•  33
    Veritism, Values, Epistemic Norms
    Philosophical Topics 45 (1): 181-203. 2017.
    This paper considers Hilary Kornblith’s suggestion that epistemic norms have a practical basis—that their normative force stems from the fact that observing them helps us to achieve our various goals. This view, I’ll argue, provides a plausible account of why epistemic norms and appraisals have a claim on us. But it does not explain, and is not meant to explain, why true belief has the status of fundamental epistemic good. An answer to that question may come from familiar semantico-conceptual an…Read more
  •  4
    Pragmatism and Reid’s “Third Way”
    In Todd Buras & Rebecca Copenhaver (eds.), Thomas Reid on Mind, Knowledge and Value, Oxford University Press. 2015.
    It is uncontroversial that there is a historical connection between Reid and American pragmatism. What is unclear is whether, as has recently been suggested, Reid’s own views—in particular, his epistemological views—contain an important pragmatist element. This chapter agues in the affirmative, but suggests that commentators have mischaracterized the pragmatist character of Reid’s position, including his response to the skeptic: “the primacy of practice” constitutes an essential feature of his e…Read more
  •  7
    First Principles as General, First Principle 7 as Special
    Analytic Philosophy 59 (4): 527-538. 2018.
  • Contextualism in Epistemology
    Dissertation, The University of Arizona. 2000.
    Traditional epistemology is universalistic, in that it proceeds on the assumption that we can fully specify conditions making for the correctness of attributions of knowledge without adverting to 'context'. In Chapter 1 examples are adduced which cast doubt on this assumption, since they seem to show that the very 'contents' of such attributions are 'context-dependent'. But even if some form of 'contextualism' is thereby shown to be correct, if we are to avoid resting content with the foregoing …Read more
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  •  26
    Thomas Reid's theory of perception (review)
    Journal of the History of Philosophy 46 (4). 2008.
    Thanks in no small part to the recognition afforded it by such established figures as William Alston, Keith Lehrer, Alvin Plantinga, and others, Thomas Reid’s philosophy is, at long last, getting the serious attention that it deserves. Ryan Nichols is among the generation of younger scholars who are making Reid’s work a focus of their research, and he has written an excellent book examining Reid’s views on perception.Previous treatments have been either in articles or part of a larger discussion…Read more
  •  26
    Testimony, simulation, and the limits of inductivism
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2). 2000.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  4
    Introduction
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (S1): 1-3. 2011.
  •  24
    Reid's First Principle #7
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (S1): 167-182. 2011.
    By Reid's own account, ‘That the natural faculties, by which we distinguish truth from error, are not fallacious’, has a special place among the First Principles of Contingent Truths. Some have found that claim puzzling, but it is not. Contrary to what's usually assumed, certain FPs preceding FP#7 do not already assert the better part of what FP#7 explicitly states. FP#7 is needed because there is nothing epistemological in the FPs that precede it; and its special place among the FPs is a straig…Read more
  •  84
    Reid and epistemic naturalism
    Philosophical Quarterly 52 (209). 2002.
    Central to the contemporary dispute over 'naturalizing epistemology' is the question of the continuity of epistemology with science, i.e., how far purely descriptive, psychological matters can or should inform the traditional evaluative epistemological enterprise. Thus all parties tend to agree that the distinction between psychology and epistemology corresponds to a firm fact/value distinction. This is something Reid denies with respect to the first principles of common sense: while insisting o…Read more
  •  120
    Rationality disputes – psychology and epistemology
    Philosophy Compass 3 (6): 1153-1176. 2008.
    This paper reviews the largely psychological literature surrounding apparent failures of human rationality (sometimes referred to as 'the Rationality Wars') and locates it with respect to concepts and issues within more traditional epistemological inquiry. The goal is to bridge the gap between these two large and typically disconnected literatures – concerning rationality and the psychology of human reasoning, on the one hand, and epistemological theories of justified or rational belief, on the …Read more
  •  39
    Reidian Evidence
    Journal of Scottish Philosophy 3 (2): 107-121. 2005.
  •  125
    Motivating the relevant alternatives approach
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (2): 259-279. 2006.
    But it’s not the mere fact that the RA theorist needs an account of ‘ruling out’ and ‘relevance’ that has tended to lead people to regard the RA approach with suspicion. In itself, this simply means that the RA theorist has some further work to do; and what theorist doesn’t? No; the principal source of scepticism regarding the ability of the RA theorist to come up with a complete and satisfactory account of knowing stems, rather, from an unhappiness with the specific elaborations of the core RA …Read more
  •  7
    Motivating the Relevant Alternatives Approach
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (2): 259-279. 2006.
    But it’s not the mere fact that the RA theorist needs an account of ‘ruling out’ and ‘relevance’ that has tended to lead people to regard the RA approach with suspicion. In itself, this simply means that the RA theorist has some further work to do; and what theorist doesn’t? No; the principal source of scepticism regarding the ability of the RA theorist to come up with a complete and satisfactory account of knowing stems, rather, from an unhappiness with the specific elaborations of the core RA …Read more
  •  2
    New Essays on Thomas Reid (edited book)
    Routledge. 2015.
    Thomas Reid was a contemporary of both David Hume and Immanuel Kant, and a central figure in the Scottish School of Common Sense. Until recently, his work has been largely neglected, and often misunderstood. Like Kant, Reid cited Hume’s _Treatise_ as the main spur to his own philosophical work. In Reid’s case, this led him to challenge ‘the theory of ideas’, which he saw as the cornerstone of Hume’s theories. For those familiar with Reid’s work, it is clear that its significance extends well bey…Read more
  •  77
    To accept ‘pragmatic encroachment’ is to take the view that whether you are in a position to know is in part a function of practical stakes. This position strikes many as not just unorthodox but extremely implausible. According to Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath (F&M), however, the best account of the prima facie oddity of certain utterances incorporates just such a pragmatist maneuver. In reaching this conclusion, F&M begin with Trent Dougherty and Patrick Rysiew’s (D&R’s) theory as the best o…Read more
  •  17
    Meaning, Communication, and the Mental
    ProtoSociology 34 31-43. 2017.
    Thomas Reid rejected ‘the theory of ideas’ in favor of perceptual direct realism and a fallibilist foundationalism. According to Reid, contact with the common and public extra-mental world is as much a part of our natural psychological and epistemological starting point as whatever special type of relation we have to the contents of our own minds. Like the general perceptual and epistemological views Reid was countering, an individualistic, idea-centered approach to language and communication co…Read more
  •  25
    Judgment and Practice in Reid and Wittgenstein
    European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 9 (2). 2017.
  •  45
    13. Is Knowledge a Non-Composite Mental State?
    Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4 333-343. 2013.
  •  4
    Introduction to New Essays on Reid
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (S1): 1-3. 2011.
  •  18
    Hume and Reid on Common Sense
    Eidos: The Canadian Graduate Journal of Philosophy 10. 1992.
    The first half of this paper is concerned with drawing out the commonalities--and, more importantly, the differences--between the views of Hume and Reid regarding both the nature of common sense and the epistemological status of the basic deliverances thereof. (Thus,the author seeks to expose the falsity of the claim that Hume and Reid "differed more in words than in opinion.) It is then argued that Reid's conception of common sense is to be preferred over Hume's
  •  67
  •  25
    Introduction
    Episteme 1 (3): 163-168. 2005.
  •  15
    Encouragement in Darwin?
    Facta Philosophica 4 (2): 271-286. 2002.