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Clause-Type, Force, and Normative Judgment in the Semantics of ImperativesIn Daniel Fogal, Daniel W. Harris & Matt Moss (eds.), New Work on Speech Acts, Oxford University Press. 2018.I argue that imperatives express contents that are both cognitively and semantically related to, but nevertheless distinct from, modal propositions. Imperatives, on this analysis, semantically encode features of planning that are modally specified. Uttering an imperative amounts to tokening this feature in discourse, and thereby proffering it for adoption by the audience. This analysis deals smoothly with the problems afflicting Portner's Dynamic Pragmatic account and Kaufmann's Modal account. …Read more
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Logic and Semantics for ImperativesJournal of Philosophical Logic 43 (4): 617-664. 2014.In this paper I will develop a view about the semantics of imperatives, which I term Modal Noncognitivism, on which imperatives might be said to have truth conditions (dispositionally, anyway), but on which it does not make sense to see them as expressing propositions (hence does not make sense to ascribe to them truth or falsity). This view stands against “Cognitivist” accounts of the semantics of imperatives, on which imperatives are claimed to express propositions, which are then enlisted in …Read more
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Triviality For Restrictor ConditionalsNoûs 50 (3): 533-564. 2015.
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
PhD, 2011
Toronto, Ontario, Canada
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Language |
Semantics |
Meta-Ethics |
Moral Expressivism |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
Areas of Interest
2 more
Philosophy of Language |
Semantics |
Semantic Theories |
Attitude Ascriptions |
Conditionals |
Modal Expressions |
Moral Irrealism |