-
83Why Everything You Think You Know about Scientism is Probably WrongSocial Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 12 (11): 1-8. 2023.I would like to thank Renia Gasparatou, Philip Goff, and Andreas Vrahimis for contributing to the book symposium on For and Against Scientism: Science, Methodology, and the Future of Philosophy (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2022). I am grateful to James Collier for hosting this book symposium on the Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective. In what follows, I will reply to Gasparatou and Vrahimis’s contributions to this book symposium.1 Before I do so, I will summarize what I take to be …Read more
-
72Scientism and Sentiments about Progress in Science and Academic PhilosophySocial Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 12 (6): 39-60. 2023.Mizrahi (2017a) advances an argument in support of Weak Scientism, which is the view that scientific knowledge is the best (but not the only) knowledge we have, according to which Weak Scientism follows from the premises that scientific knowledge is quantitatively and qualitatively better than non-scientific knowledge. In this paper, I develop a different argument for Weak Scientism. This latter argument for Weak Scientism proceeds from the premise that academic disciplines that make progress ar…Read more
-
530Is Philosophy Exceptional? A Corpus-Based, Quantitative StudySocial Epistemology 37 (5): 666-683. 2023.Drawing on the epistemology of logic literature on anti-exceptionalism about logic, we set out to investigate the following metaphilosophical questions empirically: Is philosophy special? Are its methods (dis)continuous with science? More specifically, we test the following metaphilosophical hypotheses empirically: philosophical deductivism, philosophical inductivism, and philosophical abductivism. Using indicator words to classify arguments by type (namely, deductive, inductive, and abductive a…Read more
-
533Philosophical reasoning about science: a quantitative, digital studySynthese 200 (2). 2022.In this paper, we set out to investigate the following question: if science relies heavily on induction, does philosophy of science rely heavily on induction as well? Using data mining and text analysis methods, we study a large corpus of philosophical texts mined from the JSTOR database (n = 14,199) in order to answer this question empirically. If philosophy of science relies heavily on induction, just as science supposedly does, then we would expect to find significantly more inductive argumen…Read more
-
1064Philosophy’s gender gap and argumentative arena: an empirical studySynthese 200 (2): 1-34. 2022.While the empirical evidence pointing to a gender gap in professional, academic philosophy in the English-speaking world is widely accepted, explanations of this gap are less so. In this paper, we aim to make a modest contribution to the literature on the gender gap in academic philosophy by taking a quantitative, corpus-based empirical approach. Since some philosophers have suggested that it may be the argumentative, “logic-chopping,” and “paradox-mongering” nature of academic philosophy that e…Read more
-
65Philosophical Sentiments Toward Scientism: A Reply to BryantSocial Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 10 (11): 19-24. 2021.In a reply to Mizrahi (2019), Bryant (2020) raises several methodological concerns regarding my attempt to test hypotheses about the observation that academic philosophers tend to find “scientism” threatening empirically using quantitative, corpus based methods. Chief among her methodological concerns is that numbers of philosophical publications that mention “scientism” are a “poor proxy for scholarly sentiment” (Bryant 2020, 31). In reply, I conduct a sentiment analysis that is designed to fin…Read more
-
1291The analytic-continental divide in philosophical practice: An empirical studyMetaphilosophy 52 (5): 668-680. 2021.Philosophy is often divided into two traditions: analytic and continental philosophy. Characterizing the analytic-continental divide, however, is no easy task. Some philosophers explain the divide in terms of the place of argument in these traditions. This raises the following questions: Is analytic philosophy rife with arguments while continental philosophy is devoid of arguments? Or can different types of arguments be found in analytic and continental philosophy? This paper presents the result…Read more
-
159For and Against Scientism: Science, Methodology, and the Future of Philosophy (edited book)Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 2022.The term scientism is used in several ways. It is used to denote an epistemological thesis according to which science is the source of our knowledge about the world and ourselves. Relatedly, it is used to denote a methodological thesis according to which the methods of science are superior to the methods of non-scientific fields or areas of inquiry, or even used to put forward a metaphysical thesis that what exists is what science says exists. In recent decades, the term scientism has acquired a…Read more
-
563What Is the Basic Unit of Scientific Progress? A Quantitative, Corpus-Based StudyJournal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 53 (4): 441-458. 2022.This paper presents the results of an empirical study following up on Mizrahi (2021). Using the same methods of text mining and corpus analysis used by Mizrahi (2021), we test empirically a philosophical account of scientific progress that Mizrahi (2021) left out of his empirical study, namely, the so-called functional-internalist account of scientific progress according to which the aim or goal or scientific research is to solve problems. In general, our results do not lend much empirical evide…Read more
-
31Why Park’s Argument from Double Spaces is Not a Problem for Relative RealismSocial Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 10 (6): 58-62. 2021.In this paper, I reply to Seungbae Park’s (2021) reply to my (Mizrahi 2021) reply to his (Park 2020) critique of the view I defend in Chapter 6 of The Relativity of Theory: Key Positions and Arguments in the Contemporary Scientific Realism/Antirealism Debate (Cham: Springer, 2020), namely, Relative Realism. Relative Realism is the view that, of a set of competing scientific theories, the more successful theory is comparatively true. Comparative truth is a relation between competing theories. So,…Read more
-
847Your Appeals to Intuition Have No Power Here!Axiomathes 32 (6): 969-990. 2022.In this paper, I argue that appeals to intuition in Analytic Philosophy are not compelling arguments because intuitions are not the sort of thing that has the power to rationally persuade other professional analytic philosophers. This conclusion follows from reasonable premises about the goal of Analytic Philosophy, which is rational persuasion by means of arguments, and the requirement that evidence for and/or against philosophical theses used by professional analytic philosophers be public (or…Read more
-
14The Relativity of Theory by Moti Mizrahi: Reply by the AuthorStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 87 173-174. 2021.I’m grateful to Aleta Quinn and Studies in History and Philosophy of Science for hosting this book forum for my book, The Relativity of Theory (Springer, 2020). I’m also grateful to Margaret Greta Turnbull and Joseph Martin for their commentaries. In what follows, I address their comments as I understand them.
-
537The Relativity of Theory by Moti Mizrahi: Reply by the AuthorStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 87 (C): 173-174. 2021.I’m grateful to Aleta Quinn and Studies in History and Philosophy of Science for hosting this book forum for my book, The Relativity of Theory (Springer, 2020). I’m also grateful to Margaret Greta Turnbull and Joseph Martin for their commentaries. In what follows, I address their comments as I understand them.
-
16In Defense of Relative Realism: A Reply to ParkSocial Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 10 (1): 1-6. 2021.In this paper, I reply to Seungbae Park’s (2020) critique of the view I defend in Chapter 6 of The Relativity of Theory: Key Positions and Arguments in the Contemporary Scientific Realism/Antirealism Debate (Cham: Springer, 2020), namely, Relative Realism. Relative Realism is the view that, of a set of competing scientific theories, the more predictively successful theory is comparatively true. Comparative truth is a relation between competing theories. So, to say that T1 is comparatively true i…Read more
-
1038Conceptions of scientific progress in scientific practice: an empirical studySynthese 199 (1-2): 2375-2394. 2021.The aim of this paper is to contribute to the debate over the nature of scientific progress in philosophy of science by taking a quantitative, corpus-based approach. By employing the methods of data science and corpus linguistics, the following philosophical accounts of scientific progress are tested empirically: the semantic account of scientific progress, the epistemic account of scientific progress, and the noetic account of scientific progress. Overall, the results of this quantitative, corp…Read more
-
114This book offers a close and rigorous examination of the arguments for and against scientific realism and introduces key positions in the scientific realism/antirealism debate, which is one of the central debates in contemporary philosophy of science. On the one hand, scientific realists argue that we have good reasons to believe that our best scientific theories are approximately true because, if they were not even approximately true, they would not be able to explain and predict natural phenom…Read more
-
686Proof, Explanation, and Justification in Mathematical PracticeJournal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 51 (4): 551-568. 2020.In this paper, I propose that applying the methods of data science to “the problem of whether mathematical explanations occur within mathematics itself” (Mancosu 2018) might be a fruitful way to shed new light on the problem. By carefully selecting indicator words for explanation and justification, and then systematically searching for these indicators in databases of scholarly works in mathematics, we can get an idea of how mathematicians use these terms in mathematical practice and with what f…Read more
-
1328Hypothesis Testing in Scientific Practice: An Empirical StudyInternational Studies in the Philosophy of Science 33 (1): 1-21. 2020.It is generally accepted among philosophers of science that hypothesis testing is a key methodological feature of science. As far as philosophical theories of confirmation are con...
-
844Theoretical Virtues in Scientific Practice: An Empirical StudyBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 73 (4): 879-902. 2022.It is a common view among philosophers of science that theoretical virtues (also known as epistemic or cognitive values), such as simplicity and consistency, play an important role in scientific practice. In this article, I set out to study the role that theoretical virtues play in scientific practice empirically. I apply the methods of data science, such as text mining and corpus analysis, to study large corpora of scientific texts in order to uncover patterns of usage. These patterns of usage,…Read more
-
468Is Truth the Gold Standard of Inquiry? A Comment on Elgin’s Argument Against VeritismFoundations of Science 26 (2): 275-280. 2021.In True enough,, Elgin argues against veritism, which is the view that truth is the paramount epistemic objective. Elgin’s argument against veritism proceeds from considering the role that models, idealizations, and thought experiments play in science to the conclusion that veritism is unacceptable. In this commentary, I argue that Elgin’s argument fails as an argument against veritism. I sketch a refutation by logical analogy of Elgin’s argument. Just as one can aim at gold medals and still fin…Read more
-
535How to Play the “Playing God” CardScience and Engineering Ethics 26 (3): 1445-1461. 2020.When the phrase “playing God” is used in debates concerning the use of new technologies, such as cloning or genetic engineering, it is usually interpreted as a warning not to interfere with God’s creation or nature. I think that this interpretation of “playing God” arguments as a call to non-interference with nature is too narrow. In this paper, I propose an alternative interpretation of “playing God” arguments. Taking an argumentation theory approach, I provide an argumentation scheme and accom…Read more
-
959The Case Study Method in Philosophy of Science: An Empirical StudyPerspectives on Science 28 (1): 63-88. 2020.There is an ongoing methodological debate in philosophy of science concerning the use of case studies as evidence for and/or against theories about science. In this paper, I aim to make a contribution to this debate by taking an empirical approach. I present the results of a systematic survey of the PhilSci-Archive, which suggest that a sizeable proportion of papers in philosophy of science contain appeals to case studies, as indicated by the occurrence of the indicator words “case study” and/or…Read more
-
305Factivity and Epistemic Certainty: A Reply to SankeyLogos and Episteme 10 (4): 443-444. 2019.This is a reply to Howard Sankey’s comment (“Factivity or Grounds? Comment on Mizrahi”) on my paper, “You Can’t Handle the Truth: Knowledge = Epistemic Certainty,” in which I present an argument from the factivity of knowledge for the conclusion that knowledge is epistemic certainty. While Sankey is right that factivity does not entail epistemic certainty, the factivity of knowledge does entail that knowledge is epistemic certainty.
-
105The Scientism Debate: A Battle for the Soul of Philosophy?Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 8 (9): 1-13. 2019.In this paper, I report the results of an empirical study, which was designed to test the following hypotheses: (H1) Many philosophers find scientism threatening because they see it as a threat to the future of philosophy as a major in colleges and universities; (H2) Many philosophers find scientism threatening because they see it as a threat to the soul or essence of philosophy as an a priori discipline. My results provide some empirical evidence in support of H2. These results are also in line…Read more
-
425Jewish Survival, Divine Supervision, and the Existence of GodShofar: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Jewish Studies 30 (4): 100-112. 2012.In this paper, I discuss an argument for the existence of God known as “The Argument from the Survival of the Jews.” This argument has the form of an Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE). It proceeds from the phenomenon of Jewish survival to the existence of God as the best explanation for this phenomenon. I will argue that, even if we grant that Jewish survival is a remarkable occurrence that demands an explanation, and even if we gloss over the difficulties in defining the terms “Jewish” an…Read more
-
940You Can’t Handle the Truth: Knowledge = Epistemic CertaintyLogos and Episteme 10 (2): 225-227. 2019.In this discussion note, I put forth an argument from the factivity of knowledge for the conclusion that knowledge is epistemic certainty. If this argument is sound, then epistemologists who think that knowledge is factive are thereby also committed to the view that knowledge is epistemic certainty.
-
58Correction to: An Absurd Consequence of Stanford’s New Induction Over the History of Science: A Reply to SterpettiAxiomathes 29 (5): 529-529. 2019.In the Introduction section, 6th point under the paragraph “Given the parallels between Stanford’s PUA and the PUO, and those between Stanford’s NIS and the NIP, I have sketched the following reductio against Stanford’s NIS (Mizrahi 2016a, pp. 63–64):….. should read as (6) Scientific antirealism is a philosophical theory.
-
626You Will Respect My Authoritah!? A Reply to BottingInformal Logic 39 (1): 106-122. 2019.In a paper and a reply to critics published in _Informal Logic_, I argue that arguments from expert opinion are weak arguments. To appeal to expert opinion is to take an expert’s judgment that _p_ is the case as evidence for _p_. Such appeals to expert opinion are weak, I argue, because the fact that an expert judges that _p_ does not make it significantly more likely that _p_ is true or probable, as evidence from empirical studies on expert performance suggests. Unlike other critics of this arg…Read more
-
682An Absurd Consequence of Stanford’s New Induction Over the History of Science: A Reply to SterpettiAxiomathes 29 (5): 515-527. 2019.In this paper, I respond to Sterpetti’s attempt to defend Kyle P. Stanford’s Problem of Unconceived Alternatives and his New Induction over the History of Science from my reductio argument outlined in Mizrahi :59–68, 2016a). I discuss what I take to be the ways in which Sterpetti has misconstrued my argument against Stanford’s NIS, in particular, that it is a reductio, not a dilemma, as Sterpetti erroneously thinks. I argue that antirealists who endorse Stanford’s NIS still face an absurd conseq…Read more
Melbourne, Florida, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
General Philosophy of Science |
Metaphilosophy |
Philosophy of Religion |
Areas of Interest
Argument |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
Meta-Ethics |
Moral Psychology |
PhilPapers Editorships
2 more