Neil McArthur

Although David Hume never produced a single comprehensive work that encapsulated his views on politics, his various writings address a broad range of topics of relevance to political philosophy. He critiques the social contract theory of Hobbes and Locke, and he offers an alternative, evolutionary account of the origins of government. Hume sees all governments as the result of a struggle between authority and liberty, with the best of them achieving a balance between the two by implementing systems of “general laws.” Hume’s cautious approach to social change may fairly be called conservative. However, he is willing to endorse efforts at gradual reform when these efforts do not threaten the stability of the society. His legacy for modern political philosophy remains contested.

This article examines the question of whether universities and colleges should attempt to ban all student-faculty relationships, as many have tried to do. It argues that, because adults have a fundamental right to engage in intimate relationships without interference, supporters of relationship bans must meet a high standard in defending them. But outright bans on such relationships cannot meet this standard. Though the desire to create a secure environment for students is legitimate and important, it cannot be shown that relationship bans are necessary or proportional means of doing so. Besides being a violation of the rights of the people involved, relationship bans have a negative impact on the larger university community. The argument is not a defense of such relationships per se. Romantic interactions between students and faculty are invariably complicated and perilous, and should be approached with caution.

Hume is normally—and in my view, correctly—taken to be a legal conventionalist. However, the nature of Hume's conventionalism has not been well understood. Scholars have often interpreted David Hume as being largely indifferent to the specifics of the laws, so long as they accomplish their basic task of protecting people's property. I argue that this is not correct. Hume thinks certain systems of law will accomplish their purpose, of coordinating people's behaviour for the benefit of all, better than others. He introduces two concepts, which I call generality and convenience, to designate those features of the law that allow it to best accomplish its purpose. Of the two, generality is the more important. The ability to implement a system of what Hume calls “general laws” is a feature common to those governments he considers “civilized” rather than “barbarous.” A set of more specific criteria may be extracted from Hume's texts, which laws must meet if they are to be considered general. Many of the criteria Hume identifies later become associated with theorists of the so-called “rule of law.” Hume's conventionalism can thus be read an important development beyond that of Hobbes, one that lays a foundation upon which later theorists such as A.V. Dicey are able to build

Hume’s writings, taken as a whole, address a dazzlingly broad range of topics. I argue that they do so as part of a coherent and interesting philosophical programme. While Hume’s doctrine of the general point of view provides an attractive way of understanding the process of moral judgement, it raises the threat of parochialism – that is, it potentially makes us prey to the limitations and prejudices of our society. I show that Hume endorses what I call “engaged cosmopolitanism”, which provides the resources to explain how we can, under certain circumstances, escape such parochialism. Engaged cosmopolitanism is the product of a particular sort of society – one that is open and commercial, and that governed by a system of equitable laws. Like Mandeville, Hume rejects the suspicion of commerce and “luxury” that was prevalent during his time. But he provides supporters of commercial society with a justification that does not, in contrast to Mandeville’s writings, abandon notions of morality altogether. On the contrary, he makes commerce a precondition to a society’s moral development. And he further links this development to a certain type of liberal political institutions, thus giving such institutions a moral basis

Hume uses the adjectives “civilized” and “barbarous” in a variety of ways, and in a variety of contexts. He employs them to describe individuals, societies, historical eras, and forms of government. These various uses are closely related. Hume thinks that cultural and political development are intimately connected, and are mutually dependent. Civilized government goes together with civilized society. A wise ruler cannot emerge before “refinements have taken place” in the society at large and “science [becomes] known in the world.” At the same time, the policy of a monarch who is “ignorant and uninstructed … for ever prevents all improvements.”

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume 31, Number 1, April 2005, pp. 123-144 Laws Not Men: Hume's Distinction between Barbarous and Civilized Government NEIL McARTHUR 1. Introduction Hume uses the adjectives "civilized" and "barbarous" in a variety of ways, and in a variety of contexts. He employs them to describe individuals, societies, historical eras, and forms of government. These various uses are closely related. Hume thinks that cultural and political development are intimately connected, and are mutually dependent. Civilized government goes together with civilized society. A wise ruler cannot emerge before "refinements have taken place" in the society at large and "science [becomes] known in the world." At the same time, the policy of a monarch who is "ignorant and uninstructed... for ever prevents all improvements."1 This intimate connection, however, is not an identification. A civilized government is not simply that which produces, or results from, a civilized society. When discussing forms of government, Hume uses the terms "barbarous" and "civilized" consistently and somewhat narrowly, to describe governments that possess certain specific characteristics. It is striking that these characteristics are explicitly divorced from the abilities or characters of the rulers. While a nation requires wise and refined leadership to achieve its civilized status, Hume thinks it is a crucial feature of civilized government that, once established, it depends Neil McArthur is at the University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Manitoba R3T 2M8, Canada, e-mail: [email protected] 124 Neil McArthur entirely on its institutional structure, and not on the talents or intentions of any individual or group. To understand Hume's distinction between these two kinds of government, it is useful to abstract away from his discussion of more general issues of cultural development, and to lay temporarily aside the causal question of what social and economic conditions are necessary to produce a civilized government. I propose to explain Hume's concepts of barbarous and civilized government just in terms of the institutional characteristics possessed by each. Hume's choice of adjectives is not, of course, accidental. The complex causal questions of how a civilized government comes about, and what is its relation to civilized society, are large and important ones. However, 1 do not propose to take them up here.2 The crucial feature dividing civilized and barbarous government is their relation to law. In his essay "Of Civil Liberty" Hume says: "It may now be affirmed of civilized monarchies, what was formerly said in praise of republics alone, that they are a government of Laws, not of Men."3 "Barbarous government" are thus "governments of men"—he also calls them governments "of will."4 Scholars of Hume's political theory have noted the importance of the rule of law in defining "civilized government. "5 However, they have not made clear precisely what Hume thinks precisely defines a "government of laws. " I submit that such a government must (for Hume) possess three characteristics. It must have: 1. A clear separation between the legislative and magisterial "powers" of the state; 2. A rigid subordination of the magisterial to the legislative power, such that the "discretion" of magistrates is restricted by "general laws"; 3. Self-sufficient laws and institutions, such that they are able to operate regardless of the intentions or abilities of individual rulers or officeholders. To this end, a government of laws must possess fixed rules governing the succession of officers, including (in a civilized monarchy) succession to the throne. Hume thinks specific governments may meet these criteria to varying degrees through time (with regression also possible). His use of the term "civilized government" nevertheless implies that it exists as a distinct, and achievable, ideal. An examination of Hume's theory of civilized government shows his understanding of the rule of law to be more subtle and complex than has previously been acknowledged. Hume moves beyond traditional Whig panegyrics on the rule of show to show how the law must operate if it is to protect people from oppression in the local theatres in which it is most acute. He articulates a theory of "civilized monarchy" that provides a middle path between republican and absolutist theories of government, and that is consistent his philosophy as a whole. Hume Studies Laws...

We are about to see the emergence of religions devoted to the worship of Artificial Intelligence (AI). Such religions pose acute risks, both to their followers and to the public. We should require their creators, and governments, to acknowledge these risks and to manage them as best they can. However, these new religions cannot be stopped altogether, nor should we try to stop them if we could. We must accept that AI worship will become part of our culture, and we must learn to live with it. Indeed, we should do much more than this. We should value it as a new source of meaning in a rapidly-changing world. AI-based religions deserve respect and recognition alongside other, more established ones, and they should be granted the same level of legal protection.

This essay discusses the moral costs and benefits of sexual technology. It starts with first-wave sexual technology, such as dating apps, messaging apps, and social networks, and then discusses second-wave sexual technology, which offers users more immersive experiences, such as virtual reality and sex robots. The paper argues that, overall, such technologies provide more benefits than they incur costs. Finally, the paper discusses the rise of a new identity—digisexuality, explaining that digisexuals are people who consider sexual technology an essential part of who they are, and who might forego relationships with other people. The paper argues that the development of this new identity is a good thing, and that reasons against it are not convincing.

This dissertation offers an interpretation of David Hume's political and economic theory that challenges an accepted view this theory. According to this accepted view, Hume offers no positive criteria that maybe used to criticize existing institutions. Against this view, it is argued that Hume thinks that the best society will be one that promotes three distinct human ends---ends he calls industry, knowledge, and humanity. These are, respectively, the active pursuit of intellectual or sensual gratification, the cultivation of the arts and sciences, and the active pursuit of what is good for humankind overall. Hume thinks that the society that promotes these ends will be one marked by what he calls sociability and the spirit of refinement. In such a society, people interact freely and openly with one another, and learning and the arts are widely cultivated. ;The author argues that for Hume, such a society cannot be brought about directly. Instead, enlightened lawgivers must focus on creating the necessary conditions for a sociable and refined society to come about. Hume thinks that the most refined and social society will also be the most commercial. People will be free to produce goods not only for their own consumption but also to trade with others. Further, for commerce to develop freely, a society must first have a government that Hume calls civilized. That is, it must be governed by a system of laws that apply equal to all citizens, that protect both persons and their property, and that govern the behavior of legislators themselves. ;Hume thinks that social progress will invariably be incremental, heavily dependent on the history and customs of the society involved. Reformers must keep always in mind that, except under the least tolerable of regimes, it is worse to try to improve society and fail than not to try at all

This is the first edition in over a century to present David Hume's Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, Dissertation on the Passions, Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, and Natural History of Religion in the format he intended: collected together in a single volume. Hume has suffered a fate unusual among great philosophers. His principal philosophical work is no longer published in the form in which he intended it to be read. It has been divided into separate parts, only some of which continue to be published. This volume repairs that neglect by presenting the four pieces that Hume in later life desired to "alone be regarded as containing [his] philosophical sentiments and principles" in the format he preferred, as a single volume with an organization that parallels that of his early Treatise of Human Nature. This edition's introduction comments on the historical origins and evolution of the four parts and draws attention to how they mutually inform and support one another. The text is based on the first (1758) edition of Hume's Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects. Notes advise the reader of the changes made in the final (1777) edition. Excerpts from the work of some of Hume's most important contemporary critics are included as appendices. Hume's abundant references to ancient historians, geographers, poets, and philosophers—many of them now quite obscure—are rendered accessible in this volume through extensive textual notes and a bibliography of online sources

The Ethics of Sex: An Introduction systematically and comprehensively examines the ethical issues surrounding the concept of sex. It addresses important questions such as: How to approach questions of sexual ethics in a philosophical way? Must we give affirmative consent to all sexual activity and what would be the impact of implementing an affirmative consent standard into law? Should we promote monogamy as the best way to live? Can the tools of behavioural economics offer insights into the issues of sexual ethics? What constitutes harassment? How does the state involve itself in the private sexual lives of its citizens and is it justified in doing so? What privacy issues arise within relationships due to the development of technology? What ethical issues may arise as the result of future technological developments? Including discussion questions and suggestions for further reading at the end of each chapter The Ethics of Sex is the perfect philosophical introduction to the perennially topical issue, and ideal reading for students taking courses within the fields of applied ethics, sociology, law, religion and politics.

David Hume’s legal theory has normally been interpreted as bearing close affinities to the English common law theory of jurisprudence. I argue that this is not accurate. For Hume, it is the nature and functioning of a country’s legal system, not the provenance of that system, that provides the foundation of its authority. He judges government by its ability to protect property in a reliable and equitable way. His positions on the role of equity in the law, on artificial reason and the esoteric nature of the law, and on the role of judges in the legal system are all at odds with those of the common lawyers.

Sexbots are coming. Given the pace of technological advances, it is inevitable that realistic robots specifically designed for people's sexual gratification will be developed in the not-too-distant future. Despite popular culture's fascination with the topic, and the emergence of the much-publicized Campaign Against Sex Robots, there has been little academic research on the social, philosophical, moral, and legal implications of robot sex. This book fills the gap, offering perspectives from philosophy, psychology, religious studies, economics, and law on the possible future of robot-human sexual relationships