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270Group Responsibility and HistoricismPhilosophical Quarterly 74 (3): 754-776. 2024.In this paper, we focus on the moral responsibility of organized groups in light of historicism. Historicism is the view that any morally responsible agent must satisfy certain historical conditions, such as not having been manipulated. We set out four examples involving morally responsible organized groups that pose problems for existing accounts of historicism. We then pose a trilemma: one can reject group responsibility, reject historicism, or revise historicism. We pursue the third option. W…Read more
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178Duties to Promote Just Institutions and the Citizenry as an Unorganized GroupIn Säde Hormio & Bill Wringe (eds.), Collective Responsibility: Perspectives on Political Philosophy from Social Ontology, Springer. forthcoming.Many philosophers accept the idea that there are duties to promote or create just institutions. But are the addressees of such duties supposed to be individuals – the members of the citizenry? What does it mean for an individual to promote or create just institutions? According to the ‘Simple View’, the citizenry has a collective duty to create or promote just institutions, and each individual citizen has an individual duty to do their part in this collective project. The simple view appears to …Read more
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7Review of Christine Hobden’s Citizenship in a Globalised World (review)Res Publica 29 (4): 705-711. 2023.
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401Group Agents, Moral Competence, and Duty-bearers: The Update ArgumentPhilosophical Studies 180 (5-6): 1691-1715. 2023.According to some collectivists, purposive groups that lack decision-making procedures such as riot mobs, friends walking together, or the pro-life lobby can be morally responsible and have moral duties. I focus on plural subject- and we-mode-collectivism. I argue that purposive groups do not qualify as duty-bearers even if they qualify as agents on either view. To qualify as a duty-bearer, an agent must be morally competent. I develop the Update Argument. An agent is morally competent only if t…Read more
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114Cooperative duties of efficiency and efficacyJournal of Global Ethics 18 (3): 330-348. 2022.I argue that agents can have duties to cooperate with one another if this increases their combined efficiency and/or efficacy in addressing ongoing collective moral problems. I call these duties cooperative duties of efficiency and efficacy. I focus particularly on collective agents and how agents ought to reason and act in the face of global moral problems. After setting out my account, I argue that a subset of cooperative duties of efficiency and efficacy of collective agents are duties of jus…Read more
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243Collective moral agency and self-induced moral incapacityPhilosophical Explorations 26 (1): 1-22. 2023.Collective moral agents can cause their own moral incapacity. If an agent is morally incapacitated, then the agent is exempted from responsibility. Due to self-induced moral incapacity, corporate responsibility gaps resurface. To solve this problem, I first set out and defend a minimalist account of moral competence for group agents. After setting out how a collective agent can cause its own moral incapacity, I argue that self-induced temporary exempting conditions do not free an agent from diac…Read more
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471Interconnected BlameworthinessThe Monist 104 (2): 195-209. 2021.This paper investigates agents’ blameworthiness when they are part of a group that does harm. We analyse three factors that affect the scope of an agent’s blameworthiness in these cases: shared intentionality, interpersonal influence, and common knowledge. Each factor involves circumstantial luck. The more each factor is present, the greater is the scope of each agent’s vicarious blameworthiness for the other agents’ contributions to the harm. We then consider an agent’s degree of blameworthines…Read more
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521Collective culpable ignoranceThought: A Journal of Philosophy 10 (2): 99-108. 2021.I argue that culpable ignorance can be irreducibly collective. In some cases, it is not fair to expect any individual to have avoided her ignorance of some fact, but it is fair to expect the agents together to have avoided their ignorance of that fact. Hence, no agent is individually culpable for her ignorance, but they are culpable for their ignorance together. This provides us with good reason to think that any group that is culpably ignorant in this irreducibly collective sense is non-distrib…Read more
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92On the Relation Between Collective Responsibility and Collective DutiesPhilosophy 91 (1): 99-133. 2021.There is good reason to think that moral responsibility as accountability is tied to the violation of moral demands. This lends intuitive support to Type-Symmetry in the collective realm: A type of responsibility entails the violation or unfulfillment of the same type of all-things-considered duty. For example, collective responsibility necessarily entails the violation of a collective duty. But Type-Symmetry is false. In this paper I argue that a non-agential group can be collectively responsib…Read more
Vienna, Wien, Austria
Areas of Specialization
Normative Ethics |
Moral Responsibility |
Collective Responsibility |
Philosophy of Action |
Social Ontology |
Areas of Interest
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Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Social and Political Philosophy |
Philosophy of Action |
Practical Reason |
Global Justice |