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The Ethics of Relationships: Broadening the Scope (edited book)Oxford University Press. forthcoming.
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49 Die Pflicht zur Selbstvervollkommnung. Zu Kants Konzeption der unvollkommenen Pflichten des Menschen gegen sich selbst in Ansehung seines Zwecks (§§ 19–22) (review)In Otfried Höffe (ed.), Immanuel Kant: Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre, De Gruyter. pp. 139-154. 2019.
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33Are there insolvable moral conflicts?In Peter Baumann & Monika Betzler (eds.), Practical Conflicts: New Philosophical Essays, Cambridge University Press. pp. 279-294. 2004.
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6Persönliche Projekte als diachrone OrientierungsprinzipienIn Dieter Sturma (ed.), Vernunft und Freiheit: Zur praktischen Philosophie von Julian Nida-Rümelin, De Gruyter. pp. 39-70. 2012.
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6Der Wert der KindheitIn Johannes Drerup & Gottfried Schweiger (eds.), Handbuch Philosophie der Kindheit, J.b. Metzler. pp. 203-210. 2019.Die Frage nach dem Wert der Kindheit lässt sich prinzipiell in zwei verschiedenen Weisen verstehen. Zum einen geht es darum herauszufinden, ob und in welcher Hinsicht es gut oder schlecht ist, ein Kind zu sein. Das Interesse gilt daher dem speziellen oder distinkten Wert, welcher der Kindheit etwa im Unterschied zum Erwachsensein zukommt. Zum andern wird untersucht, ob und wenn ja, inwiefern Kindheit als erste Phase menschlicher Entwicklung ein wertvoller Teil eines guten Lebens ist und wie dies…Read more
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6AutonomieIn Johannes Drerup & Gottfried Schweiger (eds.), Handbuch Philosophie der Kindheit, J.b. Metzler. pp. 61-69. 2019.Autonomie bezeichnet im Allgemeinen die Fähigkeit, sich selbst zu bestimmen und sein Verhalten oder Leben nach eigenen Regeln, Zielen oder Werten zu führen. Dazu gehören u. a. die Vorstellung von Selbstkontrolle, von Unabhängigkeit, vom eigenen Willen sowie die Idee, eine mündige, selbstständige und authentische Person zu sein, die frei von äußeren Beschränkungen und inneren Zwängen ist.
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28Shared Belief and the Limits of EmpathyPacific Philosophical Quarterly 102 (2): 267-291. 2021.To show affective empathy is to share in another person's experiences, including her emotions. Most philosophers who write about emotions accept the broadly cognitivist view that emotions are rationally connected with beliefs. We argue that affective empathy is also rationally connected with belief; you can only share in another's emotions insofar as you can share certain of her beliefs. In light of that claim, we argue that affective empathy brings both epistemic dangers and epistemic benefits,…Read more
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Evaluative Bindungen und bindungsabhängige Gründe : eine Herausforderung für den metaethischen Realisten?In Julian Nida-Rümelin & Dietmar vd Pfordten (eds.), Moralischer Realismus?: zur kohärentistischen Metaethik Julian Nida-Rümelins, Mentis. 2015.
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16Verschwörungstheorien in Zeiten der PandemieArchiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 107 (4): 475-494. 2021.To what extent can conspiracy theories be understood as a political challenge in these pandemic times? In order to discuss this issue, I provide an explication of the term ‘conspiracy theory’ that allows it to be applied in an epistemically elucidating and politically fruitful way. Against this backdrop, I will demonstrate how conspiracy theories violate, among other things, the ethically relevant standards that are established through well-ordered political deliberation, such as standards of in…Read more
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50The Right to Associational Freedom and the Scope of Relationship-Dependent DutiesCriminal Law and Philosophy 17 (2): 475-489. 2022.Humans have a fundamental need to belong. This, need, as Kimberley Brownlee argues in her book Being Sure of Each Other grounds the human right against social deprivation. But in addition to having a human right against social deprivation, we also have a right to associational freedom, which is grounded in our right to autonomy. We cannot be forced into relationships; we are free to choose our friends and loved ones.? In this paper I discuss what our right to associational freedom morally permit…Read more
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47The Moral Significance of AdolescenceJournal of Applied Philosophy 39 (4): 547-561. 2021.Journal of Applied Philosophy, EarlyView.
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98Collegial RelationshipsEthical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (1): 213-229. 2021.Although collegial relationships are among the most prevalent types of interpersonal relationships in our lives, they have not been the subject of much philosophical study. In this paper, we take the first step in the process of developing an ethics of collegiality by establishing what qualifies two people as colleagues and then by determining what it is that gives value to collegial relationships. We argue that A and B are colleagues if both exhibit sameness regarding at least two of the follow…Read more
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11Eine relationale Theorie moralischer Verpflichtung (review)Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 68 (4): 627-633. 2020.
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77What is a colleague? The descriptive and normative dimension of a dual character conceptPhilosophical Psychology 33 (7): 997-1017. 2020.Colleagues are not only an integral part of many people’s lives; empirical research suggests that having a good relationship with one’s colleagues is the single most important factor for being happy at work. However, so far, no one has provided a comprehensive account of what it means to be a colleague. To address this lacuna, we have conducted both an empirical as well as theoretical investigation into the content and structure of the concept ‘colleague.’ Based on the empirical evidence that we…Read more
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124The Relational Value of EmpathyInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (2): 136-161. 2019.ABSTRACTPhilosophers and scholars from other disciplines have long discussed the role of empathy in our moral lives. The distinct relational value of empathy, however, has been largely overlooked. This article aims to specify empathy’s distinct relational value: Empathy is both intrinsically and extrinsically valuable in virtue of the pleasant experiences we share with others, the harmony and meaning that empathy provides, the recognition, self-esteem, and self-trust it enhances, as well as trus…Read more
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30Weakness of the Will as Furtive IrrationalityIdeas Y Valores 58 (141). 2009.According to a widely extended conception, people display weakness of the will when they act freely and intentionally against their own judgment regarding what is best. However, there is another conception according to which persons display weakness of the will when they act against their reasonable intentions. On the basis of this conception focused on intentions, my objective is to specify two conditions of rationality in order to characterize actions against reasonable intentions as cases of …Read more
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William Lyons: Approaches to Intentionality (review)Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger 51 (3). 1998.
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31Wallace, R. Jay. The View from Here: On Affirmation, Attachment, and the Limits of Regret.New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. 268. $45.00 (review)Ethics 125 (2): 614-621. 2015.
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19Zweitpersonale Gründe. Was sie sind und was sie zeigenDeutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 57 (1): 159-163. 2009.
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Von einer Ethik der Technik aus antinaturalistischem GeistPhilosophische Rundschau 42 (1): 60. 1995.
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15Ästhetik und Kunstphilosophie: von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart in Einzeldarstellungen (edited book)Alfred Kröner Verlag. 2012.
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21Sources of practical conflicts and reasons for regretIn Peter Baumann & Monika Betzler (eds.), Practical Conflicts: New Philosophical Essays, Cambridge University Press. pp. 197. 2004.
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19„Objektivität“ als epistemische Norm feministischer ErkenntnistheorieDeutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 46 (5): 783. 1998.
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20Sekundäre Amoralität: Eine ethische Analyse von Bernhard Schlinks Roman Der VorleserIn Karl Mertens & Jörn Müller (eds.), Die Dimension des Sozialen: Neue Philosophische Zugänge Zu Fühlen, Wollen Und Handeln, De Gruyter. pp. 351-380. 2014.
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68The normative significance of personal projectsIn Michael Kühler & Nadja Jelinek (eds.), Autonomy and the Self, Springer. pp. 118--101. 2012.
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Ludwig Maximilians Universität, MünchenRegular Faculty
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
Faculty of Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Study of Religion
PhD, 1994
München, BY, Germany
Areas of Specialization
Moral Psychology |
Normative Ethics |
Moral Normativity |
Social Relationships |
Areas of Interest
Value Theory |
Social Epistemology |
Theories of Emotion |
Family Ethics |