•  15
    Comments on Talking to Our Selves by John Doris
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3): 753-757. 2018.
  •  8
    Comments on Emotions, Values, and Agency by Christine Tappolet
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2): 520-524. 2018.
  •  28
    Why Epistemic Partiality is Overrated
    Philosophical Topics 46 (1): 37-51. 2018.
    Epistemic partialism is the view that friends have a doxastic duty to overestimate each other. If one holds that there are no practical reasons for belief, we will argue, one has to deny the existence of any epistemic duties, and thus reject epistemic partialism. But if it is false that one has a doxastic duty to overestimate one’s friends, why does it so often seem true? We argue that there is a robust causal relationship between friendship and overestimation that can be mistaken for a constitu…Read more
  •  151
    I—On Benevolence
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 92 (1): 207-223. 2018.
    It is widely agreed that benevolence is not the whole of the moral life, but it is not as widely appreciated that benevolence is an irreducible part of that life. This paper argues that Kantian efforts to characterize benevolence, or something like it, in terms of reverence for rational agency fall short. Such reverence, while credibly an important part of the moral life, is no more the whole of it than benevolence.
  •  7
    Moral Psychology's Drinking Problem
    In Iskra Fileva (ed.), Questions of Character, Oxford University Press Usa. 2016.
    Sometimes when a person acts while drunk we see her actions as not reflective of her character ("oh, she was just drunk"). At other times we see her actions as reflective of her "deep self" ("in vino veritas"). What is the difference between the two types of cases? This paper sketches a possible answer.
  •  14
    Review: Comments on "Lack of Character" by John Doris (review)
    with John Doris
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3): 643-647. 2005.
  •  33
    Unprincipled virtue: an inquiry into moral agency
    Oxford University Press. 2003.
    Nomy Arpaly rejects the model of rationality used by most ethicists and action theorists. Both observation and psychology indicate that people act rationally without deliberation, and act irrationally with deliberation. By questioning the notion that our own minds are comprehensible to us--and therefore questioning much of the current work of action theorists and ethicists--Arpaly attempts to develop a more realistic conception of moral agency.
  •  13
    Unprincipled virtue—synopsis
    Philosophical Studies 134 (3): 429-431. 2007.
  •  81
    Moral Worth
    Journal of Philosophy 99 (5): 223. 2002.
    I argue that a right action has moral worth if and only if it is done for the right reasons - that is, for its right-making features. The reasons the agent acts on have to be identical to the reasons for which the action is right. I argue that Kantians are wrong in thinking that a right action has moral worth iff it is done because the agent thinks it is right, giving examples of morally worthy actions that are done by agents who think they are wrong (Huckleberry Finn) and right actions done "…Read more
  •  11
    Which autonomy
    In and D. Shier M. O'Rourke J. K. Campbell (ed.), Freedom and Determinism, Mit Press. pp. 173--188. 2004.
  •  1
    Huckleberry FInn Revisited: Inverse Akrasia and Moral Ignorance"
    In Michael Mckenna Randolph Clarcke & Smith Angela M. (eds.), The Nature of Moral Responsibility, Oxford University Press. pp. 141-156. 2015.
    This paper argue that moral ignorance does not excuse. Nobody is off the hook for doing something bad simply because she did it believing ii to be right. The paper uses the Arpaly view that cases of Akrasia can be praiseworthy as one premise in the argument.
  •  3
    Moral Worth and Normative Ethics
    Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 5. 2015.
    According to Arpaly and to Markovits, actions have moral worth iff they are done for the reasons that make them right. Can this view have implications for normative ethics? I argue that it has such implications, as you can start from truths about the moral worth of actions to truths about the reasons that make them right. What makes actions right is the question of normative ethics. I argue from the moral worth view to a pluralistic view of ethics - not Kantianism or utilitarianism but an accoun…Read more