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43Frontloading and the Necessary A PosterioriAustralasian Journal of Philosophy. forthcoming.In this paper, I reevaluate Kripke’s arguments for the necessary a posteriori contra a Kantian pure modal rationalism according to which modal cognition is a priori. I argue that Kripke’s critique of Kant suggests an impure but nevertheless ambitious modal rationalism according to which the basis of modal cognition remains a priori. I then argue that Kripke’s critique of pure modal rationalism does not go deep enough. More specifically, I argue that certain conditional modal judgments, which Kri…Read more
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786Does Contextualism Hinge on A Methodological Dispute?In Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism, Routledge. pp. 81-93. 2017.In this entry, we provide an overview of some of the methodological debates surrounding contextualism and consider whether they are, in effect, based on an underlying methodological dispute. We consider three modes of motivation of epistemic contextualism including i) the method of cases, ii) the appeal to linguistic analogies and iii) the appeal to conceptual analogies and functional roles. We also consider the methodological debates about contextualism arising from experimental philosophy. We …Read more
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13Stability and cognitive architecture: response to MacheryInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy. forthcoming.In this response to Edouard Machery's comments on On Folk Epistemology, I address his methodological challenges, the first of which concerns cross-cultural and interpersonal instability of case judgments. Whereas I agree with Machery about the importance of not going too quickly from folk epistemological judgments to epistemological theory, I argue against skepticism about such judgments. Machery's second challenge concerns my bias account of patterns of knowledge ascriptions. Whereas I agree wi…Read more
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7The scope of epistemic focal bias: response to Blome-TillmannInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy. forthcoming.In this response to Michael Blome-Tillmann's comments on On Folk Epistemology, I defend the book's epistemic focal bias account of the salient alternatives effect that Blome-Tillmann takes to motivate epistemic contextualism. First, I defend the epistemic focal bias account against Blome-Tillmann's criticism that it is insufficiently general insofar as it fails to account for a range of cases. Second, I defend the epistemic focal bias account from Blome-Tillmann's charge that it overgeneralizes …Read more
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16Purism and conservatism: response to NolfiInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy. forthcoming.In this response to Kate Nolfi's comments on On Folk Epistemology, I defend the book's arguments in favor of strict purist invariantism and against pragmatic encroachment. I first defend the negative Argument Argument against pragmatic encroachment by arguing that Nolfi's ingenious cases do not compromise it or my heuristic proxy/directive force account of practical factor effects. Second, I consider Nolfi's suggestion to amend the book's three methodological principles with a fourth Principle o…Read more
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20Précis of on folk epistemologyInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy. forthcoming.In this précis of On Folk Epistemology, I briefly outline some of the book's main substantive theses that the symposiasts discuss. Moreover, I sketch the book's methodology for addressing the relationship between folk epistemology and epistemological theorizing.
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45Trespassing Testimony in Scientific CollaborationMind 132 (526): 505-522. 2023.The term ‘epistemic trespassing’ has recently been coined to denote a person’s judgments regarding a domain where they are not epistemic experts. In this paper, I focus on expert trespassing testimony – that is, testimony by an expert in a domain of expertise other than his own. More specifically, I focus on intra-scientific trespassing testimony between scientific collaborators. By developing a number of distinctions, I argue that while intra-scientific trespassing testimony may seriously hampe…Read more
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31Assessing the Evidence for Outcome Bias and Hindsight BiasReview of Philosophy and Psychology 15 (1): 237-252. 2024.Outcome bias and hindsight bias are important in philosophical debates and have wide-ranging implications outside of philosophy. Recently, Hedden has articulated a novel line of argumnt that the empirical evidence for what he labels hindsight bias is largely misguided and that empirical researchers who postulate such a bias are engaged in a fallacy fallacy. In this paper, I articulate Hedden’s core insights in terms of two principles and argue that in the relevant empirical research, these princ…Read more
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287Introduction to 'Scientific Testimony: Its roles in science and society'Oxford University Press. 2022.This is the Introduction and Chapter 1.1 of the book ‘Scientific Testimony. Its roles in science and society’ (OUP 2022). The introduction contains a brief survey of the book’s chapters and main conclusions, which I hope will be useful to the curious ones.
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Epistemic entitlement : its scope and limitsIn Peter Graham & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), Epistemic Entitlement, Oxford University Press. 2020.
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66Scientific Testimony. Its roles in science and society.Oxford University Press. 2022.Scientific Testimony concerns the roles of scientific testimony in science and society. The book develops a positive alternative to a tradition famously expressed by the slogan of the Royal Society Nullius in verba ("Take nobody's word for it"). This book argues that intra-scientific testimony—i.e., testimony between collaborating scientists—is not in conflict with the spirit of science or an add-on to scientific practice. On the contrary, intra-scientific testimony is a vital part of science. T…Read more
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234Salient Alternatives and Epistemic Injustice in Folk EpistemologyIn Sophie Archer (ed.), Salience: A Philosophical Inquiry, Routledge. pp. 213-233. 2022.I consider a number of questions for foundational epistemology that arise from further reflection on salience of alternatives and epistemic position. On this basis, I turn to more applied issues. First, I will consider work in social psychology to motivate the working-hypothesis that social stereotypes will make some alternatives more, and some less, salient. A related working-hypothesis is that social stereotypes may lead to both overestimation and underestimation of a subject’s epistemic posit…Read more
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228Disagreement and Epistemic Injustice from a Communal PerspectiveIn J. Adam Carter & Fernando Broncano-Berrocal (eds.), The Epistemology of Group Disagreement. forthcoming.I will consider disagreement from a communal perspective. Thus, my focus will not primarily be on disagreement between different groups although this case will figure as well. My main focus is on the epistemic pros and cons of disagreement for a community and on how the social structure of the community bears on these pros and cons. A central lesson will be that disagreement has more epistemic costs at the communal level than is often recognized, and that these epistemic costs often yield episte…Read more
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320Representation and Misrepresentation of KnowledgeBehavioral and Brain Sciences. forthcoming.I argue for three points: First, evidence of the primacy of knowledge representation is not evidence of primacy of knowledge. Second, knowledge-oriented mindreading research should also focus on misrepresentations and biased representations of knowledge. Third, knowledge-oriented mindreading research must confront the problem of the gold standard that arises when disagreement about knowledge complicates the interpretation of empirical findings.
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84A transcendental argument from testimonial knowledge to content externalismNoûs 56 (2): 259-275. 2022.
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83Salient Alternatives in PerspectiveAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (4): 792-810. 2020.This paper empirically investigates how perspective bears on putative salient alternative effects on knowledge ascriptions. Some theoretical accounts predict salient alternative effects in both fir...
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86How to balance Balanced Reporting and Reliable ReportingPhilosophical Studies 177 (10): 3117-3142. 2020.The paper draws on philosophy of science to help resolve a tension between two central journalistic ideals: That of resenting diverse viewpoints (Balanced Reporting) and that of presenting the most reliable testimony (Reliable Reporting). While both of these ideals are valuable, they may be in tension. This is particularly so when it comes to scientific testimony and science reporting. Thus, we face a hard question: How should and be balanced in science reporting? The present paper contributes s…Read more
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162This is an appendix containing the stimulus materials for the experiments reported in the paper ‘Salient Alternatives in Perspective.’
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75Public scientific testimony in the scientific imageStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A (C). forthcoming.
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45How We Understand Others: Philosophy and Social Cognition, by Shannon Spaulding (review)Mind 129 (513): 268-275. 2020.How We Understand Others: Philosophy and Social Cognition, by SpauldingShannon. NY: Routledge, 2018. Pp. ix + 102.
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653Epistemic norms of assertion and actionIn Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion, Oxford University Press. 2018.The purpose of the present chapter is to survey the work on epistemic norms of action, practical deliberation and assertion and to consider how these norms are interrelated. On a more constructive note, we will argue that if there are important similarities between the epistemic norms of action and assertion, it has important ramifications for the debates over speech acts and harm. Thus, we hope that the chapter will indicate how thinking about assertions as a speech act can benefit from a broad…Read more
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765Pragmatic Encroachment and the Challenge from Epistemic InjusticePhilosophers' Imprint 19. 2019.I present a challenge to epistemological pragmatic encroachment theories from epistemic injustice. The challenge invokes the idea that a knowing subject may be wronged by being regarded as lacking knowledge due to social identity prejudices. However, in an important class of such cases, pragmatic encroachers appear to be committed to the view that the subject does not know. Hence, pragmatic encroachment theories appear to be incapable of accounting for an important type of injustice – namely, di…Read more
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343Burge, Tyler (1946-)Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2018.Tyler Burge is an American philosopher whose body of work spans several areas of theoretical philosophy in the analytic tradition. While Burge has made important contributions to the philosophy of language and logic, he is most renowned for his work in philosophy of mind and epistemology. In particular, he is known for articulating and developing a view he labels ‘anti-individualism.’ In his later work, Burge connects his views with state-of-the-art scientific theory. Despite this emphasis on …Read more
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562Pragmatic Encroachment on Scientific Knowledge?In Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology, Routledge. 2019.Pragmatic encroachment theories of knowledge may be characterized as views according to which practical factors may partly determine the truth-value of ascriptions that S knows that p – even though these factors do not partly determine S’s belief that p or p itself. The pros and cons of variations of pragmatic encroachment are widely discussed in epistemology. But despite a long pragmatist tradition in the philosophy of science, few efforts have been devoted to relate this particular view to iss…Read more
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366MetaepistemologyRoutledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2018.Metaepistemology may be partly characterized as the study of the nature, aims, methods and legitimacy of epistemology. Given such a characterization, most epistemological views and theories have an important metaepistemological aspect or, at least, a number of more or less explicit metaepistemological commitments. Metaepistemology is an important area of philosophy because it exemplifies that philosophy must serve as its own meta-discipline by continuously reflecting critically on its own method…Read more
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95Expert Trespassing Testimony and the Ethics of Science CommunicationJournal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 49 (3): 299-318. 2018.Scientific expert testimony is crucial to public deliberation, but it is associated with many pitfalls. This article identifies one—namely, expert trespassing testimony—which may be characterized, crudely, as the phenomenon of experts testifying outside their domain of expertise. My agenda is to provide a more precise characterization of this phenomenon and consider its ramifications for the role of science in society. I argue that expert trespassing testimony is both epistemically problematic a…Read more
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134Truth‐Sensitivity and Folk EpistemologyPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (1): 3-25. 2020.Several studies have found a robust effect of truth on epistemic evaluation of belief, decision, action and assertion. Thus, truth has a significant effect on normative participant evaluations. Some theorists take this truth effect to motivate factive epistemic norms of belief, action, assertion etc. In contrast, I argue that the truth effect is best understood as an epistemic instance of the familiar and ubiquitous phenomenon of outcome bias. I support this diagnosis from three interrelating pe…Read more
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18Conceptual Equivocation and Epistemic RelevanceDialectica 63 (2): 117-132. 2009.Much debate has surrounded “switching” scenarios in which a subject's reasoning is said to exhibit the fallacy of equivocation. Peter Ludlow has argued that such scenarios are “epistemically prevalent” and, therefore, epistemically relevant alternatives. Since a distinctive feature of the cases in question is that the subject blamelessly engages in conceptual equivocation, we may label them ‘equivocational switching cases’.Ludlow's influential argument occurs in a discussion about compatibilism …Read more
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130Introduction: Social Cognitive Ecology and Its Role in Social EpistemologyEpisteme 8 (1): 1-5. 2011.
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Inland Norway University of Applied SciencesDepartment of Law, Philosophy and International Studies (Lillehammer)Professor II (Part-time)
Odense, Denmark