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Location and propertiesIn A. R. J. Fisher & Anna-Sofia Maurin (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Properties, Routledge. 2024.
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24Would God Really Send Me to Hell for Stealing a Wispa Bar?Sophia 63 (1): 85-97. 2024.This paper discusses the problem of Hell, defending the Aquinas-Anselm-Edwards response that any immoral act deserves eternal punishment because it offends against God. I argue that the response is more defensible than one might at first think, but nevertheless faces a serious objection. If we differentiate two different problems of Hell—the logical problem and the evidential problem—we see that, in light of this objection, the Aquinas-Anselm-Edwards response only solves the logical problem of H…Read more
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36The Close Possibility of Time TravelPhilosophies 8 (6): 118. 2023.This article discusses the possibility of some outlandish tropes from time travel fiction, such as people reversing in age as they time travel or the universe being destroyed because a time traveler kills their ancestor. First, I discuss what type of possibility we might have in mind, detailing ‘close possibility’ as one such candidate. Secondly, I argue that—with only little exception—these more outlandish tropes fail to be closely possible. Thirdly, I discuss whether these outlandish tropes ma…Read more
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203Using Wormholes to Solve the Problem of EvilTheologica 5 (1): 100-125. 2021.The Multiverse Response to the problem of evil has it that God made our universe because God makes every universe meeting a certain standard. The main problem for that response is that there’s no explanation for why God didn’t just keeping making duplicates of perfect universes. This paper introduces the ‘Multiactualities Response’, which says that God actualises every possible world that meets a certain standard of value. It avoids the corresponding problem about duplication because different p…Read more
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33The Wave Theory of Time: A Comparison to Competing Tensed TheoriesJournal of the American Philosophical Association 9 (1): 172-192. 2023.This paper introduces a new theory in temporal ontology, ‘wave theory’, and argues for its attractions over and above existing tensed theories of time.
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66Can we break bread with conspiracy theorists?Philosophical Psychology 36 (5): 1030-1033. 2023.Some years ago, I was invited by Flat Earthers – well, ‘globe skeptics’—to give a fifteen-minute presentation on why the Earth is round. There were constant interruptions from the audience; point-a...
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28In Favour of Mereological Nominalism: reply to Cumpa and DeclosPhilosophia 50 (4): 1707-1719. 2022.Mereological nominalism is the thesis that properties are identical to mereological fusions of their instances. Cumpa and Declos have raised two problems for the view. This paper is a reply to both problems.
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31Celebrities discuss philosophy episode 4: A transcriptThink 21 (61): 57-72. 2022.If a lump of clay is shaped into a statue, is there one thing or are there two? That is: are the lump and the statue two distinct things? This dialogue introduces some reasons to think they are two different things and then discusses the issues involved.
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44Fission theories of Original GuiltInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion 92 (1): 15-30. 2022.One reading of the Doctrine of Original Sin has it that we are guilty of a sin committed by Adam, thousands of years ago. Fission theorists account for this by saying that Adam fissioned after he sinned and that each of us is one of his ‘fission successors’. This paper recaps the current discussion in the literature about this theory, arguing that the proposed version does not work for reasons already raised by Rea and Hudson. I then introduce a new version of fission theory that avoids the Rea-…Read more
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51Exterminous HypertimePhilosophies 6 (4): 85. 2021.This paper investigates ‘exterminous hypertime’, a model of time travel in which time travellers can change the past in virtue of there being two dimensions of time. This paper has three parts. Part one discusses the laws which might govern the connection between different ‘hypertimes’, showing that there are no problems with overdetermination. Part two examines a set of laws that mean changes to history take a period of hypertime to propagate through to the present. Those laws are of interest b…Read more
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71The Metaphysical Possibility of Time Travel FictionsErkenntnis 88 (3): 1309-1329. 2021.In some stories, time travellers cannot change the past. It is widely accepted that this is metaphysically possible. In some stories, time travellers can change the past. Many philosophers have explained how that, too, is metaphysically possible. This paper considers narratives where sometimes the past can change and sometimes it cannot, arguing that this is also something that is possible. Further, I argue that we can make sense of stories where some events appear to be ‘fixed points in time’.
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57Vacillating time: a metaphysics for time travel and GeachianismSynthese 199 (3-4): 7159-7180. 2021.‘Past vacillators’ believe that what was once the case may change over time. This has obvious applications to the possibility of changing the past via time travel. ‘Future vacillators’ believe that some things will happen and yet, later, will not. Further to issues in time travel, future vacillation has applications when it comes to ‘Geachian’ views about the open future. This paper argues that if you deny that the ‘earlier than’ and ‘later than’ relations are converses of one another then you c…Read more
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28What Truth Is by Mark Jago (review)Philosophical Review 129 (4): 661-664. 2020.Book review of 'What is Truth' by Mark Jago
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74Slot Theory and Slotite TheoryPhilosophia 49 (1): 17-35. 2020.‘Instantiation-directed slot theorists’ believe that properties/relations have slots which are filled by their instances/relata e.g., where Abigail is taller than Bronia, there are two slots in the relation Taller Than such that Abigail fills the first slot and Bronia fills the second. This crude statement of the theory runs into ‘The Problem of Filling’, whereby a natural understanding of the relation between slots, filling, and instantiation leads to absurd results. This paper examines a varie…Read more
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70Time Travel: Probability and ImpossibilityOxford University Press. 2020.Time travel is metaphysically possible. Nikk Effingham contends that arguments for the impossibility of time travel are not sound. Focusing mainly on the Grandfather Paradox, Effingham explores the ramifications of taking this view, discusses issues in probability and decision theory, and considers the potential dangers of travelling in time.
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202Mereological NominalismPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (1): 160-185. 2018.Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
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15Endurantism and timeless worldsAnalysis 67 (2): 140-147. 2007.A discussion of Ted Sider's argument for perdurantism on the grounds of the possibility of timeless worlds.
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175Universalism, vagueness and supersubstantivalismAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1). 2009.Sider has a favourable view of supersubstantivalism (the thesis that all material objects are identical to the regions of spacetime that they occupy). This paper argues that given supersubstantivalism, Sider's argument from vagueness for (mereological) universalism fails. I present Sider's vagueness argument (§§II-III), and explain why - given supersubstantivalism - some but not all regions must be concrete in order for the argument to work (§IV). Given this restriction on what regions can be co…Read more
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72Universalism and ClassesDialectica 65 (3): 451-472. 2011.Universalism (the thesis that distinct objects always compose a further object) has come under much scrutiny in recent years. What has been largely ignored is its role in the metaphysics of classes. Not only does universalism provide ways to deal with classes in a metaphysically pleasing fashion, its success on these grounds has been offered as a motivation for believing it. This paper argues that such treatments of classes can be achieved without universalism, examining theories from Goodman an…Read more
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209The Location of PropertiesNoûs 49 (4): 846-866. 2015.This paper argues that, assuming properties exist and must be located in spacetime, the prevailing view that they are exactly located where their instances are is false. Instead a property is singularly located at just one region, namely the union of its instance's locations. This bears not just on issues in the metaphysics of properties, but also on the debate over whether multi-location is conceivable and/or possible
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130Undermining Motivations for UniversalismNoûs 45 (4): 696-713. 2011.Universalism (the thesis that for any ys, those ys compose a further object) is an answer to the Special Composition Question. In the literature there are three arguments – what I call the arguments from elegance – that universalists often rely upon, but which are rarely examined in-depth. I argue that these motivations cannot be had by the perdurantist, for to avoid a commitment to badly behaved superluminal objects perdurantists must answer the ‘Proper Continuant Question’. Any answer to that …Read more
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328The metaphysics of groupsPhilosophical Studies 149 (2): 251-267. 2010.If you are a realist about groups there are three main theories of what to identify groups with. I offer reasons for thinking that two of those theories fail to meet important desiderata. The third option is to identify groups with sets, which meets all of the desiderata if only we take care over which sets they are identified with. I then canvass some possible objections to that third theory, and explain how to avoid them
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127Temporal Parts and Time TravelErkenntnis 74 (2): 225-240. 2011.This paper argues that, in light of certain scenarios involving time travel, Sider’s definition of ‘instantaneous temporal part’ cannot be accepted in conjunction with a semantic thesis that perdurantists often assume. I examine a rejoinder from Sider, as well as Thomson’s alternative definition of ‘instantaneous temporal part’, and show how neither helps. Given this, we should give up on the perdurantist semantic thesis. I end by recommending that, once we no longer accept such semantics, we sh…Read more
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394Composition, Persistence, and IdentityIn Robin Le Poidevin, Simons Peter, McGonigal Andrew & Ross P. Cameron (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics, Routledge. pp. 296. 2009.An introduction to composition, persistence, and identity.
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238Persistence, composition, and identityIn Robin Le Poidevin, Simons Peter, McGonigal Andrew & Ross P. Cameron (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics, Routledge. 2009.An introduction to persistence, composition, and identity.
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244Sider, Hawley, Sider and the Vagueness ArgumentPhilosophical Studies 154 (2). 2011.The Vagueness Argument for universalism only works if you think there is a good reason not to endorse nihilism. Sider's argument from the possibility of gunk is one of the more popular reasons. Further, Hawley has given an argument for the necessity of everything being either gunky or composed of mereological simples. I argue that Hawley's argument rests on the same premise as Sider's argument for the possibility of gunk. Further, I argue that that premise can be used to demonstrate the possibil…Read more
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37Metaphysics: The Key ConceptsRoutledge. 2010._‘Informative, accessible, and fun to read— this is an excellent reference guide for undergraduates and anyone wanting an introduction to the fundamental issues of metaphysics. I know of no other resource like it.’– __Meghan Griffith, Davidson College, USA_ _'Marvellous! This book provides the very best place to start for students wanting to take the first step into understanding metaphysics.Undergraduates would do well to buy it and consult it regularly. The quality and clarity of the material …Read more
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112Talking about Something (But Really Talking about Nothing) (review)Analysis 72 (2): 329-340. 2012.
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68Multiple Location and Christian Philosophical TheologyFaith and Philosophy 32 (1): 25-44. 2015.This paper discusses how the possibility of multi-located entities can resolve problems both with the Trinity and with the existence of souls.
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115Impure Sets May Be Located: A Reply to CookThought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (4): 330-336. 2012.Cook argues that impure sets are not located. But ‘location’ is an ambiguous word and when we resolve those ambiguities it turns out that on no resolution is Cook's argument compelling
Areas of Specialization
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Philosophy of Religion |
Metaphysics |
Metaontology |
Modality |
Objects |
Ontology |
Properties |
Time |
Areas of Interest
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Philosophy of Religion |
Metaontology |
Modality |
Objects |
Ontology |
Properties |
Time |