Miloš Agatonović

The contemporary conceptions of universal basic income, tax havens extraction, and climate emergency are briefly presented in the form of exposition in Massive Attack?s Eutopia EP. These conceptions address the most concerning issues of today?s world, while the concept of eutopia, proposed by Massive Attack?s Robert Del Naja and Mark Donne, represents?a place of well-being, as a practical aspiration,? a realistic utopia in which those issues are resolved. The present paper discusses the conceptions presented in Eutopia, assessing the possibility of the materialisation of eutopia. As suggested by Massive Attack, the ideas of Eutopia can be traced back to More?s Utopia, being rooted in a humanistic endeavour of improving humanity, inspiring engagement and search for a better and just society. Apart from discussing Eutopia, the paper explores Another Now, the political science-fiction novel by Yanis Varoufakis. Varoufakis? critique of capitalism and the alternative he proposes in the novel Another Now argue along the same line as Eutopia, encouraging engagement in today?s world.

The present paper intends to show that computer simulations used in science are akin to fiction. Starting from the problem of defining computer simulation, the paper discusses the uses and disadvantages of simulations in science. Computer simulations have a representational function, but they do not resemble the phenomena that they purport to represent. Computer simulations do not preserve the content of the models, input data, and theories from which they proceed, since the content is modified by computational processes. Because of the complexities of these processes, we cannot control or test the methods used to process the content of computer simulations. Still, simulations may help to explain the behaviour of a possible aspect of the phenomenon under examination. Although their role in doing so may be limited, by conforming to and immersing us in the worldview of science, simulations, thus reinforce the intuitions of the existing body of scientific knowledge, and similarly to the “believable fiction” described by John Woods, provide genuine understanding.

Nick Bostrom’s “simulation argument” purports to show that if it is possible to create and run a vast number of computer simulations indistinguishable from the reality we are living in, then it is highly probable that we are already living in a computer simulation. However, the simulation argument requires a modification to escape the undermining implications of the scepticism it implies, as argued by Birch. The present paper shows that, even if the modified simulation argument is valid, still it is unsound since it relies on the indistinguishability assumption that even in principle cannot be tested. To account for the unsoundness of the simulation argument, the present paper draws on John Woods' theory of fiction, to expose structural similarities between general fiction and the simulation argument. Though the simulation argument is unsound, it seems persuasive, because the argument immerses the reader in a fictive world with the help of tacit assumptions, leveraging just enough common sense to remain compelling while covering over an untestable premise. Simultaneously with the critique of Bostrom’s argument, Chalmers' argument for the matrix hypothesis is assessed on similar criteria. In either case, both arguments rely on an accumulation of assumptions, both implicit and explicit, hiding the premises that are untestable in principle.