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The Moral Psychology of Anger (edited book)Rowman & Littlefield. 2017.
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Caring to Know: Comparative Care Ethics, Feminist Epistemology, and the MahābhārataOxford University Press India. 2016.The manuscript explores the plausibility of care-based epistemology in a comparative key. Investigating the epistemic virtue of care-giving, the work weaves together insights from care ethics, virtue epistemology and a particular reading of the Mah=abh=arata which, left to themselves, do not appear compatible with one another. Drawing on these traditions, the work goes on to provide a feminist vision of search for truth that is consistent with both ethical relations and interventions for justice…Read more
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Surface NoiseBritish Journal of Aesthetics 58 (3): 255-270. 2018.In this paper, I argue that the dominant view of musical sampling embodies an impoverished conception of the expressive capabilities of sampling. There are two respects in which it goes wrong. First, it overlooks the possibility of samples representing their sample sources. Second, it overlooks the possibility of samples that are not instances of their sample sources. En route to bringing out why the dominant view is impoverished, I introduce a theoretical framework that illuminates some of the …Read more
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Solidarity, Fate-Sharing, and CommunityPhilosophers' Imprint 19. 2019.Solidarity is a widespread but under-explored phenomenon. In this paper, I give a philosophical account of solidarity, answering three salient questions: What motivates acts of solidarity? What unifies different acts into tokens of a single type of act, one of solidarity? And what values do acts of solidarity exhibit? The answer to all three, I argue, involves a certain way of relating to others: identifying with them on the basis of shared features, and identifying with the larger group that on…Read more
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Duty and DesolationPhilosophy 67 (262). 1992.
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Private BlameCriminal Law and Philosophy 10 (2): 215-220. 2016.
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Uneasy VirtueCambridge University Press. 2001.The predominant view of moral virtue can be traced back to Aristotle. He believed that moral virtue must involve intellectual excellence. To have moral virtue one must have practical wisdom - the ability to deliberate well and to see what is morally relevant in a given context. Julia Driver challenges this classical theory of virtue, arguing that it fails to take into account virtues which do seem to involve ignorance or epistemic defect. Some 'virtues of ignorance' are counterexamples to accoun…Read more
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More seriously wrongJournal of the American Philosophical Association 5 41-58. 2019.Common-sense morality divides acts into those that are right and those that are wrong, but it thinks some wrong acts are more seriously wrong than others, for example murder than breaking a promise. If an act is more seriously wrong, you should feel more guilt about it and, other things equal, are more blameworthy for it and can deserve more punishment; more serious wrongs are also more to be avoided given empirical or moral uncertainty. This paper examines a number of different views about what…Read more
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Trust within LimitsInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (2): 240-250. 2018.There have two recent challenges to the orthodoxy that ‘X trusts Y to ø’ is the fundamental notion of trust. Domenicucci and Holton maintain that trust, like love and friendship, is fundamentally two-place. Paul Faulkner argues to the more radical conclusion that the one-place ‘X is trusting’ is explanatorily basic. I argue that ‘X trusts Y in domain D’ is the explanatorily basic notion. I make the case that only by thinking of trust as domain-specific can we make sense of the relationships betw…Read more
APA Western Division
Burnaby, British Columbia, Canada
Areas of Specialization
Normative Ethics |
Moral Psychology |
Tibetan Philosophy |
Buddhist Ethics |
Areas of Interest
Aesthetics |
Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy |
Asian Philosophy |