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21Cue-overload theory and the method of interpolated attributesBulletin of the Psychonomic Society 7 (3): 289-291. 1976.
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12The Problem of Perceptual AgreementCroatian Journal of Philosophy 23 (68): 133-138. 2023.We present the problem of perceptual agreement (of determinate color) and submit that it proves to be a serious and long overlooked obstacle for those insisting that colors are not objective features of objects, viz., nonobjectivist theories like C. L. Hardin’s (2003) eliminativism and Jonathan Cohen’s (2009) relationalism.
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27WIESING, LAMBERT. The Philosophy of Perception: Phenomenology and Image Theory. Trans. Nancy Ann Roth. New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014, ix +166 pp., $120.00 cloth, $39.95 paper (review)Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 75 (1): 88-90. 2017.
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71Supervenience and Realization: Aesthetic Objects and their PropertiesBritish Journal of Aesthetics 61 (2): 229-245. 2021.Aestheticians generally agree that the aesthetic features of an object depend upon the non-aesthetic features of an object, and that this dependence can be captured by some formulation of the supervenience relation. I argue that the aesthetic depends upon the non-aesthetic in various and importantly different ways; that these dependence relations cannot be explained by supervenience; that appeals to supervenience create puzzles that aestheticians have neither fully appreciated nor resolved; and …Read more
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33Colors, Perceptual Variation, and ScienceErkenntnis 89 (3): 1157-1181. 2024.Arguments from perceptual variation challenge the view that colors are objective properties of objects, properties that objects have independent of how they are perceived. This paper attempts, first, to diagnose one central reason why arguments from perceptual variation seem especially challenging for objectivists about color. Second, we offer a response to this challenge, claiming that once we focus on determinate colors rather than the determinables they determine, a response to arguments from…Read more
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8Do Animals See Colors? An Anthropoccentrist's Guide to Animals, The Color Blind, and Far AwayPhilosophical Studies 94 (3): 189-209. 1999.
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196Response-dependence about aesthetic valuePacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (3): 338-352. 2012.The dominant view about the nature of aesthetic value holds it to be response-dependent. We believe that the dominance of this view owes largely to some combination of the following prevalent beliefs: 1 The belief that challenges brought against response-dependent accounts in other areas of philosophy are less challenging when applied to response-dependent accounts of aesthetic value. 2 The belief that aesthetic value is instrumental and that response-dependence about aesthetic value alone accom…Read more
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289The knowledge argument against the knowledge argumentAnalysis 49 (June): 158-60. 1989.Epiphenomenalism => qualia don't cause beliefs => we don't know about qualia
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19Colours and Causes: A Reply to Jackson and PargetterDialogue 36 (2): 281-286. 1997.RésuméFrank Jackson et Robert Pargetter défendent l'idée que la couleur rouge est lapropriété, quelle qu'elle soit, qui cause ou causerait l'apparition de rouge dans notre expérience visuelle. Ceci empêche la couleur rouge d'être une propriété dispositionnelle, soutiennent-ils, puisque les propriétés dispositionnelles sont causalement inertes. Pour des raisons similaires, Us concluent aussi que la couleur rouge ne peut pas être une propriété disjonctive. Mais, comme ils s'en rendent bien compte,…Read more
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7Rediscovering Colors: A Study in Pollyanna RealismSpringer Verlag. 2002.In Rediscovering Colors: A Study in Pollyanna Realism, Michael Watkins endorses the Moorean view that colors are simple, non-reducible, properties of objects. Consequently, Watkins breaks from what has become the received view that either colors are reducible to certain properties of interest to science, or else nothing is really colored. What is novel about the work is that Watkins, unlike other Mooreans, takes seriously the metaphysics of colors. Consequently, Watkins provides an account of wh…Read more
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59Intentionalism and the Inverted SpectrumCroatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (3): 299-313. 2008.Intentionalism holds that two experiences differ in their representational content if and only if they differ in phenomenal character. It is generally held that Intentionalism cannot allow for the possibility of spectrum inversion without systematic error, unless it abandons the idea that, for example, the qualitative character of color experience is inherited from the qualitative character of colors. The paper argues that the conjunction of all three -- the possibility of spectrum inversion, In…Read more
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21Colours: Their Nature and Representation Barry Maund New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995. xv + 247 pp., $49.95 (review)Dialogue 37 (3): 580-. 1998.
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44What our colour experiences don't teach us: A reply to Boghossian and VellemanDialogue 36 (4): 783-786. 1997.RésuméPaul Boghossian et David Velleman ont soutenu que les théories physicalistes des couleurs — celles qui identifient les propriétés de couleur avec certaines propriétés physiques des objets ou de la lumière—ne peuvent accommoder l'intuition profonde selon laquelle nous ne pouvons pas être dans l'erreur au sujet des contenus représentationnels de nos expériences de couleur. Contre Boghossian et Velleman, je soutiens que cette intuition prétendue que les théories physicalistes ne réussisssent …Read more
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161A posteriori primitivismPhilosophical Studies 150 (1). 2010.Recent criticisms of non-reductive accounts of color assume that the only arguments for such accounts are a priori arguments. I put forward a posteriori arguments for a non-reductive account of colors which avoids those criticisms
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180Seeing red: The metaphysics of colours without the physicsAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (1): 33-52. 2005.By treating colours as sui generis intrinsic properties of objects we can maintain that (1) colours are causally responsible for colour experiences (and so agree with the physicalist) and (2) colours, along with the similarity and difference relations that colours bear to one another, are presented to us by casual observation (and so agree with the dispositionalist). The major obstacle for such a view is the causal overdetermination of colour experience. Borrowing and expanding on the works of S…Read more
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57Do animals see colors? An anthropocentrist's guide to animals, the color blind, and far away placesPhilosophical Studies 94 (3): 189-209. 1999.
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43The Red and the Real: An Essay on Color Ontology (review)Philosophical Review 120 (2): 326-329. 2011.
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34Varieties of Relativism (review)Review of Metaphysics 50 (3): 663-665. 1997.As the title suggests, Varieties of Relativism presents a catalogue of types of relativism, as well as the arguments both for and against each type. The authors say they "are aiming at a presentation that would serve in the classroom to introduce the kinds of arguments that appear in particular texts", and the book is primarily devoted to this task. The authors also suggest a positive thesis, what they take to be a version of relativism. Their primary concern is not to develop that thesis, howev…Read more
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Evan Thompson, Colour Vision: A Study in Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of Perception Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 17 (4): 295-298. 1997.
Auburn, Alabama, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Value Theory |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Value Theory |