CV
Hartford, Connecticut, United States of America
Areas of Interest
History of Western Philosophy
  • Authority and the dialectic of Socrates
    In Jenny Bryan, Robert Wardy & James Warren (eds.), Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy, Cambridge University Press. 2018.
  •  11
    ABSTRACT McCabe is right on one thing and wrong on another. She is right to draw our attention to the different aspects that a verb might have—and not only because attention to aspect helps us understand what is going on in Plato’s Euthydemus. Getting straight on aspect promises benefits for our philosophy of action, and for our metaphysics more generally, comparable to those of getting straight about modality and about excuses. The same is true of getting straight on the active, middle, and pas…Read more
  •  22
    The Master Argument of Diodorus Cronus
    History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 2 (1): 239-252. 1999.
  •  83
    Ethics in Plato's Republic
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series 20 19-32. 1986.
    Why should I be just? What have I to gain if I am decent, honest, moral, upright, fair and truthful? Other people benefit if I am just, but do I? And doesn't it seem clear that sometimes the benefit that other people receive from my being just is a benefit received at my expense? Perhaps then I have no adequate reason to be just. Perhaps if I have any sense I will not bother.
  •  15
    Plato: The Apology of Socrates and Xenophon: The Apology of Socrates (edited book)
    Cambridge University Press. 2019.
    In 399 BC Socrates was prosecuted, convicted, sentenced to death and executed. These events were the culmination of a long philosophical career, a career in which, without writing a word, he established himself as the figure whom all philosophers of the next few generations wished to follow. The Apologies by Plato and Xenophon are rival accounts of how, at his trial, Socrates defended himself and his philosophy. This edition brings together both Apologies within a single volume. The commentary a…Read more
  •  86
    Imagine a child′s toy arrow, sticking by its rubber sucker to a mirror′s reflective surface. We can call the direction in which such an arrow would point the finwards direction ; and we can call the opposite direction boutwards . When we look at things in a mirror, their images are apparently just as far finwards of the mirror as the things themselves are boutwards of it. For example, if we look at the tail of our arrow and cast our glance finwards, we see first the tail, then the head, then the…Read more
  •  54
    V*—Chess and Life: The Structure of a Moral Code
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 82 (1): 59-68. 1982.
    Nicholas Denyer; V*—Chess and Life: The Structure of a Moral Code, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 82, Issue 1, 1 June 1982, Pages 59–68, https
  •  18
    Traffic Lights
    Philosophy Now 4 29-30. 1992.
  •  62
    Pure second-order logic
    Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 33 (2): 220-224. 1992.
  •  89
    The principle of harmony
    Analysis 49 (1): 21-22. 1989.
  •  52
    The Master Argument of Diodorus Chronus: A Near Miss
    History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 2 (1): 239-252. 1999.
    Diodorus' Master Argument was intended to show that whatever is possible either is or will be true. The intended conclusion does not follow from the extant premisses of the Master Argument. The Near Miss argues however, from those premisses alone, that nothing can be more than momentarily an exception to the Master Argument's intended conclusion. Strong arguments support even the most contentious of those premisses . We therefore cannot easily ignore the Near Miss. Moreover, there are various su…Read more
  •  72
    Plato's Theory of Stuffs
    Philosophy 58 (225). 1983.
    The theory of forms makes a very poor theory of universals. It-or at least the "phaedo's" version of it-makes excellent sense as a theory of the elemental stuffs from which everything is made. This is shown by a detailed examination of all that this "phaedo" has to say about forms
  •  80
  •  34
    Ethics in Plato's Republic
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series 20 19-32. 1986.
    Why should I be just? What have I to gain if I am decent, honest, moral, upright, fair and truthful? Other people benefit if I am just, but do I? And doesn't it seem clear that sometimes the benefit that other people receive from my being just is a benefit received at my expense? Perhaps then I have no adequate reason to be just. Perhaps if I have any sense I will not bother.
  •  15
    Names, Verbs and Quantification
    Philosophy 73 (286). 1998.
  •  5
    Sun and line: The role of the good
    In G. R. F. Ferrari (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Plato's Republic, Cambridge University Press. pp. 284--309. 2007.
  •  75
    Plato: Protagoras (edited book)
    Cambridge University Press. 2008.
    The Protagoras is one of Plato's most entertaining dialogues. It represents Socrates at a gathering of the most celebrated and highest-earning intellectuals of the day, among them the sophist Protagoras. In flamboyant displays of both rhetoric and dialectic, Socrates and Protagoras try to out-argue one another. Their arguments range widely, from political theory to literary criticism, from education to the nature of cowardice; but in view throughout this literary and philosophical masterpiece ar…Read more
  •  1
    Never Will and Cannot
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. forthcoming.
  •  38
    Just war
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 46 137-. 2000.
    The innocent are immune. We must never, that is, make the object of any violent attack those who bear no responsibility for doing wrong to others; and only with grave reason and in extreme circumstances should we be prepared to cause them any incidental harm as we press home a violent attack against those who are its legitimate objects. This principle of the immunity of the innocent seems almost self-evidently true. This is not to say that the principle is incapable of further development and ar…Read more