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IntroductionIn Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen P. Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents, Oxford University Press Usa. 2005.This introductory chapter reviews some of the debates in philosophy, psychology, anthropology, evolutionary theory, and other cognitive sciences that provide a background for the topics with which this volume is concerned. Topics covered include the history of nativism, the poverty of the stimulus argument, the uniform and structure pattern followed by human cognitive development, evolution biology, and cognitive modularity. An overview of the subsequent chapters is presented.
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The roots of scientific reasoning: Infancy, modularity and the art of trackingIn Peter Carruthers & Jill Boucher (eds.), [Book Chapter], Cambridge University Press. 1998.This chapter examines the extent to which there are continuities between the cognitive processes and epistemic practices engaged in by human hunter-gatherers, on the one hand, and those which are distinctive of science, on the other. It deploys anthropological evidence against any form of 'no-continuity' view, drawing especially on the cognitive skills involved in the art of tracking. It also argues against the 'child-as-scientist' accounts put forward by some developmental psychologists, which …Read more
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Suffering without SubjectivityIn Consciousness: Essays From a Higher-Order Perspective, Oxford University Press Uk. 2005.Takes up the same topic as the previous one – the appropriateness of sympathy for non-human animals – but argues for a similar conclusion in a very different way. The focus of the chapter is on forms of suffering, such as pain, grief, and emotional disappointment. It argues that these phenomena can be made perfectly good sense of in purely first-order terms. And it argues that the primary forms of suffering in the human case are first-order also. So although our pains and disappointments are phe…Read more
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35The editors of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research thank the members of the Editorial Board and the following scholars, who have served as referees during the period of October 2006 through July 2007 (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3). 2007.
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1Theories of theories of mindIn Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind, Cambridge University Press. 1996.
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509The phenomenal concept strategyJournal of Consciousness Studies 14 (9-10): 212-236. 2007.A powerful reply to a range of familiar anti-physicalist arguments has recently been developed. According to this reply, our possession of phenomenal concepts can explain the facts that the anti-physicalist claims can only be explained by a non-reductive account of phenomenal consciousness. Chalmers (2006) argues that the phenomenal concept strategy is doomed to fail. This article presents the phenomenal concept strategy, Chalmers' argument against it, and a defence of the strategy against his
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127Nativism past and presentIn Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen P. Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents, Oxford University Press Usa. pp. 3. 2005.
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166Déjà vu may be illusory gist identificationBehavioral and Brain Sciences 46. 2023.In déjà vu, a novel experience feels strangely familiar. Here we propose that this phenomenology is best seen as consisting in an illusory feeling of identification of the gist of the current scene or event, rather than in the intensity of the fluency-based, metacognitive feeling of familiarity.
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36Subpersonal IntrospectionJournal of Consciousness Studies 30 (9): 75-85. 2023.Kammerer and Frankish (this issue) set up a broad tent, intended to encompass all forms of directly-useable self-awareness. But they omit an entire dimension of possibilities by restricting themselves to person-level self-awareness. Their account needs to be enriched to allow at least for model-free meta-representational signals that are not consciously available, but whose appraisal issues in action-tendencies and/or states of person-level emotion.
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The case for massively modular models of mindIn Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science, Wiley-blackwell. 2006.
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218No doing without timeBehavioral and Brain Sciences 42. 2019.Hoerl & McCormack claim that animals don't represent time. Because this makes a mystery of established findings in comparative psychology, there had better be some important payoff. The main one they mention is that it explains a clash of intuition about the reality of time's passage. But any theory that recognizes the representational requirements of agency can do likewise.
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14Nothing is Hidden: Wittgenstein's Criticism of his Early ThoughtPhilosophical Quarterly 37 (148): 328-331. 1987.
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22Tractarian Semantics.The Metaphysics of the TractatusPhilosophical Quarterly 41 (164): 354. 1991.
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300The Case Against Cognitive PhenomenologyIn Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology, Oxford University Press Uk. pp. 35. 2011.The goal of this chapter is to mount a critique of the claim that cognitive content (that is, the kind of content possessed by our concepts and thoughts) makes a constitutive contribution to the phenomenal properties of our mental lives. We therefore defend the view that phenomenal consciousness is exclusively experiential (or nonconceptual) in character. The main focus of the chapter is on the alleged contribution that concepts make to the phenomenology of visual experience. For we take it that…Read more
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11Review of Peter Carruthers and Jill Boucher: Language and Thought: Interdisciplinary Themes (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (2): 305-308. 1999.
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221Evolution and the possibility of moral realism (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1): 237-244. 2008.A commentary on Richard Joyce's The Evolution of Morality.
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47BAIER, KURT, The Rational and the Moral Order: The Social Roots of Reason and Morality, reviewed by Sarah Stroud.. 577Philosophical Review 106 (4): 589. 1997.
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79The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents (edited book)Oxford University Press USA. 2005.This is the first volume of a projected three-volume set on the subject of innateness. The extent to which the mind is innate is one of the central questions in the human sciences, with important implications for many surrounding debates. By bringing together the top nativist scholars in philosophy, psychology, and allied disciplines these volumes provide a comprehensive assessment of nativist thought and a definitive reference point for future nativist inquiry. The Innate Mind: Structure and Co…Read more
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57The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents (edited book)Oxford University Press on Demand. 2005.This is the first of three volumes on the subject of innateness. The extent to which the mind is innate is one of the central questions in the human sciences, with important implications for many surrounding debates. This book along with the following two volumes provide assess of nativist thought and a definitive reference point for future nativist inquiry. This book is concerned with the fundamental architecture of the mind, addressing such question as: what capacities, processes, representati…Read more
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30The Innate Mind, Volume 2: Culture and Cognition (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2005.This book is the second of a three-volume set on the subject of innateness. The book is highly interdisciplinary, and addresses such question as: to what extent are mature cognitive capacities a reflection of particular cultures and to what extent are they a product of innate elements? How do innate elements interact with culture to achieve mature cognitive capacities? How do minds generate and shape cultures? How are cultures processed by minds?
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13Innate Mind: Volume 2: Culture and Cognition (edited book)Oup Usa. 2005.This book is the second of a three-volume set on the subject of innateness. The book is highly interdisciplinary, and addresses such question as: to what extent are mature cognitive capacities a reflection of particular cultures and to what extent are they a product of innate elements? How do innate elements interact with culture to achieve mature cognitive capacities? How do minds generate and shape cultures? How are cultures processed by minds?
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62Pragmatic development explains the Theory-of-Mind ScaleCognition 158 (C): 165-176. 2017.Henry Wellman and colleagues have provided evidence of a robust developmental progression in theory-of-mind (or as we will say, “mindreading”) abilities, using verbal tasks. Understanding diverse desires is said to be easier than understanding diverse beliefs, which is easier than understanding that lack of perceptual access issues in ignorance, which is easier than understanding false belief, which is easier than understanding that people can hide their true emotions. These findings present a c…Read more
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Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Cognitive Sciences |