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27Acknowledgement of external reviewers for 2002Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (95): 151-152. 2003.
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20Reverent Awe and the Field of ConsciousnessHuman Studies 45 (3): 397-416. 2022.This article extends Aron Gurwitsch’s ( 1964 ) central insight about the field of consciousness—that it is always organized in a theme, thematic field, margin pattern—to the human capacity for reverence. It offers an original phenomenology of reverent awe, inspired by Gurwitsch’s work, as an articulation of reverential index and reverential attitude. According to Paul Woodruff ( 2014 ) in Reverence: Renewing a Forgotten Virtue, reverence names those times when we become aware of something larger…Read more
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21How Can Sartrean Consciousness be Reverent?Sartre Studies International 25 (2): 18-36. 2019.According to philosopher Paul Woodruff, reverent awe is a feeling of being limited or dwarfed by something larger than the human, usually accompanied by feelings of respect for fellow human beings. Drawing from Jean-Paul Sartre’s early philosophy, this article responds positively to the title question, showing how reverent awe is in bad faith yet is similar to anguish, and unique with respect to both. Especially remarkable in reverent awe is the feeling of connectedness to humankind. In section …Read more
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13On the Origin of Organization in ConsciousnessJournal of the British Society for Phenomenology 23 (1): 53-65. 1992.This article examines the origin of experiential organization, especially whether it is salient or selective. Aron Gurwitsch believes it is salient and William James that it is selective. I argue that Gurwitsch is right, and recount his argument and his critique of James, but I also pose my own critique and critical questions on the issue. Gurwitsch's argument attempts to show that the organization of consciousness is not arbitrary or merely selected in some way by the subject. He claims that wh…Read more
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37The Field of Consciousness and Extended CognitionHuman Studies 41 (1): 21-40. 2018.Extended cognition theorists claim that the definition of cognition can be extended to include not only the brain, but also the body and environment. In a series of works, Mark Rowlands has envisioned a new science of mind that explores the externalism of consciousness and cognition. This paper connects Rowlands’ work with the phenomenology of Aron Gurwitsch. It shows how Gurwitsch’s field of consciousness, in particular his conception of the marginal halo, can provide a distinct, organized way …Read more
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78Bringing Context Into Focus: Parallels i n tHe Psychology of Attention and the Philosophy of ScienceJournal of Phenomenological Psychology 29 (1): 50-91. 1998.In the experimental psychology of attention, the phenomenon of attentional context has been underappreciated, while focal attention has taken center stage. Similar problems of context are found in certain realist arguments in.the philosophy of science. Through the lens of Aron Gurwitsch's phenomenology of attention, this paper discusses and evaluates the ways in which context is or is not brought into focus in experimental psychology and the philosophy of science. It concludes that recent develo…Read more
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147Attentional capture and attentional characterPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4): 539-562. 2008.Attentional character is a way of thinking about what is relevant in a human life, what is meaningful and how it becomes so. This paper introduces the concept of attentional character through a redefinition of attentional capture as achievement. It looks freshly at the attentional capture debate in the current cognitive sciences literature through the lens of Aron Gurwitsch’s gestalt-phenomenology. Attentional character is defined as an initially limited capacity for attending in a given environ…Read more
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59The field of consciousness: James and GurwitschTransactions of the C. S. Peirce Society 28 (4): 833-856. 1992.
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Looking intuit: A phenomenological analysis of intuition and attentionIn R. Davis-Floyd & P. Sven Arvidson (eds.), Intuition: The Inside Story, Routledge. pp. 39-56. 1997.
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34Intuition: The Inside Story : Interdisciplinary Perspectives (edited book)Routledge. 1997.NATURALLY. DEVELOPED. THOUGHT. Figure i these two construcrs to define a sprctrum of modes of thought, ranging ftom analytical (inrensive checking and nattow focus) to intuitive (minimal checking and btoad focus). He develops the ...
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116Restructuring Attentionality and IntentionalityHuman Studies 36 (2): 199-216. 2013.Phenomenology and experimental psychology have been largely interested in the same thing when it comes to attention. By building on the work of Aron Gurwitsch, especially his ideas of attention and restructuration, this paper attempts to articulate common ground in psychology and phenomenology of attention through discussion of a new way to think about multistability in some phenomena. What psychology views as an attentionality-intentionality phenomenon, phenomenology views as an intentionality-…Read more
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215A lexicon of attention: From cognitive science to phenomenology (review)Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (2): 99-132. 2003.This article tries to create a bridge of understanding between cognitive scientists and phenomenologists who work on attention. In light of a phenomenology of attention and current psychological and neuropsychological literature on attention, I translate and interpret into phenomenological terms 20 key cognitive science concepts as examined in the laboratory and used in leading journals. As a preface to the lexicon, I outline a phenomenology of attention, especially as a dynamic three-part struc…Read more
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The Field of Consciousness: James and GurwitschTransactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 28 (4): 833-856. 1992.William James and Aron Gurwitsch form a one-two punch on disclosing the nature of the field of consciousness. James claims that it is comprised of two parts, a focus (the center of our attention) and a margin (everything else). Gurwitsch expands on James' account by noting that the margin itself is comprised of relevant data and irrelevant data. The former he calls "thematic field" and the latter he calls "margin." So Gurwitsch argues for a three-dimensional or three-part field of consciousness,…Read more
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Limits in the Field of ConsciousnessDissertation, Georgetown University. 1990.Aron Gurwitsch claims that the field of consciousness is invariantly organized in a theme, thematic field, margin pattern. However, at least two perceptual presentations, chaos and boundlessness, are not ordered in accordance with this pattern. The question this study poses then is the following: given Gurwitsch's field-theory of experiential organization, what is the structure, status, and function of chaos and boundlessness in the field of consciousness? ;Using Gurwitsch's field-theory organiz…Read more
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232Stability and achievement in Richard Lind's aesthetic theoryJournal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 51 (4): 619-622. 1993.
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45Between Phenomenology and PsychologyJournal of Phenomenological Psychology 45 (2): 146-167. 2014.This essay reflects on what it means to bring together the disciplines of Husserlian philosophy and psychology in light of current thinking about interdisciplinarity. Drawing from Allen Repko’s work on the interdisciplinary research process, aspects highlighted include justifying using an interdisciplinary approach, identifying conflicts between disciplinary insights, creating common ground between concepts, and constructing a more comprehensive understanding. To focus the discussion and provide…Read more
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97Transformations in consciousness: Continuity, the self and marginal consciousnessJournal of Consciousness Studies 7 (3): 3-26. 2000.The term ‘consciousness’ is usually reserved only for the focus of attention. This restriction empties the phenomenology of consciousness of some of its richness. Rather than conceiving of consciousness as one-dimensional, researchers should consider that consciousness has a three-dimensional organization. Conscious presentations are structured in a focus, context and margin pattern. Inclusion of these other dimensions of consciousness as consciousness is important for an adequate relation betwe…Read more
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52Moral attention in encountering you: Gurwitsch and Buber (review)Husserl Studies 19 (1): 71-91. 2003.
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141Toward a phenomenology of attentionHuman Studies 19 (1): 71-84. 1996.There is a considerable amount of research being done on attention by cognitive psychologists. I claim that in the process of measuring and mapping consciousness, these researchers have missed important phenomenological findings. After a synopsis and illustration of the nature of attention as described by Aron Gurwitsch, I critique the assumptions of current psychological research on this topic. Included is discussion of the metaphor of attention as a beam or spotlight, the concept of selective …Read more
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76Experimental evidence for three dimensions of attentionIn Lester Embree (ed.), GurwitschS Relevancy for Cognitive Science, Springer. pp. 151-168. 2004.I extend cognitive science research to phenomenological philosophy to argue that there are three distinct organizational principles coordinate with three dimensions of attention.
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99The Sphere of Attention: Context and MarginSpringer. 2006.For the first time, this book classifies how attention shifts, and argues that self-awareness, reflection, and even morality, are best thought of as dynamic...
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On the origin of organization in consciousnessJournal of the British Society of Phenomenology 23 (1): 53-65. 1992.This article examines the origin of experiential organization, especially whether it is salient or selective. Aron Gurwitsch believes it is salient and William James that it is selective. I argue that Gurwitsch is right, and recount his argument and his critique of James, but I also pose my own critique and critical questions on the issue. Gurwitsch's argument attempts to show that the organization of consciousness is not arbitrary or merely selected in some way by the subject. He claims that wh…Read more
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Areas of Interest
Cognitive Sciences |
Continental Philosophy |