis, and they can be corrected for by relying on the corroboration of findings by different researchers. This response to the problem of suggestion faces several challenges, and a reply to these is offered. I argue that the psychodynamic model of mind, if not the metapsychological and etiological claims of psychoanalysis, can be vindicated in light of the actual agreement that exists.

Philosophy for AS is the definitive textbook for students of the current AQA Advanced Subsidiary Level. Structured closely around the examination specifications, it covers the two units of the AS Level in an exceptionally clear and student-friendly style. As an invitation to philosophy, the book encourages and enables students to engage philosophically with the following syllabus topics: reason and experience Why should I be governed? Why should I be moral? the idea of God persons knowledge of the external world tolerance the value of art God and the world the debate about free will and determinism. Each chapter contains an introduction to the basic ideas, arguments and objections of the issue, and a development section, which clarifies the previous material, introduces more complex ideas, and encourages students to link up ideas and draw new implications. To aid student learning and revision, each chapter includes: comprehension questions to test core knowledge discussion questions to deepen understanding 'going further' sections for advanced study cross-references to help students make connections helpful summaries and a glossary. In addition, a chapter on exam preparation contains a wealth of helpful hints and tips on revision and exam techniques. Written by an experienced philosopher and A Level consultant, Philosophy for AS is an essential course book for all students of AS Level philosophy.

_Philosophy for A2_ is an engaging textbook for the new AQA A2 Philosophy syllabus. Structured closely around the AQA specification this textbook covers the two units, Ethics and Philosophy of Mind, in a comprehensive and student-friendly way. All of the anthology texts are explained and commented on and woven into the discussion of the syllabus. With chapters on ‘How to Do Philosophy’ and exam preparation this textbook provides students with the philosophical skills they need to succeed. Each chapter includes: explanation and commentary of the AQA anthology texts comprehension questions to test understanding discussion questions to generate evaluative argument 'going further' sections for advanced study cross-references to help students make connections bullet-point summaries of each topic. The companion website hosts a wealth of further resources, including PowerPoint slides, flashcards, further reading, weblinks and handouts, all structured to accompany the textbook. It can be found at www.routledge.com/cw/alevelphilosophy.

In this paper, I argue against a perceptual model of moral epistemology. We should not reject the claim that there is a sense in which, on some occasions, emotions may be said to be perceptions of values or reasons. But going further than this, and taking perception as a model for moral epistemology is unhelpful and unilluminating. By focusing on the importance of the dispositions and structures of the self to moral knowledge, I bring out important disanalogies between moral epistemology and typical cases of perceptual expertise. As a result, how we gain, or fail to gain, moral knowledge should not be understood in terms of the operation of a perceptual capacity

_Revise Philosophy for AS Level_ is the definitive revision guide for students of the Advanced Subsidiary level syllabus. Following the AQA syllabus, it helps students revise using past exam questions, examiner's reports, and tips on revision for the examination. Also included are a helpful glossary and annotated further reading. It covers all three units of the AS Level syllabus: Unit 1: Theory of Knowledge Unit 2: Moral Philosophy and Philosophy of Religion Unit 3: Texts. The four set texts are discussed: Plato's _The Republic, _Descartes' _Meditations_, Marx and Engels’_ The German Ideology_ and Sartre’s _Existentialism and Humanism_. Essential reading for all students of AS Level Philosophy, it is an ideal companion to the textbook _Philosophy for AS and A2_, also published by Routledge

Philosophy for A2: Unit 4 is the definitive textbook for students of the current AQA Advanced Level syllabus for philosophy. Structured very closely around the AQA specifications for Unit 4: Philosophical Problems, Michael Lacewing helps students to engage with and understand the arguments of the five key texts: Hume's An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding Plato's The Republic Mill's On Liberty Descartes' Meditations Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil . All chapters are helpfully subdivided into short digestible passages, and include: quiz questions to test core knowledge discussion questions to deepen understanding 'going further' sections for advanced study text boxes highlighting key definitions and arguments cross-references to help students make connections. In addition, a chapter on exam preparation contains a wealth of helpful hints and tips on revision and exam techniques. Written by an experienced philosopher and A Level consultant, Philosophy for A2: Unit 4 is an essential companion for all students of A2 Level philosophy

As is widely known, the last 25 years have seen an acceleration in the development of theories of emotion. Perhaps less well-known is that the last three years have seen an extended defense of a predominant, though not universally accepted, framework for the understanding of emotion in philosophy and psychology. The central claim of this framework is that emotions are a form of evaluative response to their intentional objects, centrally involving cognition or something akin to cognition, in which the evaluation of the object relates to the concerns, interests, or well-being of the subject. I aim to summarize and review the work of five authors on three of the central themes of this framework, and to note some implications for the understanding of emotion in different psychotherapeutic approaches.

The aim of this paper to analyse the central argument of Cottingham’s (1998) Philosophy and the Good Life, and to strengthen and develop it against misinterpretation and objection. Cottingham’s argument is an objection to ‘ratiocentrism’, the view that the good life can be understood in terms of and attained by reason and strength of will. The objection begins from a proper understanding of akrasia, or weakness of will, but its focus, and the focus of this paper, is the relation between reason and the passions in the good life. Akrasia serves to illustrate ratiocentrism’s misunderstanding of this relation and of the nature of the passions themselves. In § I, I outline and clarify the objection. In § II, I present and provisionally elaborate on Cottingham’s diagnosis of what a corrected understanding of the passions makes necessary for the good life, viz. the rediscovery and reclamation of the source of our passions, our childhood past. In § III, I discuss whether ratiocentrism could accept and absorb the critique as developed so far. Cottingham (1998: 162) is aware that his claim, with its emphasis on self-knowledge, could be reinterpreted by ratiocentrism as no more than the need for reason to work with a different source of information regarding the passions in order to master them. I briefly present three further objections to show why this is a mistake. In § IV, I argue that Cottingham’s diagnosis is not quite right, and I seek to emphasise aspects of self-discovery that I believe Cottingham overlooks or underplays. What is needed is a set of interrelated dispositions, viz. acceptance, vulnerability, courage, and compassion; these can be inculcated and sustained by the journey Cottingham defends, but it is the dispositions, rather than the journey, that are properly considered a necessary part of the good life.