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Homunculi heads and silicon chips: the importance of history to phenomenologyIn Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, Mit Press. 2019.
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69The problem of simple minds: Is there anything it is like to be a honey bee?Philosophical Studies 88 (3): 289-317. 1997.
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21Is Content-Externalism Compatible with Privileged Access?Philosophical Review 107 (3): 349-380. 1998.
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120Causal Roles and Higher-Order PropertiesTen Problems of ConsciousnessPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3): 657. 1998.I discuss whether Michael Tye, in Ten Problems of Consciousness. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1966, holds that phenomenal properties are neurological properties, but that what gives them their phenomenal property names are their highly complex interconnections with other neurological properties and, most especially, subjects' surroundings. Or, alternatively, whether he holds that they are higher-level, wide functional properties in the sense of being properties of having properties that …Read more
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14Shoemaker's The First-Person Perspective and Other EssaysPhilosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (2): 461-464. 2000.This excellent collection of essays by Sydney Shoemaker covers his work over the last ten years in the philosophy of mind. Shoemaker's overarching concern in the collection is to provide an account of the mind that does justice to the “first-person perspective.” The two main topics are the nature of self-knowledge and the nature of sensory experience. The essays are insightful, careful, and thought-provoking.
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46Raw Feeling: A Philosophical Account of the Essence of ConsciousnessPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4): 968-971. 1997.
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111Externalism and MemoryAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 72 (72): 77-109. 1998.[Michael Tye] Externalism about thought contents has received enormous attention in the philosophical literature over the past fifteen years or so, and it is now the established view. There has been very little discussion, however, of whether memory contents are themselves susceptible to an externalist treatment. In this paper, I argue that anyone who is sympathetic to Twin Earth thought experiments for externalism with respect to certain thoughts should endorse externalism with respect to certa…Read more
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29Filling In and the Nature of Visual ExperienceThe Harvard Review of Philosophy 27 59-69. 2020.This essay begins with a discussion of the phenomenon of filling in. It is argued that filling in is naturally accounted for by taking visual experiences to be importantly like drawn pictures of the world outside. An alternative proposal is then considered, one that models visual experiences on incomplete descriptions. It is shown that introspection does not favor the pictorial view. It is also shown that the phenomenon of blurriness in visual experience does not provide a good reason for favori…Read more
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28Consciousness and Causality: A Debate on the Nature of MindPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2): 336-339. 1986.
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107Two Cheers for RepresentationalismTen Problems of ConsciousnessPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3): 671. 1998.
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14Richard Arneson University of California, San Diego Alison Leigh Brown Northern Arizona UniversityPhilosophical Studies 99 (1). 2000.
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67Vagueness and the Evolution of Consciousness: Through the Looking GlassOxford University Press. 2021.The two dominant theories of consciousness argue it appeared in living beings either suddenly, or gradually. Both theories face problems. The solution is the realization that a foundational consciousness was always here, yet varying conscious states were not, and appeared gradually. Michael Tye explores this idea and the key questions it raises.
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1Representation in Pictorialism and ConnectionismSouthern Journal of Philosophy 26 (S1): 163-183. 1988.
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38Filling In and the Nature of Visual ExperienceThe Harvard Review of Philosophy 27 59-69. 2020.This essay begins with a discussion of the phenomenon of filling in. It is argued that filling in is naturally accounted for by taking visual experiences to be importantly like drawn pictures of the world outside. An alternative proposal is then considered, one that models visual experiences on incomplete descriptions. It is shown that introspection does not favor the pictorial view. It is also shown that the phenomenon of blurriness in visual experience does not provide a good reason for favori…Read more
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170Of Colors, Kestrels, Caterpillars, and LeavesJournal of Philosophy 98 (9): 469. 2001.According to color realism, object colors are mind-independent properties that cover surfaces or permeate volumes of objects. In recent years, some color scientists and a growing number of philosophers have opposed this view on the grounds that realism about color cannot accommodate the apparent unitary/binary structure of the hues. For example, Larry Hardin asserts, the unitary-binary structure of the colors as we experience them corresponds to no known physical structure lying outside nervous …Read more
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114The Problem of Simple Minds: Is There Anything It Is Like to Be a Honey Bee? (review)Philosophical Studies 88 (3): 289-317. 1997.
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13Metaphysical and Epistemological Problems of PerceptionPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (2): 347-350. 1987.
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981What Acquaintance TeachesIn Thomas Raleigh & Jonathan Knowles (eds.), Acquaintance: New Essays, Oxford University Press. 2019.In her black and white room, Mary doesn’t know what it is like to see red. Only after undergoing an experience as of something red and hence acquainting herself with red can Mary learn what it is like. But learning what it is like to see red requires more than simply becoming acquainted with it. To be acquainted with something is to know it, but such knowledge, as we argue, is object-knowledge rather than propositional-knowledge. To know what it is like one must know an appropriate propositional…Read more
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3Response to DiscussantsTen Problems of ConsciousnessPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3): 679. 1998.
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78Are Pains Feelings?The Monist 100 (4): 478-484. 2017.This essay defends the view that pain is a feeling, and thus that token pains are instances of feeling, against a number of objections.