•  1162
    Questions about 'Internal and External Questions about God'
    Religious Studies 48 (2): 257-268. 2012.
    This article is an evaluation of Le Poidevin’s use of Carnap ’s stance on ontology within the philosophy of religion. Le Poidevin claims that 1) theists need to take God to be a putative entity within space-time in order for their claim that God exists to be meaningful, and that 2) instrumentalism about theology is viable. I argue that although Le Poidevin’s response to Carnap ’s argument is no less problematic than that argument itself, his position is in fact thoroughly un-Carnapian. The upsho…Read more
  •  461
    Our Experience of Passage on the B-Theory
    Erkenntnis 78 (4): 713-726. 2013.
    Elsewhere I have suggested that the B-theory includes a notion of passage, by virtue of including succession. Here, I provide further support for that claim by showing that uncontroversial elements of the B-theory straightforwardly ground a veridical sense of passage. First, I argue that the B-theory predicts that subjects of experience have a sense of passivity with respect to time that they do not have with respect to space, which they are right to have, even according to the B-theory. I then …Read more
  •  430
    I offer an interpretation and a partial defense of Kit Fine's ‘Argument from Passage’, which is situated within his reconstruction of McTaggart's paradox. Fine argues that existing A-theoretic approaches to passage are no more dynamic, i.e. capture passage no better, than the B-theory. I argue that this comparative claim is correct. Our intuitive picture of passage, which inclines us towards A-theories, suggests more than coherent A-theories can deliver. In Finean terms, the picture requires not…Read more
  •  273
    Time, Metaphysics of
    Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. forthcoming.
    Metaphysics is the part of philosophy that asks questions about the nature of reality – about what there is, and what it is like. The metaphysics of time is the part of the philosophy of time that asks questions about the nature of temporal reality. One central such question is that of whether time passes or flows, or whether it has a dynamic aspect.
  •  271
    On Whether B-Theoretic Atheists Should Fear Death
    Philosophia 43 (4): 1011-1021. 2015.
    In this paper I revisit a dispute between Mikel Burley and Robin Le Poidevin about whether or not the B-theory of time can give its adherents any reason to be less afraid of death. In ‘Should a B-theoretic atheist fear death?’, Burley argues that even on Le Poidevin’s understanding of the B-theory, atheists shouldn’t be comforted. His reason is that the prevalent B-theoretic account of our attitudes towards the past and future precludes treating our fear of death as unwarranted. I examine his ar…Read more
  •  219
    ‘Beyond A- and B-Time’ Reconsidered
    Philosophia 38 (4): 741-753. 2010.
    This article is a response to Clifford Williams’s claim that the debate between A- and B theories of time is misconceived because these theories do not differ. I provide some missing support for Williams’s claim that the B-theory includes transition, by arguing that representative B-theoretic explanations for why we experience time as passing (even though it does not) are inherently unstable. I then argue that, contra Williams, it does not follow that there is nothing at stake in the A- versus B…Read more
  •  214
    What is temporal ontology?
    Philosophical Studies 175 (3): 793-807. 2018.
    Temporal ontology is the part of ontology involving the rival positions of presentism, eternalism, and the growing block theory. While this much is clear, it’s surprisingly difficult to elucidate the substance of the disagreement between presentists and eternalists. Certain events happened that are not happening now; what is it to disagree about whether these events exist? In spite of widespread suspicion concerning the status and methods of analytic metaphysics, skeptics’ doubts about this deba…Read more
  •  209
    Does time seem to pass, even though it doesn’t, really? Many philosophers think the answer is ‘Yes’—at least when ‘time’s passing’ is understood in a particular way. They take time’s passing to be a process by which each time in turn acquires a special status, such as the status of being the only time that exists, or being the only time that is present. This chapter suggests that, on the contrary, all we perceive is temporal succession, one thing after another, a notion to which modern physics i…Read more
  •  206
    Religion for Naturalists and the Meaning of Belief
    European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 11 (3): 157-174. 2019.
    This article relates the philosophical discussion on naturalistic religious practice to Tim Crane’s The Meaning of Belief: Religion from an Atheist’s Point of View, in which he claims that atheists can derive no genuine solace from religion. I argue that Crane’s claim is a little too strong. There is a sense in which atheists can derive solace from religion and that fact is worth acknowledging.
  •  192
    How A-theoretic deprivationists should respond to Lucretius
    Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (3): 417-432. 2015.
    What, if anything, makes death bad for the deceased themselves? Deprivationists hold that death is bad for the deceased iff it deprives them of intrinsic goods they would have enjoyed had they lived longer. This view faces the problem that birth too seems to deprive one of goods one would have enjoyed had one been born earlier, so that it too should be bad for one. There are two main approaches to the problem. In this paper, I explore the second approach, by Anthony Brueckner and John Martin Fis…Read more
  •  172
    Religion for Naturalists
    International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 78 (2): 195-214. 2015.
    Some naturalists feel an affinity with some religions, or with a particular religion. They may have previously belonged to it, and/or been raised in it, and/or be close to people who belong to it, and/or simply feel attracted to its practices, texts and traditions. This raises the question of whether and to what extent a naturalist can lead the life of a religious believer. The sparse literature on this topic focuses on religious fictionalism. I also frame the debate in these terms. I ask what r…Read more
  •  154
    On Explaining Why Time Seems to Pass
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (3): 367-382. 2013.
    Usually, the B-theory of time is taken to involve the claim that time does not, in reality, pass; after all, on the B-theory, nothing really becomes present and then more and more past, times do not come into existence successively, and which facts obtain does not change. For this reason, many B-theorists have recently tried to explain away one or more aspect(s) of experience that they and their opponents take to constitute an experience of time as passing. In this paper, I examine three promine…Read more
  •  153
    Acknowledgement and the paradox of tragedy
    with Daan Evers
    Philosophical Studies 173 (2): 337-350. 2016.
    We offer a new answer to the paradox of tragedy. We explain part of the appeal of tragic art in terms of its acknowledgement of sad aspects of life and offer a tentative explanation of why acknowledgement is a source of pleasure
  •  147
    On ‘Experiencing time’: a response to Simon Prosser
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (3): 281-301. 2018.
    In his recent book ‘Experiencing time’, Simon Prosser discusses a wide variety of topics relating to temporal experience, in a way that is accessible both to those steeped in the philosophy of mind, and to those more familiar with the philosophy of time. He forcefully argues for the conclusion that the B-theorist of time can account for the temporal appearances. In this article, I offer a chapter by chapter response.
  •  119
    What Quine (and Carnap) might say about contemporary metaphysics of time
    In Frederique Janssen-Lauret (ed.), Quine, Structure, and Ontology, Oxford University Press. forthcoming.
    This chapter explores some of the relations between Quine’s and Carnap’s metaontological stances on the one hand, and contemporary work in the metaphysics of time, on the other. Contemporary metaphysics of time, like analytic metaphysics in general, grew out of the revival of the discipline that Quine’s critique of the logical empiricists (such as Carnap) made possible. At the same time, the metaphysics of time has, in some respects, strayed far from its Quinean roots. This chapter examines some…Read more
  •  117
    SEP Entry: Eternity in Christian Thought
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2018. 2018.
    This entry provides an overview of some key positions on God and time and discusses arguments for and against divine timelessness. The final section outlines some other philosophical contexts in which the concept of eternity can play a role.
  •  111
    Making Sense of the Growing Block View
    Philosophia 45 (3): 1113-1127. 2017.
    In this paper, I try to make sense of the growing block view using Kit Fine’s three-fold classification of A-theoretic views of time. I begin by motivating the endeavor of making sense of the growing block view by examining John Earman’s project in ‘Reassessing the prospects for a growing block model of the universe’. Next, I review Fine’s reconstruction of McTaggart’s argument and its accompanying three-fold classification of A-theoretic views. I then consider three interpretations of Earman’s …Read more
  •  100
    This is a joint review of Jenann Ismael's 'How physics makes us free' (OUP).
  •  86
    Debates in the Metaphysics of Time (review)
    International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 29 (3): 340-344. 2015.
    This is a review of 'Debates in the Metaphysics of Time' (Bloomsbury), ed. by Nathan Oaklander.
  •  77
    Metaphysics, Science, and Religion: A Response to Hud Hudson
    Journal of Analytic Theology 5 613-620. 2017.
    ㅤThis is a response to Hud Hudson's book 'The Fall and Hypertime' (OUP).
  •  56
    Response to Jeffrey Bishop
    Studies in Christian Ethics 29 (3): 269-271. 2016.
    I respond to Jeffrey Bishop’s article ‘Arts of Dying and the Statecraft of Killing’, in this issue, and in particular to his remarks in support of the claim that assisted death should not be legalised.
  •  50
    Response to 'Fear of death and the symmetry argument'
    Manuscrito 39 (4): 297-304. 2016.
    ABSTRACT This article is a response to 'Fear of death and the symmetry argument', in this issue. In that article, the author discusses the above Lucretian symmetry argument, and proposes a view that justifies the existing asymmetry in our attitudes towards birth and death. I begin by distinguishing this symmetry argument from a different one, also loosely inspired by Lucretius, which also plays a role in the article. I then describe what I take to be the author's solution to the original symmetr…Read more
  •  25
    God and Time
    Cambridge University Press. 2019.
    The God of Western religion is said to be eternal. But what does that mean? Is God somehow beyond time, living a life that does not involve one thing after another? Or is God's relationship to time much more like ours, so that God's eternality just consists in there being no time at which God doesn't exist? Even for non-believers, these issues have interesting implications for the relation between historical and scientific findings on the one hand, and religion on the other. This Element introdu…Read more
  •  18
    This chapter discusses some aspects of the relation between temporal experience and the A versus B debate. To begin with, I provide an overview of the A versus B debate and, following Baron et al. (2015), distinguish between two B-theoretic responses to the A- theoretic argument from experience, veridicalism and illusionism. I then argue for veridicalism over illusionism, by examining our (putative) experiences as of presentness and as of time passing. I close with some remarks on the relation b…Read more
  •  2
    Religion für Naturalisten
    In Klaus Viertbauer & Georg Gasser (eds.), Handbuch Analytische Religionsphilosophie. Akteure – Diskurse – Perspektiven, Metzler. pp. 321-330. 2019.
    Dieses Kapitel ist der Frage gewidmet, ob und inwieweit sich ein Naturalist, dessen Weltbild keinerlei übernatürliche Elemente beinhaltet, am religiösen Leben teilhaben und sich auf religiöse Gedanken und Empfindungen einlassen kann.