Paula Castelli

This paper aims to draw attention to the connection between two central metaphysical theses of Anne Conway’s philosophy: a) the fact that each creature possesses an individual essence that makes it possible to identify and distinguish it from all others, but that b)unfolds over time according to its own free action. In our view, for Conway, creaturesacquire their individual essences through the choices they make. According to ourinterpretation, the free actions of each creature, together with the laws of divine justice,explain the series of modes of being that each creature displays through time. This series is what constitutes their individual essences, which God knows sub specie aeternitatis but whichare nonetheless generated by each creature in the course of its temporal existence. Keywords: Anne Conway; Essence; Free will; Theodicy.

As a tenacious and rigorous reader of the Cartesian corpus, Merleau-Ponty payed special attention to its ambiguities. On the one hand, the intellectualism of the Cartesian theory of perception (Dioptrique) goes along with a mechanistic physiology (Traité de l’Homme) and also with the substantial dualism of the first Méditations Métaphysiques. On the other, Descartes always insisted on hylomorphism, composition, permixtio and even substantial union. Thereby, the human body becomes endowed with such peculiar properties as its inner binding, indivisibility and a biological self-interest, instilling a certain teleology into a part of extension

As neuroethics continues to grow as an established discipline, it has been charged with not being sufficiently sensitive to the way in which the identification, conceptualization, and management of the ethical issues raised by neuroscience and its applications are shaped by local systems of knowledge and structures. Recently there have been calls for explicit recognition of the role played by local cultural contexts and for the development of cross‐cultural methodologies that can facilitate meaningful cultural engagement. In this article, we attempt to fill this perceived gap by providing a culturally situated analysis of the practice of electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) in Argentina. ECT was introduced as a psychiatric treatment in Argentina in the 1930s but it is largely underutilized. While the use of ECT remains low in several countries, what makes the Argentinian case interesting is that the executive branch of government has taken a stance regarding both the scientific and moral appropriateness of ECT, recommending its prohibition. Here, we begin with a recent controversy over the use of ECT in Argentina and explain the legal recommendation to ban its application. Next, we offer an overview of some of the salient aspect of the international and local discussions on ECT. We argue that the governmental recommendation to ban the procedure should be rethought. While acknowledging the role that contexts and local conditions play in shaping the identification and assessment of the relevant ethical issues, we caution against using contextual and cultural considerations to avoid a necessary ethical debate on controversial issues.

As a tenacious and rigorous reader of the Cartesian corpus, Merleau-Ponty payed special attention to its ambiguities. On the one hand, the intellectualism of the Cartesian theory of perception goes along with a mechanistic physiology and also with the substantial dualism of the first Méditations Métaphysiques. On the other, Descartes always insisted on hylomorphism, composition, permixtio and even substantial union. Thereby, the human body becomes endowed with such peculiar properties as its inner binding, indivisibility and a biological self-interest, instilling a certain teleology into a part of extension

En este trabajo se analizan dos modos paradigmáticos en que en la actualidad se comprende la relación entre las disciplinas que se encuentran implicadas en la tarea de la neuroética, en su carácter de neurociencia de la ética. Particularmente se crítica la forma que toma la interdisciplinariedad en estos dos modelos. En el primer caso se señala que la tarea de reflexión filosófica no da lugar a que la evidencia neurocientífica pueda modificar de modo importante los presupuestos teóricos en que se funda tal reflexión. En el segundo caso, por el contrario, el papel dado al componente empírico, necesario a la neuroética, obtura la reflexión ético-filosófica.

En este trabajo se analizan dos modos paradigmáticos en que en la actualidad se comprende la relación entre las disciplinas que se encuentran implicadas en la tarea de la neuroética, en su carácter de neurociencia de la ética. Particularmente se critica la forma que toma la interdisciplinariedad en estos dos modelos. En el primer caso se señala que la tarea de reflexión filosófica no da lugar a que la evidencia neurocientífica pueda modificar de modo importante los presupuestos teóricos en que se funda tal reflexión. En el segundo caso, por el contrario, el papel dado al componente empírico, necesario a la neuroética, obtura la reflexión ético-filosófica.In this paper, I analyze two paradigmatic contemporary ways of understanding the relation between the disciplines involved in neuroethics. In particular, I criticize the form interdisciplinarity takes in these two models. It is pointed out that, according to one of these, the philosophical reflection does not allow neuroscientific evidence to influence in any significant way the theoretical presupositions of that reflection. According to the second model, on the contrary, the role of the empirical component, essential to neuroethics, rather blocks the ethical and philosophical reflection.