•  1
    What is knowledge? What, if anything, can we know? Michael Ayers initiates a fresh approach to these questions by recovering the insight in the distinction between 'knowledge' and 'belief' that was common philosophical currency for two millennia after Plato. He argues that knowledge comes only with direct cognitive contact with reality or truth.
  •  79
    Tradução para o português do verbete "George Berkeley, de Michael Ayers, retirado de "A Companion to Epistemology", ed. Jonathan Dancy e Ernest Sosa (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), pp. 261–264. Criticanarede. ISSN 1749-8457
  • The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy
    Studia Leibnitiana 30 (1): 124-132. 1998.
  • Bryan Magee Talks to Michael Ayers About Locke and Berkeley
    with Bryan Magee, Inc Bbc Education & Training, B. B. C. Worldwide Americas, and Films for the Humanities
    Films for the Humanities & Sciences. 1987.
  •  4
    The Problem of Contrary-to-fact Conditionals
    with John Watling, Alan R. White, Sidney Gendin, and Robert Hoffman
    Journal of Symbolic Logic 33 (2): 310-311. 1968.
  • The Refutation of Determinism
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 20 (2): 170-171. 1969.
  •  15
    What Is Realism?
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes( 75 91-110. 2001.
    A scholastic-Cartesian schema faithfully maps ordinary, effective ways of dealing with intentionality; yet its apparent incoherence provokes philosophers into opting for one of two stances, 'Cartesian' or 'direct realist', seemingly incompatible, yet each seem in accord with ordinary thought. A wide range of canonical and current theories, realist, idealist and hybrid, essentially involve one option or the other. We should instead consider why the language of intentionality, with its apparent an…Read more
  •  9
    The Empiricist Strikes Back
    The Philosophers' Magazine 5 54-55. 1999.
  •  138
    Substance: Prolegomena to a Realist Theory of Identity
    Journal of Philosophy 88 (2): 69-90. 1991.
  • No Title available: PHILOSOPHY
    Philosophy 47 (181): 276-278. 1972.
  •  24
    Perception and Action: M. R. Ayers
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 3 91-106. 1969.
    There is an ancient and ambiguous philosophical doctrine that perception is passive. This can mean that the mind contributes nothing to the content of our sensory experience: its power of perception is a mere receptivity. In this sense the principle has often been questioned, and is indeed doubtful on empirical grounds, given one reasonable interpretation of what it would be for the mind to make such a contribution
  •  14
    The Nature of Things: M. R. Ayers
    Philosophy 49 (190): 401-413. 1974.
    Anthony Quinton's The Nature of Things covers competently a good deal of philosophical ground in hopeful pursuit of a coherent ontology de-scribable as ‘a version of materialism’. He seems to discern two major difficulties for the enterprise: first, that of giving an acceptable account of ontology, and, secondly, that of reconciling his naturalism with his empiricist principles. ‘Naturalism’ is the view that man and his doings constitute a part of nature on the same ontological level as other na…Read more
  •  1
    No Title available: New Books (review)
    Philosophy 52 (200): 227-230. 1977.
  •  8
    Early modern writing and the new philosophy
    with J. W. Binns, Lorraine Daston, Katharine Park, Daniel Garber, Glyn P. Norton, and Charles B. Schmitt
    Journal of the History of Ideas 53 541-51. 1992.
  • Mehmet on Substances: A Reply
    Facta Philosophica: Internazionale Zeitschrift für Gegenwartsphilosophie: International Journal for Contemporary Philosophy 4 121-141. 2002.
  •  4
    Ideas and objective being
    In Daniel Garber & Michael Ayers (eds.), The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, Cambridge University Press. pp. 2--1063. 1998.
  •  37
    Perception and Action
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 3 91-106. 1969.
    There is an ancient and ambiguous philosophical doctrine that perception is passive. This can mean that the mind contributes nothing to the content of our sensory experience: its power of perception is a mere receptivity. In this sense the principle has often been questioned, and is indeed doubtful on empirical grounds, given one reasonable interpretation of what it would be for the mind to make such a contribution.
  •  21
    Berkeley (review)
    Philosophical Books 16 (2): 8-13. 1975.
  • The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy: Volume 2 (edited book)
    Cambridge University Press. 2008.
    This book offers a uniquely authoritative overview of early-modern philosophy, written by an international team of specialists.
  • The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy: Volume 1 (edited book)
    Cambridge University Press. 2008.
    The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy offers a uniquely comprehensive and authoritative overview of early-modern philosophy written by an international team of specialists. As with previous Cambridge Histories of Philosophy the subject is treated by topic and theme, and since history does not come packaged in neat bundles, the subject is also treated with great temporal flexibility, incorporating frequent reference to medieval and Renaissance ideas. The basic structure of the v…Read more
  •  8
    The Nature of Things
    Philosophy 49 (190). 1974.
  •  57
    Perhaps everyone who can think has the concept of possibility, but no one understands it. The metaphysical theory of Determinism is a symptom of this lack of understanding, and the inconclusiveness of its opponents’ arguments indicates that the lack is universal. In this book, first published in 1968, the author shows that there are a number of different kinds on non-logical possibility, subtly interrelated, each requiring separate explanation. An original contribution to the subject, it is esse…Read more
  •  4
    Reviews (review)
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 21 (2): 215-216. 1970.
  •  28
    Austin on `could' and `could have'
    Philosophical Quarterly 16 (63): 113-120. 1966.
  •  68
    Popkin’s revised scepticism
    British Journal for the History of Philosophy 12 (2). 2004.
    This Article does not have an abstract