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IntroductionIn Peter Goldie & Elisabeth Schellekens (eds.), Philosophy and conceptual art, Oxford University Press. 2007.
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5Who's Afraid of Conceptual Art?Routledge. 2009.What is conceptual art? Is it really a kind of art in its own right? Is it clever – or too clever? Of all the different art forms it is perhaps conceptual art which at once fascinates and infuriates the most. In this much-needed book Peter Goldie and Elisabeth Schellekens demystify conceptual art using the sharp tools of philosophy. They explain how conceptual art is driven by ideas rather than the manipulation of paint and physical materials; how it challenges the very basis of what we can know…Read more
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164Philosophy and conceptual art (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2007.This volume is most probably the first collection of papers by analytic Anglo-American philosophers tackling these concerns head-on.
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5Narratives Denken, Emotion und PlanenIn Sonja Koroliov (ed.), Emotion und Kognition: Transformationen in der europäischen Literatur des 18. Jahrhunderts, De Gruyter. pp. 187-203. 2013.
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27Acknowledgement of external reviewers for 2002Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (95): 151-152. 2003.
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Emotion, reason and virtueIn Dylan Evans & Pierre Cruse (eds.), Emotion, Evolution and Rationality, Oxford University Press. 2004.
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85The Aesthetic Mind: Philosophy and Psychology (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2011.The Aesthetic Mind breaks new ground in bringing together empirical sciences and philosophy to enhance our understanding of aesthetics and the experience of art.
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280Conceptual Art, Social Psychology, And DeceptionPostgraduate Journal of Aesthetics 1 (1): 32-41. 2004.Some works of conceptual art require deception for their appreciation—deception of the viewer of the work. Some experiments in social psychology equally require deception— deception of the participants in the experiment. There are a number of close parallels between the two kinds of deception. And yet, in spite of these parallels, the art world, artists, and philosophers of art, do not seem to be troubled about the deception involved, whereas deception is a constant source of worry for social ps…Read more
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Die Rezeption von Evolutionstheorien im 19. JahrhundertJournal of the History of Biology 32 (1): 225-229. 1999.
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73Narratives and Narrators: A Philosophy of Stories: Book Reviews (review)British Journal of Aesthetics 51 (3): 335-338. 2011.
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53Moral Emotions and Intuitions. By Sabine Roeser. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. Pp. Xvii + 207. Price £55.)Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246): 204-206. 2012.
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271Explaining expressions of emotionMind 109 (433): 25-38. 2000.The question is how to explain expressions of emotion. It is argued that not all expressions of emotion are open to the same sort of explanation. Those expressions which are actions can be explained, like other sorts of action, by reference to a belief and a desire; however, no genuine expression of emotion is done as a means to some further end. Certain expressions of emotion which are actions can also be given a deeper explanation as being expressive of a wish. Expressions of emotion which are…Read more
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32There are reasons and reasonsIn Daniel D. Hutto & Matthew Ratcliffe (eds.), Folk Psychology Re-Assessed, Kluwer/springer Press. pp. 103--114. 2007.
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24ALLAN, DEREK. Art and the Human Adventure: Andre Malreaux's Theory of Art.(Amsterdam: Rodopi). 2009. pp. 342.£ 64.60 (pbk). BARRETT, ESTELLE and BOLT, BARBARA (eds). Practice as Research: Approaches to Creative Arts Enquiry.(London: IB Tauris). 2010. pp. 224.£ 17.99 (pbk) (review)British Journal of Aesthetics 50 (2): 223. 2010.
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170Narrative Thinking, Emotion, and PlanningJournal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 67 (1): 97-106. 2009.
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95Love for a ReasonEmotion Review 2 (1): 61-67. 2010.According to Bob Solomon, love is a human emotion, with a complex intentional structure, having its own kind of reasons. I will examine this account, which, in certain respects, tends to mask the deep and important differences between love and other emotions
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261One's Remembered Past: Narrative Thinking, Emotion, and the External PerspectivePhilosophical Papers 32 (3): 301-319. 2003.Abstract Narrative thinking has a very important role in our ordinary everyday lives?in our thinking about fiction, about the historical past, about how things might have been, and about our own past and our plans for the future. In this paper, which is part of a larger project, I will be focusing on just one kind of narrative thinking: the kind that we sometimes engage in when we think about, evaluate, and respond emotionally to, our own past lives from a perspective that is external to the rem…Read more
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173Imagination and the distorting power of emotionJournal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10): 127-139. 2005._In real life, emotions can distort practical reasoning, typically in ways that it is_ _difficult to realise at the time, or to envisage and plan for in advance. This fea-_ _ture of real life emotional experience raises difficulties for imagining such expe-_ _riences through centrally imagining, or imagining ‘from the inside’. I argue_ _instead for the important psychological role played by another kind of imagin-_ _ing: imagining from an external perspective. This external perspective can draw_…Read more
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1Emotion, personality and simulationIn Understanding Emotions: Mind and Morals, Brookfield: Ashgate. 2002.
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127Dramatic Irony, Narrative, and the External PerspectiveRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 60 69-84. 2007.There is a frequently asked philosophical question about our ability to grasp and to predict the thoughts and feelings of other people, an ability that is these days sometimes given the unfortunate name of ‘mentalising’ or ‘mind-reading’–I say ‘unfortunate’ because it makes appear mysterious what is not mysterious. Some philosophers and psychologists argue that this ability is grounded in possession of some kind of theory or body of knowledge about how minds work. Others argue that it is grounde…Read more
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92Review. Paul E Griffiths. What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories. Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1997 (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (4): 642-648. 1998.
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1118Thick concepts and their role in moral psychologyIn Robyn Langdon & Catriona Mackenzie (eds.), Emotions, Imagination, and Moral Reasoning, Psychology Press. 2012.
Peter Goldie
Manchester
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ManchesterDepartment Of PhilosophySamuel Hall Chair In Philosophy
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Aesthetics |
Meta-Ethics |