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1How we reason: a view from psychologyThe Reasoner 2 4-5. 2008.Good reasoning can lead to success; bad reasoning can lead to catastrophe. Yet it's not obvious how we reason, and why we make mistakes. This book by one of the pioneers of the field, Philip Johnson-Laird, looks at the mental processes that underlie our reasoning. It provides the most accessible account yet of the science of reasoning
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4Mental Models in Prepositional ReasoningIn Ashwin Ram & Kurt Eiselt (eds.), Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, Erlbaum. pp. 16--15. 1994.
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21The Meaning of ModalityCognitive Science 2 (1): 17-26. 1978.This paper describes a semantics for modal terms such as can and may that is intended to model the mental representation of their meaning. The basic assumption of the theory is that the evaluation of a modal assertion involves an attempted mental construction of a specified alternative to a given situation rather than the separate evaluation of each member of a set of possible alternatives as would be required by a “possible worlds” semantics. The theory leads to the conclusion that, contrary to…Read more
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12Will there be any neat solutions to small problems in cognitive science?Cognitive Science 3 (2): 173-176. 1979.
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23Will There Be Any Neat Solutions to Small Problems in Cognitive Science?Cognitive Science 3 (2): 173-176. 1979.
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56The nature and limits of human understanding (edited book)T & T Clark. 2003.This book is an exploration of human understanding, from the perspectives of psychology, philosophy, biology and theology. The six contributors are among the most internationally eminent in their fields. Though scholarly, the writing is non-technical. No background in psychology, philosophy or theology is presumed. No other interdisciplinary work has undertaken to explore the nature of human understanding. This book is unique, and highly significant for anyone interested in or concerned about th…Read more
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35The Truth of Conditional AssertionsCognitive Science 42 (8): 2502-2533. 2018.Given a basic conditional of the form, If A then C, individuals usually list three cases as possible: A and C, not‐A and not‐C, not‐A and C. This result corroborates the theory of mental models. By contrast, individuals often judge that the conditional is true only in the case of A and C, and that cases of not‐A are irrelevant to its truth or falsity. This result corroborates other theories of conditionals. To resolve the discrepancy, we devised two new tasks: the “collective” truth task, in whi…Read more
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22Strategies in sentential reasoningCognitive Science 26 (4): 425-468. 2002.Four experiments examined the strategies that individuals develop in sentential reasoning. They led to the discovery of five different strategies. According to the theory proposed in the paper, each of the strategies depends on component tactics, which all normal adults possess, and which are based on mental models. Reasoners vary their use of tactics in ways that have no deterministic account. This variation leads different individuals to assemble different strategies, which include the constru…Read more
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29Semantic primitives for emotions: A Reply to Ortony and CloreCognition and Emotion 4 (2): 129-143. 1990.
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48Believability and syllogistic reasoningCognition 31 (2): 117-140. 1989.In this paper we investigate the locus of believability effects in syllogistic reasoning. We identify three points in the reasoning process at which such effects could occur: the initial interpretation of premises, the examination of alternative representations of them (in all of which any valid conclusion must be true), and the “filtering” of putative conclusions. The effect of beliefs at the first of these loci is well established. In this paper we report three experiments that examine whether…Read more
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28Why models rather than rules give a better account of propositional reasoning: A reply to Bonatti and to O'Brien, Braine, and YangPsychological Review 101 (4): 734-739. 1994.
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51The psychological puzzle of SudokuThinking and Reasoning 14 (4): 342-364. 2008.Sudoku puzzles, which are popular worldwide, require individuals to infer the missing digits in a 9 9 array according to the general rule that every digit from 1 to 9 must occur once in each row, in each column, and in each of the 3-by-3 boxes in the array. We present a theory of how individuals solve these puzzles. It postulates that they rely solely on pure deductions, and that they spontaneously acquire various deductive tactics, which differ in their difficulty depending on their “relational…Read more
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45Syllogistic inferenceCognition 16 (1): 1-61. 1984.This paper reviews current psychological theories of syllogistic inference and establishes that despite their various merits they all contain deficiencies as theories of performance. It presents the results of two experiments, one using syllogisms and the other using three-term series problems, designed to elucidate how the arrangement of terms within the premises affects performance. These data are used in the construction of a theory based on the hypothesis that reasoners construct mental mode…Read more
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67The psychological puzzle of sudokuThinking and Reasoning 14 (4). 2008.Sudoku puzzles, which are popular worldwide, require individuals to infer the missing digits in a 9 9 array according to the general rule that every digit from 1 to 9 must occur once in each row, in each column, and in each of the 3-by-3 boxes in the array. We present a theory of how individuals solve these puzzles. It postulates that they rely solely on pure deductions, and that they spontaneously acquire various deductive tactics, which differ in their difficulty depending on their “relation…Read more
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93The processes of inferenceArgument and Computation 4 (1). 2013.(2013). The processes of inference. Argument & Computation: Vol. 4, Formal Models of Reasoning in Cognitive Psychology, pp. 4-20. doi: 10.1080/19462166.2012.674060.
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28Illusions in ReasoningMinds and Machines 27 (1): 11-35. 2017.Some philosophers argue that the principles of human reasoning are impeccable, and that mistakes are no more than momentary lapses in “information processing”. This article makes a case to the contrary. It shows that human reasoners commit systematic fallacies. The theory of mental models predicts these errors. It postulates that individuals construct mental models of the possibilities to which the premises of an inference refer. But, their models usually represent what is true in a possibility,…Read more
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10What happened to the “new paradigm”? Commentary on Knauff and Gazzo Castañeda (2023)Thinking and Reasoning 29 (3): 409-415. 2023.Knauff and Gazzo Castañeda (this issue) critique the "new paradigm" – a framework that replaces logic with probabilities – on the grounds that there existed no "old” paradigm for it to supplant. Their position is supported by the large numbers of theories that theorists developed to explain the Wason selection task, syllogisms, and other tasks. We propose some measures to inhibit such facile theorizing, which threatens the viability of cognitive science. We show that robust results exist contrar…Read more
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9The correspondence and coherence theories of cognitive truthBehavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (1): 108-109. 1978.
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University of New MexicoRegular Faculty
Albuquerque, New Mexico, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |