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    Theories as recipes: third-order virtue and vice
    Philosophical Studies 177 (2): 391-411. 2020.
    A basic way of evaluating metaphysical theories is to ask whether they give satisfying answers to the questions they set out to resolve. I propose an account of “third-order” virtue that tells us what it takes for certain kinds of metaphysical theories to do so. We should think of these theories as recipes. I identify three good-making features of recipes and show that they translate to third-order theoretical virtues. I apply the view to two theories—mereological universalism and plenitudinous …Read more
  •  138
    Debunking Logical Ground: Distinguishing Metaphysics from Semantics
    Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1-15. forthcoming.
    Many philosophers take purportedly logical cases of ground (such as a true disjunction being grounded in its true disjunct(s)) to be obvious cases, and indeed such cases have been used to motivate the existence of and importance of ground. I argue against this. I do so by motivating two kinds of semantic determination relations. Intuitions of logical ground track these semantic relations. Moreover, our knowledge of semantics for (e.g.) first order logic can explain why we have such intuitions. A…Read more
  •  122
    Logical Realism and the Metaphysics of Logic
    Philosophy Compass 14 (1). 2019.
  •  162
    Following logical realism where it leads
    Philosophical Studies 176 (1): 117-139. 2019.
    Logical realism is the view that there is logical structure in the world. I argue that, if logical realism is true, then we are deeply ignorant of that logical structure: either we can’t know which of our logical concepts accurately capture it, or none of our logical concepts accurately capture it at all. I don’t suggest abandoning logical realism, but instead discuss how realists should adjust their methodology in the face of this ignorance.
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    An Epistemic Account Of Metaphysical Equivalence1
    Philosophical Perspectives 30 (1): 270-293. 2016.
    I argue that, in order for us to be justified in believing that two theories are metaphysically equivalent, we must be able to conceive of them as unified into a single theory, which says nothing over and above either of them. I propose one natural way of precisifying this condition, and show that the quantifier variantist cannot meet it. I suggest that the quantifier variantist cannot meet the more general condition either, and argue that this gives the metaphysical realist a way to rule out th…Read more