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1671Endurantism and PerdurantismIn Robert Barnard Neil Manson (ed.), Continuum Companion to Metaphysics, . pp. 170. 2012.An introduction to the theories of endurantism and perdurantism, and persistence more broadly.
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379A mereological challenge to endurantismAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4). 2007.In this paper, we argue that time travel is problematic for the endurantist. For it appears to be possible, given time travel, to construct a wall out of a single time travelling brick. This commits the endurantist to one of the following: (a) the wall is composed of the time travelling brick many times over; (b) the wall does not in fact exist at all; (c) the wall is identical to the brick. We argue that each of these options is unsatisfactory.
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358Composition, Persistence, and IdentityIn Robin Le Poidevin (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics, Routledge. pp. 296. 2009.An introduction to composition, persistence, and identity.
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335Endurantism and timeless worldsAnalysis 67 (2): 140-147. 2007.A paper against Ted Sider's argument for perdurantism on the grounds of timeless worlds
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322The metaphysics of groupsPhilosophical Studies 149 (2): 251-267. 2010.If you are a realist about groups there are three main theories of what to identify groups with. I offer reasons for thinking that two of those theories fail to meet important desiderata. The third option is to identify groups with sets, which meets all of the desiderata if only we take care over which sets they are identified with. I then canvass some possible objections to that third theory, and explain how to avoid them
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283Michael Almeida, The Metaphysics of Perfect Beings, Routledge, 2008European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 8 (4): 243--247. 2016.Book review of 'The Metaphysics of Perfect Beings'
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231Sider, Hawley, Sider and the Vagueness ArgumentPhilosophical Studies 154 (2). 2011.The Vagueness Argument for universalism only works if you think there is a good reason not to endorse nihilism. Sider's argument from the possibility of gunk is one of the more popular reasons. Further, Hawley has given an argument for the necessity of everything being either gunky or composed of mereological simples. I argue that Hawley's argument rests on the same premise as Sider's argument for the possibility of gunk. Further, I argue that that premise can be used to demonstrate the possibil…Read more
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216It is a common view that if composition as identity is true, then so is mereological universalism (the thesis that all objects have a mereological fusion). Various arguments have been advanced in favour of this: (i) there has been a recent argument by Merricks, (ii) some claim that Universalism is entailed by the ontological innocence of the identity relation, (or that ontological innocence undermines objections to universalism) and (iii) it is entailed by the law of selfidentity. After a prelim…Read more
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204The Location of PropertiesNoûs 49 (4): 846-866. 2015.This paper argues that, assuming properties exist and must be located in spacetime, the prevailing view that they are exactly located where their instances are is false. Instead a property is singularly located at just one region, namely the union of its instance's locations. This bears not just on issues in the metaphysics of properties, but also on the debate over whether multi-location is conceivable and/or possible
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202Persistence, composition, and identityIn Robin Le Poidevin, Simons Peter, McGonigal Andrew & Ross P. Cameron (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics, Routledge. 2009.An introduction to persistence, composition, and identity.
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191Mereological NominalismPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (1): 160-185. 2018.Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
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189An unwelcome consequence of the Multiverse ThesisSynthese 184 (3): 375-386. 2012.The Multiverse Thesis is a proposed solution to the Grandfather Paradox. It is popular and well promulgated, found in fiction, philosophy and (most importantly) physics. I first offer a short explanation on behalf of its advocates as to why it qualifies as a theory of time travel (as opposed to mere 'universe hopping'). Then I argue that the thesis nevertheless has an unwelcome consequence: that extended objects cannot travel in time. Whilst this does not demonstrate that the Multiverse Thesis i…Read more
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185Metaphysics: The Key ConceptsRoutledge. 2010._‘Informative, accessible, and fun to read— this is an excellent reference guide for undergraduates and anyone wanting an introduction to the fundamental issues of metaphysics. I know of no other resource like it.’– __Meghan Griffith, Davidson College, USA_ _'Marvellous! This book provides the very best place to start for students wanting to take the first step into understanding metaphysics.Undergraduates would do well to buy it and consult it regularly. The quality and clarity of the material …Read more
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175Using Wormholes to Solve the Problem of EvilTheologica 5 (1): 100-125. 2021.The Multiverse Response to the problem of evil has it that God made our universe because God makes every universe meeting a certain standard. The main problem for that response is that there’s no explanation for why God didn’t just keeping making duplicates of perfect universes. This paper introduces the ‘Multiactualities Response’, which says that God actualises every possible world that meets a certain standard of value. It avoids the corresponding problem about duplication because different p…Read more
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170This paper argues that, if we believe both in works of music and sets, that the former are the latter. My argument is that such an ontology offers more explanatory power than the alternatives when it comes to explaining why works of music fall under the predicates that they do
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169Universalism, vagueness and supersubstantivalismAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1). 2009.Sider has a favourable view of supersubstantivalism (the thesis that all material objects are identical to the regions of spacetime that they occupy). This paper argues that given supersubstantivalism, Sider's argument from vagueness for (mereological) universalism fails. I present Sider's vagueness argument (§§II-III), and explain why - given supersubstantivalism - some but not all regions must be concrete in order for the argument to work (§IV). Given this restriction on what regions can be co…Read more
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125Temporal Parts and Time TravelErkenntnis 74 (2): 225-240. 2011.This paper argues that, in light of certain scenarios involving time travel, Sider’s definition of ‘instantaneous temporal part’ cannot be accepted in conjunction with a semantic thesis that perdurantists often assume. I examine a rejoinder from Sider, as well as Thomson’s alternative definition of ‘instantaneous temporal part’, and show how neither helps. Given this, we should give up on the perdurantist semantic thesis. I end by recommending that, once we no longer accept such semantics, we sh…Read more
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122Undermining Motivations for UniversalismNoûs 45 (4): 696-713. 2011.Universalism (the thesis that for any ys, those ys compose a further object) is an answer to the Special Composition Question. In the literature there are three arguments – what I call the arguments from elegance – that universalists often rely upon, but which are rarely examined in-depth. I argue that these motivations cannot be had by the perdurantist, for to avoid a commitment to badly behaved superluminal objects perdurantists must answer the ‘Proper Continuant Question’. Any answer to that …Read more
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111Impure Sets May Be Located: A Reply to CookThought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (4): 330-336. 2012.Cook argues that impure sets are not located. But ‘location’ is an ambiguous word and when we resolve those ambiguities it turns out that on no resolution is Cook's argument compelling
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111Talking about Something (But Really Talking about Nothing) (review)Analysis 72 (2): 329-340. 2012.
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98An Introduction to OntologyPolity. 2013.In this engaging and wide-ranging new book, Nikk Effingham provides an introduction to contemporary ontology - the study of what exists - and its importance for philosophy today. He covers the key topics in the field, from the ontology of holes, numbers and possible worlds, to space, time and the ontology of material objects - for instance, whether there are composite objects such as tables, chairs or even you and me. While starting from the basics, every chapter is up-to-date with the most rece…Read more
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97Mereological Explanation and Time TravelAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2): 333-345. 2010.I have previously argued in a paper with Robson that a particular time travel scenario favours perdurantism over endurantism on the grounds that endurantists must give up on the Weak Supplementation Principle. Smith has responded, arguing that the reasons we provided are insufficient to warrant this conclusion. This paper agrees with that conclusion (for slightly different reasons: that even the perdurantist has to give up on the Weak Supplementation Principle) but argues that the old argument c…Read more
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70Harmoniously Investigating Concrete StructuresThought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (3): 190-195. 2013.Traynor identifies a tension between armchair reasoning telling us about the mereological structure of objects and empirical investigation telling us about the structure of spacetime. Section 1 explains, and bolsters, that tension. Section 2 discusses Traynor's resolution, and suggests some possible problems with it, whilst Section 3 discusses an alternative
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69Universalism and ClassesDialectica 65 (3): 451-472. 2011.Universalism (the thesis that distinct objects always compose a further object) has come under much scrutiny in recent years. What has been largely ignored is its role in the metaphysics of classes. Not only does universalism provide ways to deal with classes in a metaphysically pleasing fashion, its success on these grounds has been offered as a motivation for believing it. This paper argues that such treatments of classes can be achieved without universalism, examining theories from Goodman an…Read more
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66The Metaphysical Possibility of Time Travel FictionsErkenntnis 88 (3): 1309-1329. 2021.In some stories, time travellers cannot change the past. It is widely accepted that this is metaphysically possible. In some stories, time travellers can change the past. Many philosophers have explained how that, too, is metaphysically possible. This paper considers narratives where sometimes the past can change and sometimes it cannot, arguing that this is also something that is possible. Further, I argue that we can make sense of stories where some events appear to be ‘fixed points in time’.
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65Multiple Location and Christian Philosophical TheologyFaith and Philosophy 32 (1): 25-44. 2015.This paper discusses how the possibility of multi-located entities can resolve problems both with the Trinity and with the existence of souls.
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63Time Travel: Probability and ImpossibilityOxford University Press. 2020.Time travel is metaphysically possible. Nikk Effingham contends that arguments for the impossibility of time travel are not sound. Focusing mainly on the Grandfather Paradox, Effingham explores the ramifications of taking this view, discusses issues in probability and decision theory, and considers the potential dangers of travelling in time.
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62Slot Theory and Slotite TheoryPhilosophia 49 (1): 17-35. 2020.‘Instantiation-directed slot theorists’ believe that properties/relations have slots which are filled by their instances/relata e.g., where Abigail is taller than Bronia, there are two slots in the relation Taller Than such that Abigail fills the first slot and Bronia fills the second. This crude statement of the theory runs into ‘The Problem of Filling’, whereby a natural understanding of the relation between slots, filling, and instantiation leads to absurd results. This paper examines a varie…Read more
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62Can we break bread with conspiracy theorists?Philosophical Psychology 36 (5): 1030-1033. 2023.Some years ago, I was invited by Flat Earthers – well, ‘globe skeptics’—to give a fifteen-minute presentation on why the Earth is round. There were constant interruptions from the audience; point-a...
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48Exterminous HypertimePhilosophies 6 (4): 85. 2021.This paper investigates ‘exterminous hypertime’, a model of time travel in which time travellers can change the past in virtue of there being two dimensions of time. This paper has three parts. Part one discusses the laws which might govern the connection between different ‘hypertimes’, showing that there are no problems with overdetermination. Part two examines a set of laws that mean changes to history take a period of hypertime to propagate through to the present. Those laws are of interest b…Read more
Areas of Specialization
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Philosophy of Religion |
Metaphysics |
Metaontology |
Modality |
Objects |
Ontology |
Properties |
Time |
Areas of Interest
2 more
Philosophy of Religion |
Metaontology |
Modality |
Objects |
Ontology |
Properties |
Time |