Pedro Alves

In this paper, I start with the opposition between the Husserlian project of a phenomenology of the experience of time, started in 1905, and the mathematical and physical theory of time as it comes out of Einstein’s special theory of relativity in the same year. Although the contrast between the two approaches is apparent, my aim is to show that the original program of Husserl’s time theory is the constitution of an objective time and a time of the world, starting from the intuitive giveness of time, i.e., from time as it appears. To show this, I stress the structural similarity between Husserl’s original question of time and the problem of a phenomenology of space constitution as it was first developed in the his manuscripts from the nineteenth century, in which we find the threefold question of the origin of our representation of space, of the geometrization of intuitive space, and of the constitution of transcendent world space. Finally, I reconsider some of Husserl’s main theses about the phenomenological constitution of objective time in light of the main results of special relativity time-theory, introducing several corrections to central assumptions that underlie Husserl’s theory of time.

En este documento, debato ampliamente sobre la fenomenología de la intersubjetividad presentada por Husserl y por Sartre, centrándome en los conceptos de empatía y ser-para-otros. Contrariamente a la opinión más común, rechazo la objeción de solipsista dirigida a Husserl y sostengo que es la descripción de Sartre la que da lugar a esa objeción, en la medida en que él describe la conciencia de otro sujeto como una forma de autoconocimiento como un "objeto" (para "otros"). Termino señalando algunas directrices para convertir el análisis de Husserl de la aprehensión de otros sujetos en una fenomenología de la comunicación del más alto nivel

In this article, I start with an analysis of Husserl’s description of the intentional structure of communicative intentions in the Logical Investigations, pointing to some obvious shortcomings of it. Then, I stress some important criticisms of Husserl’s approach, namely by Pfänder, and I endeavor to show that Husserl was very close to a full-fledged theory of communicative intentions in the years around 1910. I then turn to Reinach’s theory of social acts, without deciding whether Reinach’s approach was dependent or not on Husserl’s new views concerning the intentionality of communicative acts. Regarding Reinach’s theory of the Vernehmung, I criticize a widespread trend to construe it as something like a perception, showing that it expresses what I call the “vocative element” of the communicative acts. Then, I point to some complements that Reinach’s description is in need, and I finish with an outline of a phenomenologically oriented concept of communication, based on Husserl’s and Reinach’s insights.

In this paper, I discuss the possible relations between Fritz London’s account of the status of the observer in quantum physics and transcendental phenomenology. Firstly, I discuss Steven French’s interpretation of London’s thesis as a phenomenological account of the status of the observer, along with the objections Otávio Bueno has brought forward. Secondly, refusing in part both French’s and Bueno’s theses for several reasons, I propose another way of reading London’s thesis in the framework of transcendental phenomenology. Namely, I put London’s account of the observer against the backdrop of Husserl’s analyses of the objectifying acts and objectual constitution. Finally, I end this article with some criticisms of what seems to me the ontological indigency of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum physics, to whose “spirit” London also belongs.

In this paper I address some philosophical questions regarding the impact quantum mechanics has in the classical conceptions about reality and knowledge. I stress that onto-gnosiological realism still is an option to the issues regarding the relationship between knowledge and reality. Rejecting some radical aspects of Copenhagen interpretation of quantum formalism, I emphasize the advantages of de Broglie’s realistic and causal model. To finish with, I discuss the limits of the Cartesian concept of matter and the split between matter and mind.

En este artículo, examino algunas características importantes de las teorías de conciencia y autoconciencia de Brentano y Rosenthal. En particular, analizo la distinción entre estados mentales y estados conscientes, y la cuestión relacionada con de determinar si todos los estados mentales pueden convertirse en estados conscientes. Interpreto la teoría de Brentano como una teoría de la mente de un nivel que está de acuerdo con la fusión cartesiana entre los estados mentales y la conciencia. Argumento que los problemas que surgen de la posición de Brentano son, hasta cierto punto, superados por una teoría de orden superior, de modo que la posición de Rosenthal es más precisa. Sin embargo, estoy en desacuerdo con ambos en la interpretación de la consciencia de un estado mental como autoconciencia. Desarrollo los fundamentos de una teoría basada en la primacía del organismo y su mundo vital, y de la experiencia consciente como la forma superior de la vida mental, que tiene, sin embargo, sus raíces en la compleja red de estados mentales que son no estados conscientes.In this paper, I examine some important features of Brentano’s and Rosenthal’s theories of consciousness and self-consciousness. In particular, I discuss the distinction between mental states and conscious states, and the related question of determining whether all mental states can become conscious states. I interpret Brentano’s theory as a one-level theory of mind which is in keeping with the Cartesian conflation between mental states and conscious-ness. I argue that the problems arising from Brentano’s position are to a certain extent surpassed by a higher-order theory, so that Rosenthal’s position is more accurate. Nevertheless, I disagree with both in the construal of the consciousness of a mental state as self-consciousness. I develop then the fundamentals for a theory based on the primacy of the organism and its vital world, and of conscious experience as the higher form of mental life, which has, however, its roots in the complex net of mental states which are not conscious states.

In dieser Arbeit wird die Selbstdarstellung der Phänomenologie als Wissenschaft der Weltkonstituierende transzendentale n Subjektivität, nach einer Erklärung über das, was wir die «Grundfrage» der Phänomenologie nennen, betrachtet. Diese Grundfrage ist die thematisierung des unerklärt Voraussetzung aller philosophischer und wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis: die Vorgegebenheit einer Welt als Horizont für alle aktuelle oder mögliche Forschung. Die phänomenologischen Begriffe von «Reduktion», «Intentionalität» und «transzendentaler Subjektivität» sind dargestellt als Strecken für die Begrenzung des Feldes, in dem die Frage über die Welt nachfolgend bearbeitet und systematisch beantwortet sein könnte.

Berkeley’s general tenet about immaterialism is presented and discussed. I examined apart the several theses that concur to the immaterialist theory. After that, the general argument is presented and discussed. In particular, I stress Berkeley’s assumption that a world without matter and a world with matter would be indistinguishable from the point of view of the content of perceptions, natural science. I stress that this assumption depends on a relative account of circular motion, generating the centrifugal forces, as Newton shows in his bucket experiment. In spite of the efforts by Leibniz and Huygens, such a relative account of rotational motion was never presented. So the thesis about the scientific and perceptual identity between worlds with and without matter remains a simple case of wishful thinking in need for a justification.

Dans un contrepoint polémique au livre de A. Damásio, L'Erreur de Descartes, nous soutenons: que la thèse de l a «séparation» de l’âme et du corps permet, dans les écrits physiologiques de Descartes tels que le Traité de l'Homme, une réduction des fonctions végétative et sensitive aux processus mécaniques et naturels du corps humain; que l'in troduction d'une âme dans le corps se justifie, chez Descartes, par l'impossibilité de rendre raison de la rationalité du comportement humain et de la conscience par les simples mécanismes physiologiques et la seule «disposition des organes». On montre, donc, que Descartes est, d'un côté, un des père s de la moderne approche neurologique qui est à l a base du livre de M. Damásio et, de l'autre, qu'il a vu d'avance une des limites d'une explication exclusivement neurologique de la complexité du comportement humain.

The chapter has two parts. In the first part, I introduce a more fine-grained analysis of evaluative sentences. I distinguish between evaluations proper and directions for action with several degrees of constraint: commands, pieces of advice, suggestions, and so on. I call the latter “ductive-statements.” Thus, I affirm that the realm of morals has two branches: one relative to evaluations, which are is-sentences ranging from the several degrees between good and bad to the indifferent ; the other relative to sentences having a “ductive” force that impose, with different degrees of coercion, a course of action. In the second part of the chapter, I address Searle’s famous argument concerning the derivation of ought-sentences from is-sentences. Relying on my previous distinctions, I argue that Searle’s derivation is flawed in two main points, which I present and discuss at length.

In this paper, I examine some important features of Brentano’s and Rosenthal’s theories of consciousness and self-consciousness. In particular, I discuss the distinction between mental states and conscious states, and the related question of determining whether all mental states can become conscious states. I interpret Brentano’s theory as a one-level theory of mind which is in keeping with the Cartesian conflation between mental states and consciousness. I argue that the problems arising from Brentano’s position are to a certain extent surpassed by a higher-order theory, so that Rosenthal’s position is more accurate. Nevertheless, I disagree with both in the construal of the consciousness of a mental state as self-consciousness. I develop then the fundamentals for a theory based on the primacy of the organism and its vital world, and of conscious experience as the higher form of mental life, which has, however, its roots in the complex net of mental states which are not conscious states.

En partant des derniers paragraphes de la cinquième parti du Discours de la Méthode, on a reconstitué la formulation cartésienne de la perception d’un autre moi. Les critères de l’usage du langage et de la plasticité du comportement ont été analysés à la lumière de l’idée d’une machine universelle et du test de Turing. On conclut de la faiblesse de l’argument cartésien sur l’irréductibilité de la pensée à un dispositif machinal. En tant qu’issue de la difficulté, on propose une révision de la façon cartésienne de caractérisation de la pensée à partir du concept d’expérience, tout en abandonnant le thème d’une perception interne incommunicable et intémoignable.

In this paper, I examine phenomenologically the structure of the normative noema, which I call the “nomothetic noema.” I distinguish the meaning content, its normative characters, which I call “ductive forces”, and its modes of givenness. Next, I introduce the traditional difference between modalities de re and de dicto. I argue that the current tendency, in deontic logic, to treat deontic expressions as operators over sentences induces, at least on the syntactic surface, a de dicto reading. I then discuss some of the theoretical decisions that underlie deontic logic, starting from two basic asymmetries between modal alethic logic and deontic logic. The decisive point is to recover a strong sense of permission that I equate with the factor of free agency, which is difficult to formalize. Finally, I return to the analysis of the nomothetic noema and try to show how a de re reading is better suited to account for normative intentionality. I simultaneously introduce the concept of status-imposing norms, which must be formulated with a normative use of the copulas “is” and “has.” I conclude that the treatment of normative expressions is more appropriate when they are understood as complex copulas, irreducible to assertive sentences, rather than as operators over whole sentences. I emphasize on this occasion that, from a phenomenological point of view and within the framework of genetic analysis, the primitive basic datum is the freedom of agency, on which the normative domain of assigning statuses to agents, obligations, and prohibitions is built.

In dieser Arbeit werden die Thesen S. J. Becks über den kantischen Begriff von Ding-an-sich geprüft. Es sollen weder die zwei Doktrinen verglichen werden, noch die Punkte, in denen sie übereinstimmen, noch die Punkte, in denen sie sich voneinander entfernen. Basis-Voraussetzung ist mehr die Idee, dass es eine kantische Lehre des Ding-an-sich nicht gibt, sondern, dass es vielfältige divergente Tendenzen gibt in der Art, wie Kant das Problem bearbeitet. Die Auffassung Becks wird als ein Dialog mit denjenigen divergenten Tendenzen dargestellt, die in Kants Gedanken koexistieren, und dadurch eine Reflexion, die an die eigene innere Entwicklung der kritischen Philosophie gebunden ist. Die Originalität von Becks Auffassung liegt in seiner Entscheidung eine eng idealistische Interpretation der transzendentale Philosophie zu privilegieren und - infolgedessen - die theoretischen Nichtigkeit des Begriffs des Ding-an-sich zu behaupten, wenn die systematische Darstellung der kritischen Philosophie nach seinem einzigen, voraussichtlichen Prinzip unternommen wird: das Prinzip der ursprünglichen synthetischen Einheit der Apperzeption. Diese Arbeit wird in drei Teile geteilt. Im ersten Teil wird Becks These geprüft, ob in der Kritik des vorliegenden Begriffs des Ding-an-sich eine Bewilligung Kants an dem Dogmatismus liegt, die durch didaktische und pädagogische Gründe determiniert ist. Im zweiten Teil werden die Übe rprüfungen, die von der systematischen Darstellung der kritischen Philosophie bei den Doktrinen der transzendentalen ästhetik, der transzendentalen Analytik und dem Schematismus gemacht werden müssen, gezeigt, so wie die nachfolgenden änderungen vom Sinn der Affektion, Synthese und Subsumption. Letztlich, im dritten Teil wird dargelegt, dass die Entscheidung Becks für den Idealismus mit einigen Punkten von Kants Denken nicht übereinstimmt und deswegen von ihm abgelehnt werden müsste.