•  45
    Expressivism without Mentalism in Meta-Ontology
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (5): 781-800. 2018.
    ABSTRACTCarnap famously argued that there are two kinds of questions and claims concerning the existence or reality of entities: internal and external ones. We focus on Carnapian external ontological claims of the form: ‘Xs really exist’, where ‘X’ stands for some traditional metaphysical category, such as ‘substance’, ‘fact’ or ‘structure’. While Carnap considered them as meaningless, we consider them as faultlessly meaningful. However, in line with an expressivist guise, we do not claim that t…Read more
  •  30
    Scientific Models and Metalinguistic Negotiation
    Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 34 (2): 277. 2019.
    The aim of this paper is to explore the possibility that, at least, some metaphysical debates are ‘metalinguistic negotiations’. I will take the dispute between the dominant approaches of realism and the anti-realism ones about the ontological status of scientific models as a case-study. I will argue that such a debate may be better understood as a disagreement, at bottom normatively, motivated, insofar as a normative and non-factual question may be involved in it: how the relevant piece of lang…Read more
  •  11
    Transparent Contents and Trivial Inferences
    Studia Semiotyczne 33 (1): 9-28. 2019.
    A possible way out to Kripke’s Puzzle About Belief could start from the rejection of the notion of epistemic transparency. Epistemic transparency seems, indeed, irremediably incompatible with an externalist conception of mental content. However, Brandom’s inferentialism could be considered a version of externalism that allows, at least in some cases, to save the principle of transparency. Appealing to a normative account of the content of our beliefs, from the inferentialist’s standpoint, it is …Read more
  •  8
    American Philosophical Quarterly 60 (1): 1-4. 2023.
    Obviously, science matters to philosophy. But is philosophy also constrained by science? Naturalism is roughly the view that answers positively. However, even among proponents of naturalism, how science constrains philosophy has always been (and still is) a subject of debate. There are two basic dimensions in which the debate takes place, which give rise to two different kinds of naturalism: ontological and methodological. The former concerns what there is, while the latter deals with the method…Read more
  •  7
    Categories and the Language of Metaphysics
    Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 26 (2): 186-206. 2019.
    The purpose of this paper is to better understand what ontologists are doing when they ask questions about the categories of the world. I will take Cumpa’s attempts to find out the fundamental structure of the world as a case-study. In one of his latest paper (Cumpa 2014), he conceives the classical ontological question about the existence of the fundamental categories of the world (what are the fundamental categories of the world?) as a question about the category able to unify the two Sellarsi…Read more
  •  6
    Rectification note to “Scientific models and metalinguistic negotiation”, 277-295).