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1Foundationalism and coherentism in moral epistemologyIn Aaron Zimmerman, Karen Jones & Mark Timmons (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology, Routledge. 2018.
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15Practical Reasoning, by Robert Audi (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4): 998-1001. 1992.
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77Conditionalism, intrinsicalism, and pleasure in the badPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 107 (3): 692-705. 2023.Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
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1Foundationalism and coherentism in moral epistemologyIn Aaron Zimmerman, Karen Jones & Mark Timmons (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology, Routledge. 2018.
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27Seemings and the Response to Radical SkepticismInternational Journal for the Study of Skepticism 13 (2): 105-119. 2022.I begin by making some brief remarks about commonsense particularism. Commonsense particularists hold that we know pretty much what we think we know and hold that some of these beliefs are more reasonable than competing skeptical principles. However, commonsense philosophers often differ about what justifies these particular beliefs. Michael Bergmann holds that that our commonsense epistemic beliefs depend for their justification on epistemic intuitions or epistemic seemings. After a brief descr…Read more
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69Defeat, pluralism, and indispensable goodsPhilosophical Studies 179 (10): 3039-3053. 2022.Is Moore’s principle of organic unities true? Does it matter whether it is? I argue that it is true and important. I defend the principle of organic unites and the view that intrinsic value can be defeated by presenting examples of the defeat of intrinsic value. I next respond to two objections. The first claims the examples fail since the allegedly defeated parts lack actual intrinsic value—they are “evaluatively inadequate”. The second is that the principle of organic unities lacks “theoretica…Read more
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97What Is Basic Intrinsic Value?Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (1): 33-43. 2021.The concept of basic intrinsic value is important for axiology. Michael Zimmerman and Timothy Perrine each present necessary and sufficient conditions for something’s having basic intrinsic value. I argue that neither account is satisfactory. I present two objections to Zimmerman’s view. First, I argue that his view cannot accommodate some widely held and plausible views about the intrinsic value of knowledge and true belief. Second, I argue that it cannot accommodate some plausible views about …Read more
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25Value … and What Follows (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2): 492-495. 2001.Joel Kupperman’s Value…And What Follows ranges widely over topics in value theory, moral epistemology, normative ethics and political philosophy. Given its breadth, and the generally high quality of the discussion, Kupperman’s work should interest philosophers working in one or more of these areas. The book is divided into three parts, entitled “Axiology”, “Axiology and Conduct”, and “Axiology and Social Choice”. The first part on axiology receives the most attention and consists of five chapter…Read more
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Organic Unities, Summation, and the Problem of EvilOxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 9 165-182. 2019.
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13Promising, Intending, and Moral AutonomyPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (4): 685-688. 1987.
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6Rational Desire and the Good - Value and the Good LifeThomas L. Carson Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2000, xi + 328 pages; cloth $45, paper $22.95 (review)Business Ethics Quarterly 14 (2): 329-336. 2004.
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15Love, Beneficence, and the Hedonic ConstraintAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 53 (3): 259-268. 2016.In this paper, I present briefly a view about intrinsic value, one connected to the concepts of ethically required attitudes of favor, disfavor, and preference. If lives can have both welfare value and intrinsic value, how are these values related? I defend the view that the welfare value of a life does not track the intrinsic value of that life. Some philosophers, however, deny that anything can have intrinsic value or absolute value. Some argue that to hold that something is both bad for a per…Read more
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26Feldman , Fred . What Is This Thing Called Happiness? Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. Pp. xv+286. $45.00 (cloth)Ethics 121 (3): 657-661. 2011.
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15Intrinsic Value: Concept and WarrantPhilosophical and Phenomenological Research 59 (3): 829-832. 1994.
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96Intrinsic Value: Concept and WarrantCambridge University Press. 1994.This book addresses some basic questions about intrinsic value: What is it? What has it? What justifies our beliefs about it? In the first six chapters the author defends the existence of a plurality of intrinsic goods, the thesis of organic unities, the view that some goods are 'higher' than others, and the view that intrinsic value can be explicated in terms of 'fitting' emotional attitudes. The final three chapters explore the justification of our beliefs about intrinsic value, including cohe…Read more
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Egoism and the Concept of One's Own GoodDissertation, Brown University. 1983.There are two main tasks which I undertake in this thesis. First, I consider critically certain concepts of one's own good and the relation of these concepts to egoism. I distinguish between subjective and objective views of one's own good and argue that no subjective account, such as that offered by R. B. Brandt, is satisfactory. I attempt to provide an objective account of one's own good which is compatible with Moore's criticisms of the concept of "good for me". Unfortunately, the objective a…Read more
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54The Bearers of Intrinsic ValueIn Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Recent work on intrinsic value, Springer. pp. 181--190. 2005.
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11The Concept of Intrinsic ValueIn Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Recent work on intrinsic value, Springer. pp. 17--31. 2005.
Areas of Specialization
Value Theory |
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Value Theory |