•  80
    Normative Indeterminacy in the Epistemic Domain
    In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles., K. Mccain, S. Stapleford & M. Steup. forthcoming.
    Building on recent formal work by Aleks Knoks, we explore how the idea that certain epistemic norms may be indeterminate could be implemented in a default logic.
  •  8
    Promises and all of the people who rely on them
    Journal of Social Philosophy. forthcoming.
    Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.
  •  65
    Epistemic dilemmas and rational indeterminacy
    Philosophical Studies 177 (3): 573-596. 2020.
    This paper is about epistemic dilemmas, i.e., cases in which one is doomed to have a doxastic attitude that is rationally impermissible no matter what. My aim is to develop and defend a position according to which there can be genuine rational indeterminacy; that is, it can be indeterminate which principles of rationality one should satisfy and thus indeterminate which doxastic attitudes one is permitted or required to have. I am going to argue that this view can resolve epistemic dilemmas in a …Read more
  •  52
    The Transmission View of Testimony and the Problem of Conflicting Justification
    American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (1): 27-36. 2018.
    According to the Transmission View of Testimony : TVT: If a speaker testifies to a hearer that p, and if the hearer is justified in believing that p on the basis of that speaker's testimony, then the hearer's belief is justified by whatever justification the speaker has for believing that p. The aim of this paper is to develop and defend a novel objection to the TVT.
  •  27
    Sortal terms, such as table or horse, are count nouns (akin to a basic-level terms). According to some theories, the meaning of sortals provides conditions for telling objects apart (individuating objects, e.g., telling one table from a second) and for identifying objects over time (e.g., determining that a particular horse at one time is the same horse at another). A number of psychologists have proposed that sortal concepts likewise provide psychologically real conditions for individuating and…Read more
  •  99
    Testimony, evidence and interpersonal reasons
    Philosophical Studies 173 (9): 2333-2352. 2016.
    According to the Interpersonal View of Testimony, testimonial justification is non-evidential in nature. I begin by arguing that the IVT has the following problem: If the IVT is true, then young children and people with autism cannot participate in testimonial exchanges; but young children and people with autism can participate in testimonial exchanges; thus, the IVT should be rejected on the grounds that it has over-cognized what it takes to give and receive testimony. Afterwards, I consider wh…Read more