•  17
    Dynamic Humeanism
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (4): 983-1007. 2018.
    Humean accounts of laws of nature fail to distinguish between dynamic laws and static initial conditions. But this distinction plays a central role in scientific theorizing and explanation. I motivate the claim that this distinction should matter for the Humean, and show that current views lack the resources to explain it. I then develop a regularity theory that captures this distinction. My view takes empirical accessibility to be one of the primary features of laws, and I identify features law…Read more
  •  10
    What Everyone Should Say About Symmetries
    Philosophy of Science. forthcoming.
    The laws of physics have an interesting internal explanatory structure. Some principles explain others; some constraints fall out of the dynamic equations, and others help determine them. This leads to interesting, and non-trivial, questions for metaphysicians of laws. What sort of explanation is this? Which principles are explananda, and which explanandum? In a recent and insightful series of papers, Marc Lange has discussed these questions in detail, with a focus on the explanatory priority of…Read more
  •  14
    Making Fit Fit
    Philosophy of Science 84 (5): 931-943. 2017.
    Reductionist accounts of objective chance rely on a notion of fit, which ties the chances at a world to the frequencies at that world. Here, I criticize extant measures of the fit of a chance system and draw on recent literature in epistemic utility theory to propose a new model: chances fit a world insofar as they are accurate at that world. I show how this model of fit does a better job of explaining the normative features of chance, its role in the laws of nature, and its status as an expert …Read more
  •  51
    Dynamic Humeanism
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 2017.
    Humean accounts of laws of nature fail to distinguish between dynamic laws and static initial conditions. But this distinction plays a central role in scientific theorizing and explanation. I motivate the claim that this distinction should matter for the Humean, and show that current views lack the resources to explain it. I then develop a regularity theory that captures this distinction. My view takes empirical accessibility to be one of the primary features of laws, and I identify features law…Read more
  •  126
    Derivative Properties in Fundamental Laws
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (2). 2017.
    Orthodoxy has it that only metaphysically elite properties can be invoked in scientifically elite laws. We argue that this claim does not fit scientific practice. An examination of candidate scientifically elite laws like Newton’s F = ma reveals properties invoked that are irreversibly defined and thus metaphysically non-elite by the lights of the surrounding theory: Newtonian acceleration is irreversibly defined as the second derivative of position, and Newtonian resultant force is irreversibly…Read more