•  6
    The Reason-Giving Force of Requests
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (2): 431-442. 2021.
    How do we change the normative landscape by making requests? It will be argued that by making requests we create reasons for action if and only if certain conditions are met. We are able to create reasons if and only if doing so is valuable for the requester, and if they respect the requestee. Respectful requests have a normative force – it will be argued – because it is of instrumental value to us that we all have the normative power of creating reasons by making requests. The normative power h…Read more
  •  3
    In Defense of the Lenient View
    Philosophia 1-8. forthcoming.
    This paper deals with the wrongness of having sex with someone without her valid consent. There are good reasons to think that deception about deal-breakers invalidate consent to sex and that acting without valid consent wrongs the consenter. Tom Dougherty argues that it is always seriously wrong to deceive another person into sex by deceiving her. We should on his view therefore reject the view that doing so is in certain cases only a minor wrong. It will be argued here that we should accept th…Read more
  •  2
    In Johann S. Ach & Dagmar Bochers (eds.), Handbuch Tierethik: Grundlagen – Kontexte – Perspektiven, J.b. Metzler. pp. 167-172. 2018.
    Mit dem Begriff ›Instrumentalisierung‹ steht eine Praxis im Blick, die dadurch charakterisiert ist, dass andere jeweils als Mittel behandelt werden. Das tun wir, wenn wir uns von einem Taxifahrer zum Bahnhof fahren lassen, wenn wir uns im Supermarkt vom Verkäufer beraten lassen und vom Kollegen einen Aufsatz lesen und kommentieren lassen. Wenn wir andere als Mittel benutzen, dienen sie bestimmten Zwecken, die wir verfolgen. Diese Zwecke müssen nicht notwendigerweise die eigenen sein. Ich kann je…Read more
  •  22
    How permissive consent works
    Ratio 33 (2): 117-124. 2020.
    Ratio, EarlyView.
  •  22
    The Volenti Maxim
    The Journal of Ethics 24 (1): 79-89. 2020.
    This paper discusses the volenti non fit injuria maxim. The volenti maxim states that a person is not wronged by that to which she consents, provided her consent is valid. I will argue, however, that the volenti maxim does not apply to all instances of valid consent. In some cases the consenter is wronged even if his consent is valid. Valid consent can only release others from consent-sensitive duties, not from consent-insensitive duties. If the consentee flouts a consent-insensitive duty the co…Read more
  •  35
    ZusammenfassungEs wurde für die These argumentiert, dass der Begriff der Würde in der Medizinethik nutzlos sei und in den Fällen, in denen er verständlich verwendet wird, nichts anderes meint als den Respekt vor der Autonomie von Personen. In diesem Aufsatz soll gezeigt werden, dass diese These falsch ist. Es wird ein Begriff von Würde vorgestellt, der sich nicht auf den Begriff des Respekts vor der Autonomie von Personen reduzieren lässt. Anhand der Diskussion um ein Sterben in Würde soll auch …Read more
  •  11
    Human dignity and the right to assisted suicide
    with Baumann Holger
    In Sebastian Muders (ed.), Human dignity and assisted death, Oxford University Press. pp. 218-229. 2017.
    If a person competently requests another person to assist her in dying, she thereby exercises her normative power to make the act permissible that belongs to her rights over her own body. Denying a person this normative power means, on the view developed in this chapter, to disrespect her human dignity. We thus argue against views that regard terminating one’s own life as morally impermissible for reasons of human dignity. At the same time, however, we do not think that exercises of a person’s n…Read more
  •  22
    Selbstbestimmter Wille und das Recht auf assistierten Suizid
    Ethik in der Medizin 29 (2): 97-107. 2017.
    ZusammenfassungIm Blick auf ein Recht auf assistierten Suizid ist nicht nur umstritten, ob es ein solches Recht gibt, es ist auch umstritten, worauf ein solches Recht denn ein Recht wäre. Der vorliegende Artikel versucht deutlich zu machen, dass das, worum es in dieser Diskussion um den selbstbestimmten Suizid geht, die Frage ist, was Entscheidungen von Menschen achtungswürdig macht. Der Artikel plädiert für eine Idee von Achtungswürdigkeit, für welche die selbstbestimmte Ausübung von Rechten üb…Read more
  •  10
    Wird die Moral von uns geschaffen?
    In Katharina Neges, Josef Mitterer, Sebastian Kletzl & Christian Kanzian (eds.), Realism - Relativism - Constructivism: Proceedings of the 38th International Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg, De Gruyter. pp. 365-378. 2017.
  •  12
    Kann eine Handlung, in die eingewilligt wurde, moralisch falsch sein?
    Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 70 (4): 477-492. 2016.
  • From the editors
    with Richard Haynes, Frans W. A. Brom, and Jan Elliott
    Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 13 (1-2): 1-5. 2000.
  •  46
    Normative Handlungsgründe
    Analyse & Kritik 21 (1): 25-40. 1999.
    It is a widely held view in moral philosophy that reasons for action are based on desires. This view should be rejected. Reasons for action are never provided by desires. Desires provide us with motives, whereas reasons for action are based on valuable facts which obtain independently of our desires. The recognition of these reasons does not necessarily motivate us. Motives depend on desires, for instance the motive for moral actions on the desire to do the morally right thing
  • Is dignity a useless concept in medical ethics?
    Ethik in der Medizin 24 (4): 297-306. 2012.
  •  49
    Wieso moralische Achtung wichtig ist
    Analyse & Kritik 31 (2): 351-361. 2009.
    Bittner argues in his paper that the idea of a general duty to respect persons is of much less importance than some moral philosophers think. If respect plays a role in our lives it is mainly appriciation respect persons have to merit. Respecting persons as such is, Bittner thinks, not just irrelevant, but also incompatibel with personal relations. Against this it is argued that respect for persons should be seen as the basic moral duty we have towards persons. And in addition, it is argued, tha…Read more
  •  8
    Book Review (review)
    Economics and Philosophy 14 (2): 357-362. 1998.
  • The indispensability of motives: Thoughts on Ernst Fehr and altruism
    with Mark S. Peacock and Michael Schefczyk
    Analyse & Kritik 27 (1): 188-196. 2005.
  •  31
    Sind alle Werte vergleichbar?
    Analyse & Kritik 16 (2): 153-165. 1994.
    Are the values of different options and goods, as cost-benefit analysis assumes, commensurable? Not always. The incommensurability of certain options is based on the fact that preferences are sometimes not rankable, even if the agent is fully informed about the options in question. In addition, even if all values were commensurable they could not be compared in monetary terms. If this is the case, cost-benefit analysis should not be seen as a decision procedure
  •  1
    Moralischer Realismus
    Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 60 (4): 778-779. 1998.
  •  70
    Human Rights and Human Dignity: A Reply to Doris Schroeder (review)
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (1): 155-161. 2014.
    According to Doris Schroeder, the view that human rights derive from human dignity should be rejected. She thinks that this is the case for three different reasons: the first has to do with the fact that the dominant concept of dignity is based on religious beliefs which will do no justificatory work in a secular society; the second is that the dominant secular view of dignity, which is the Kantian view, does not provide us with a justification of human rights, i.e. rights all humans have; and t…Read more
  • Der Wert von Autonomie
    Studia Philosophica 49 (n/a): 39-48. 1990.
  •  86
    Value pluralism: Some problems (review)
    Journal of Value Inquiry 33 (1): 71-78. 1999.
  • Èokologie Aus Philosophischer Sicht
    with Thomas Kesselring, Ortwin Renn, and Humboldt-Studienzentrum Ulm)
    . 1994.
  •  6
    No Title available: Reviews
    Economics and Philosophy 14 (2): 357-362. 1998.
  •  30
    The paper deals with the question of whether poverty as such violates the dignity of persons. It is argued that it does. This is, it is argued, not due to a lack of basic goods, nor to the fact that poverty prevents persons from enjoying the rights they have, particularly the right to bodily integrity. Poverty does violate dignity, so it is argued, insofar as poor people are dependent on others in a degrading way
  • Analytische Moralphilosophie
    Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 189 (3): 423-423. 1999.