-
14Moral Psychology: Feminist Ethics and Social Theory (edited book)Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 2004.Moral psychology studies the features of cognition, judgement, perception and emotion that make human beings capable of moral action. Perspectives from feminist and race theory immensely enrich moral psychology. Writers who take these perspectives ask questions about mind, feeling, and action in contexts of social difference and unequal power and opportunity. These essays by a distinguished international cast of philosophers explore moral psychology as it connects to social life, scientific stud…Read more
-
10Feeling crazy: self worth and the social character of responsibilityIn Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar (eds.), Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self, Oxford University Press. 2000.
-
1Feminist intuitions and the normative substance of autonomyIn J. Stacey Taylor (ed.), Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and Its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy, Cambridge University Press. pp. 124--142. 2005.
-
17Ordinary ability and free actionCanadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (June): 307-335. 1987.We can understand much, perhaps most, of our thinking and speaking about persons’ powers, capabilities, capacities, skills, and competences to act as employing a particular concept of ability. This concept is so pervasive in discourse about these matters that it is appropriately called the ordinary notion of ability. However, the pervasiveness of this concept does not mean that we clearly comprehend its content or readily distinguish it from the many other senses of ability with which we can be …Read more
-
6Ordinary Ability and Free ActionCanadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (2): 307-335. 1987.We can understand much, perhaps most, of our thinking and speaking about persons’ powers, capabilities, capacities, skills, and competences to act as employing a particular concept of ability. This concept is so pervasive in discourse about these matters that it is appropriately called the ordinary notion of ability. However, the pervasiveness of this concept does not mean that we clearly comprehend its content or readily distinguish it from the many other senses of ability with which we can be …Read more
-
Freedom and Criticism: An Account of Free ActionDissertation, Princeton University. 1984.This essay attempts to develop an account of the abilities which free action involves. I argue that the notion of ability which is especially relevant for the purpose of understanding free action is correctly given a compatibilist interpretation. More importantly, it turns out that persons who act freely have the ability to do otherwise than they do. Acting with the ability to do otherwise is not a distinctive mark of free action, however, since anyone who merely acts intentionally possesses tha…Read more
-
10Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments by R.Jay Wallace (review)Journal of Philosophy 93 (11): 574-578. 1996.
-
13Marilyn Friedman, Autonomy, Gender, Politics. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003 (review)Hypatia 20 (3): 214-217. 2005.
-
61Authority and Voice in Autonomous AgencyIn John Christman & Joel Anderson (eds.), Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism: New Essays, Cambridge University Press. pp. 101-126. 2005.How can any of my actions genuinely be my own? How can they be more than just intentional performances, with whatever investment of my will that involves, but also belong to me in the special way that makes me autonomous in performing them? How, in other words, can any of my actions be my own in such a way that they arise from or manifest my capacities for self-governance? -/- The literature on autonomous agency employs a number of metaphors to characterize the difference between merely intentio…Read more
-
11Symposia on Gender, Race and PhilosophySymposia on Gender, Race, and Philosophy 7 (1): 26-49. 2011.
-
19Feminist Second Thoughts About Free AgencyHypatia 5 (3): 47-64. 1990.This essay suggests that common themes in recent feminist ethical thought can dislodge the guiding assumptions of traditional theories of free agency and thereby foster an account of freedom which might be more fruitful for feminist discussion of moral and political agency. The essay proposes constructing that account around a condition of normative-competence. It argues that this view permits insight into why women's labor of reclaiming and augmenting their agency is both difficult and possible…Read more
-
9Blame, oppression, and diminished moral competenceIn Peggy DesAutels & Margaret Urban Walker (eds.), Moral Psychology: Feminist Ethics and Social Theory, Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 183--200. 2004.
Dayton, Ohio, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Action |
Normative Ethics |
Philosophy of Gender, Race, and Sexuality |