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111, two basic forms of philosophical skepticismIn Paul K. Moser (ed.), The Oxford handbook of epistemology, Oxford University Press. pp. 336. 2002.
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14Contemporary Responses to Agrippa's TrilemmaIn John Greco (ed.), The Oxford handbook of skepticism, Oxford University Press. 2008.This article discusses contemporary response to the epistemic regress problem or Agrippa's trilemma. The epistemic regress problem is considered the most crucial in the entire theory of knowledge and it is a major concern for many contemporary epistemologists. However, only two of the three alternative solutions have been developed in any detail, foundationalism and coherentism. Infinitism was not seriously considered as a solution because of the finite-mind objection. This article also provides…Read more
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The Concept of KnowledgeIn Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Genealogy to Iqbal, Routledge. 1998.
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10Austrian Perspectives on Entrepreneurship, Strategy, and OrganizationCambridge University Press. 2019.The 'Austrian' tradition is well-known for its definitive contributions to economics in the twentieth century. However, Austrian economics also offers an exciting research agenda outside the traditional boundaries of economics, especially in the management disciplines. This Element examines how Austrian ideas play a key role in expanding the understanding of fields like entrepreneurship, strategy, and organization. It focuses especially on the vital role that entrepreneurs play in guiding econom…Read more
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18Ad Infinitum: New Essays on Epistemological Infinitism (edited book)Oxford University Press UK. 2014.Infinitism is an ancient view in epistemology about the structure of knowledge and epistemic justification, according to which there are no foundational reasons for belief. The view has never been popular, and is often associated with skepticism, but after languishing for centuries it has recently begun a resurgence. Ad Infinitum presents new work on the topic by leading epistemologists. They shed new light on infinitism's distinctive strengths and weaknesses, and address questions, new and old,…Read more
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3Skepticism: Ascent and Assent?In John Greco (ed.), Ernest Sosa and His Critics, Blackwell. 2004.This chapter contains section titled: Consideration of (T1) Consideration of (T2)
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28When Infinite Regresses Are Not ViciousPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3): 718-729. 2003.I will argue for two main points. First, the regress imbedded in infinitism need not be subject to the Structural Objection; and second, the Structural Objection does not pose a real problem for any regress. I will not be arguing for the correctness of my proposal directly. That is, as will become apparent soon, my proposal rests on two principles of reasoning which together entail infinitism and I will not present my arguments for those principles here. The purpose of this paper is to show that…Read more
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61SkepticismIn Paul K. Moser (ed.), The Oxford handbook of epistemology, Oxford University Press. 2002.In ”Skepticism,” Peter Klein distinguishes between the “Academic Skeptic” who proposes that we cannot have knowledge of a certain set of propositions and the “Pyrrhonian Skeptic” who refrains from opining about whether we can have knowledge. Klein argues that Academic Skepticism is plausibly supported by a “Closure Principle‐style” argument based on the claim that if x entails y and S has justification for x, then S has justification for y. He turns to contextualism to see if it can contribute t…Read more
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515Human knowledge and the infinite progress of reasoningPhilosophical Studies 134 (1). 2007.The purpose of this paper is to explain how infinitism—the view that reasons are endless and non-repeating—solves the epistemic regress problem and to defend that solution against some objections. The first step is to explain what the epistemic regress problem is and, equally important, what it is not. Second, I will discuss the foundationalist and coherentist responses to the regress problem and offer some reasons for thinking that neither response can solve the problem, no matter how they are …Read more
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48Contextualism and the Real Nature of Academic SkepticismPhilosophical Issues 10 (1): 108-116. 2000.
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138The Virtues of InconsistencyThe Monist 68 (1): 105-135. 1985.I "argue" that by knowingly accepting a set of propositions which is logically inconsistent, An epistemic agent need not violate any valid epistemic rule. Those types of logically inconsistent sets which it is permissible to accept are distinguished from those which may not be accepted. The results of the discussion are applied to the lottery paradox set of propositions and the preface paradox set. I also "suggest" that it may be an epistemic virtue to accept some inconsistent sets
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62How to get Certain Knowledge from Fallible JustificationEpisteme 16 (4): 395-412. 2019.“Real knowledge,” as I use the term, is the most highly prized form of true belief sought by an epistemic agent. This paper argues that defeasible infinitism provides a good way to characterize real knowledge and it shows how real knowledge can arise from fallible justification. Then, I argue that there are two ways of interpreting Ernest Sosa's account of real knowledge as belief that is aptly formed and capable of being fully defended. On the one hand, if beliefs are aptly formed only if they …Read more
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Praktische Logik: Traditionen und Tendenzen: Abhandlungen eines Seminars beim 13. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposium Kirchberg am Wechsel 1988 (edited book)Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 1990.
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3Useful False BeliefsIn Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: new essays, Oxford University Press. pp. 25-63. 2008.
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics and Epistemology |